Abstract
Since the function of causation is to recount and explain observed phenomena in order to make a judgment on civil liability, promoting a purely legal conception of causation appears to be problematic. The purpose of this contribution is to show that the various theories of causation found in legal thinking are, in many respects, the extension of philosophical developments. Therefore, two points will be made. The first part of this paper will present the three main theories that are discussed by contemporary philosophers. The second part will show how philosophical accounts are present in legal thinking. This part will deal with three major legal theories: the theories based on the counterfactual approach of causation, the theories based on the covering law model and the probabilistic account of causation in the law.
Recommended Citation
Florence G'sell,
Causation, Counterfactuals and Probabilities in Philosophy and Legal Thinking,
91
Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
503
(2016).
Available at:
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol91/iss2/5
