Bruce Ledewitz


This article proceeds in five parts. First, I explain why I hope the future of the Establishment Clause lies in the realm of government neutrality. Then I proceed in Part II to critique the basic form of neutrality that much of the legal academy has supported until now as its understanding of the Establishment Clause. The flaw in this form of neutrality is its failure to consider public expressions of meaning as a positive good. In Part III, I describe public expressions of meaning that do not utilize traditional religious imagery and argue that these are neutral toward religion. In Part IV, I sharpen my disagreement with mainstream neutrality theory by applying this same approach to some governmental expressions of meaning that do utilize religious imagery, especially including the word God, and try to show that they are also not inconsistent with government neutrality toward religion. Finally, in the Conclusion, using Christopher Lund's article on legislative prayers as a starting point, I try to set forth what a meaning-full neutrality would look like. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Chicago Kent Law Review is the property of Chicago Kent Law Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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