Abstract
This Note examines the standard for the admission of novel scientific evidence at trial in Illinois. After tracing the nationwide emergence, dominance, and current departure from Frye v. United State's general acceptance standard, the Note focuses on the inherent problems and ambiguities involved in Frye's application, and the problematic results that arise from using Frye. The future of Frye's use in Illinois is examined in light of the conflict between Frye and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc. Stolfi concludes that Frye has outlived its usefulness in our high-speed, technologically advanced nation and that only through adoption of a Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or Daubert-based approach will Illinois ensure that the jury's fact-finding role is protected.
Recommended Citation
Andrew Stolfi,
Why Illinois Should Abandon Frye's General Acceptance Standard for the Admission of Novel Scientific Evidence,
78
Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
861
(2003).
Available at:
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol78/iss2/16
