The economic analysis of civil liability aims to demonstrate how the civil liability system can be set to provide the potential injurers with optimal incentives to regulate the level of risk they bear. However, despite a wide range of applications, there are few studies on the apportionment of liability between several tortfeasors. In this article, we especially focus on the case of an industrial activity involving a firm, whose activity is potentially harmful for the society, and one of its input providers. They both have an impact on the level of risk through an effort in care and quality. After highlighting the originality of our contribution within this literature, we propose an efficient sharing rule. We demonstrate that this rule of apportionment depends on the relative degree of solvency of the agents and, more importantly, it crucially depends on the market relationship that links the two contributors; thus calling for a collaboration between the competition agency, and the legislatures and courts.

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