Political Dynamics within the Balkans: The Cases of Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro

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POLITICAL DYNAMICS WITHIN THE BALKANS: THE CASES OF BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA, MACEDONIA, BULGARIA, SERBIA, AND MONTENEGRO

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INTRODUCTION

The origin, history, political doctrines, and geopolitics of the Balkan region make its current political dynamic extremely complicated. The Balkan Peninsula lies between Western and Eastern Europe and contains a complex composition of populations. The main reasons for the multifarious nature of Balkan political dynamics are the presence of various civilizations, ethno-cultural identities, contradictory geopolitical orientations, and unique affiliations with other peoples and countries in Europe and the rest of the world.

The historical trends of Balkan political dynamics have had three interconnected dimensions: national, regional, and geopolitical. National political dynamics influenced regional dynamics from one side, while geopolitics influenced regional dynamics from the other side. Similarly, both the regional and geopolitical dynamics have transformed the national political dynamic.

The national, regional, and geopolitical dynamics in the Balkans historically have produced mostly negative results. Within the last century, regional political dynamics culminated in three Balkan wars and dramatically affected the two world wars. National political dynamics provoked these regional wars, which in turn impacted those same national dynamics. Geopolitical dynamics negatively fed into this dramatic process, as well.

National, regional, and geopolitical dynamics have transformed political spectrums within Balkan countries many times, have changed the forms of the regimes in control many times, and have changed the political map of the region three times. Unfortunately, these transformations and changes have never been accomplished peacefully through political and diplomatic means, but rather through internal sociopolitical confrontations and external conflicts and wars. The national, regional, and geopolitical dynamics in

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the Balkans were characterized by policies of force and not by force of policy. Balkan leaders systematically violated international law and ignored diplomatic practices.¹ This is why the Balkan region is well-known as one of problems and conflicts. The term “Balkanization” entered political terminology as a synonym for the degeneration of an area toward permanent instability and wars.

As a consequence of three dimensions of political dynamics clashing in various ways from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to the end of the Cold War, both foreign policy and security policy in the Balkans have systematically failed. This small region, although in the center of Europe, is paradoxically one of the most destabilized areas in the world.

Historically, the traditional European Powers behaved in the Balkans like elephants in a glass shop. The European Union (“EU”) still lacks a clear vision on the region, offering mostly political rhetoric and moral recommendations on the prospect of future European integration.² But nobody in the EU has stated specifically how this process can proceed in light of unresolved problems in the Balkans. This stems from a lack of foreign and security policy within the EU itself.

Given these circumstances in Europe, most Balkan peoples and countries after the end of the Cold War, especially during the war in Former Yugoslavia, turned to the United States of America and NATO in hopes of a quicker resolution. The American and NATO presence played a role in stopping the wars in Bosnia & Herzegovina, prevented tragedy and ethnic

¹. For example, a Special Commission defined the border of the Balkan States, including Albania, at the Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Servia and Turkey, May 30, 1913, 218 Consol. T.S. 159. During the First and Second Balkan Wars as well as during World War I, this border map was ignored systematically, violating the United Nations Charter’s Principles for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity, U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 1, 4, and violating the Helsinki Final Act, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 13 I.L.M. 1292, 1293-95.

². In statements, comments, and press releases, European Union Commissioners Javier Solana and Chris Patten have repeated the notion that Kosovo’s future is with the European Union, without offering any concrete details regarding how this might be achieved. European Commission, Speech by the Rt. Hon. Chris Patten, CH before the Plenary European Parliament, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/pattern/sp04_166.htm (Mar. 30, 2004). In a speech before the European Parliament, Patten noted that:

It is always tempting after horrible events like [the March unrests] to conclude that we should rip up our strategy and come up with a new plan. I do not believe that we can give up on our insistence about a multi-ethnic Kosovo in which all ethnic groups can live freely and without fear. Nor do I believe that we should abandon the idea of ‘standards before status’. On the other hand, I don’t think that we should send a signal that final status discussion will be delayed indefinitely. That would risk a grave worsening of tension. Nothing that happened earlier this month can change the geography of Kosovo. We all have a shared interest in making sure that Kosovo does not become a black hole in the middle of SE Europe, where organised crime flourishes and ethnic division is entrenched. We have to go on working patiently for the long term future. Whatever Kosovo’s final status, it’s future lies in Europe.

Id.
cleansing in Kosovo, and defended state integrity and democracy in Macedonia. Additionally, three main international documents—the Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia & Herzegovina (1995), United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 for Kosovo (1999), and the Framework Agreement for Securing the Future of Macedonia’s Democracy (2001)—were signed with much support by the United States. These documents brought peace, stability, and democratic development in the Balkans.

The time has come to review seriously the historical Balkans experience, not simply for research purposes or curiosity, but rather to avoid repeating mistakes and to find some better ways of resolving the situation definitively, offering a clear prospective for the entire region. Political dynamics are among the most important factors to analyze and consider in the course of this review.

I. POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA

Peace, stability, and democracy in the Balkans remain fragile. This is primarily due to contradictory political dynamics within the Balkan countries. Bosnia & Herzegovina is one of the most typical cases of fragility in the Balkans. Since the Dayton Peace Accords were signed in 1995 by the parties to the conflict and by representatives from the international community, Bosnia & Herzegovina has operated under foreign administration and is secured by foreign peacekeeping forces.

3. The Dayton Peace Accords were signed by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and Croat President Franjo Tudjman, who were the high representatives of each party to the conflict, as well as by Western representatives from the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, and the European Union. Under the Dayton Peace Accords, Bosnia & Herzegovina was recognized as an independent state with a border that had been defined under the Former Yugoslav Constitution. Bosnia & Herzegovina was organized into two parts: the Bosnian and Croat Federation and the Serbian Republic. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75, 89, 91, 180, 181 [hereinafter Dayton Peace Accords].


The main goals of the Dayton Peace Accords are to maintain peace and stability, to restore the internal integrity of the country, to build state institutions and promote democracy, to return refugees and displaced persons, and to cooperate closely with the International Court of Justice in prosecuting war criminals. Toward reaching these noble goals, the international community supported creating two state entities—the Bosnian and Croat Federation and the Serbian Republic. This process of building new state institutions started from the top.

In the Bosnian and Croat Federation and the Serbian Republic, the moderate political parties won the first political elections. The traditional nationalist parties, which had waged the war, lost. This political victory by moderate democratic parties facilitated establishing some federal institutions. High Representatives of the international community led the creation of a federal government, parliament, president, and later on, a federal court, military, and security staff.

Initially, the Dayton Peace Accords had brought peace and relative stability to Bosnia & Herzegovina. War was over. Normalcy had returned. Life was improved. The economy was better. But the state of the country was far from ideal. Within a few years, further progress had stagnated. Today, the integrity and functionality of the state institutions remain on the verge of possible disintegration. Continued hatred, hostility, and nationalism threaten democracy. The process of returning refugees and persons displaced from their residential areas of origin already has failed. The war criminals are still hidden from the peacekeeping troops. This political and economic stagnation has increased the general level of disappointment, which in turn works as an advantage for the old nationalist political parties.

This reversal of political dynamics brought at the second general election victory for the three main nationalist political parties: the Party for Democratic Action (of Bosnians), the Croat Democratic Party (of Croats), and the Serbian Democratic Party (of Serbs). Although this turnabout surprised the international community, those who saw what really was going on within Bosnia & Herzegovina expected it. There were three main causes of this reversal of political dynamics in Bosnia & Herzegovina. First, the goals of the Dayton Peace Accords were not reached in time. Second, the

nationalist parties promoted their own separate interests. Finally, geopolitical and other influences from abroad played a role.

Concerning failing to reach the goals of the Dayton Peace Accords, those reforms, as we have noted, were concentrated mainly at the federal level in order to preserve state integrity and to promote modest democratic developments. The lack of bottom-up reforms left state entities to improvise for a long time. This spontaneous process paved the way for the most extremist elements—namely, nationalist parties and prior military leaders—to reenter active political life without any serious obstacles. Finding space to operate during the transition, these former contingents of the war kept their power over local entities via demagogy, pressure, and money. Within local entities, they then undermined implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. To date, the reforms envisaged by the Dayton Peace Accords remain only partially realized on the federal level and have not been vertically implemented downward to local entities. Thus, the Dayton Peace Accords neither restored integrity to state institutions nor advanced democratic society.

Concerning the nationalist parties' agendas, we know they have been and remain in favor of keeping the country separated rather than united. More typical of the Serbian Republic, the political will of nationalist parties to cooperate in favor of a Bosnia & Herzegovina integral state never existed. Bosnia & Herzegovina contains two main federal structures: the Bosnian and Croat Federation on one hand and the Serbian Republic on the other. Within those two structures exist three traditional and nationalist state entities, which are stronger than the federal institutions above them. These three state entities are still primarily under the influence and leadership of nationalist political parties. These political leaders ignore in many cases the political, legal, and financial obligations of the federal institutions above them.\(^7\) The two federal entities have their own armies, police forces, modest security structures, and customs officials, as well as some formal and informal fiscal institutions. However, local nationalist authorities are curbing the process of returning refugees and displaced persons. It seems the local nationalist authorities are more interested in keeping their territorial entities ethnically cleansed. These same local nationalist authorities make it very difficult for peacekeeping troops to arrest hiding war criminals and send them to the International Court of Justice.

\(^7\) Bosnia & Herzegovina File, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Albania, Directorate of Analysis and Prognosis, Fact-Finding Mission in Sarajevo (May 29, 2003). The report for this fact-finding mission is confidential material. The author has quoted only the part that can be open to public in accordance with the Ministry's own rules for classified documents.
Concerning geopolitical influences, Bosnia & Herzegovina is still in a very difficult and unfavorable geopolitical situation. Although not as bad as during the war, geopolitics remain very complicated. Everybody knows that during the war the two main nations, Serbia and Croatia, led by two extremist nationalist leaders, Milosevic and Tudjman, directly and indirectly fueled the conflict. At the very beginning stage of the war, the Serbian leader and the Croat leader intended to create their own “greater nations” by splitting Bosnia & Herzegovina into two parts. Each was responsible for the war, the crimes, the genocide, the ethnic cleansing, and the refugees and displaced persons.

Now the war is over, but the consequences are still alive. The political and moral influence of the two main nations, Croatia and Serbia, are still present in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Each has political and moral power over its ethnic entity and could contribute to the process of achieving internal state integrity for Bosnia & Herzegovina. Very unfortunately, Croatia has not used its political and moral power as positively as it could, while Serbia has harmfully misused its political and moral power.

Due to this geopolitical situation, the political dynamics in Bosnia & Herzegovina have reversed. Capitalizing on this specific geopolitical situation, local nationalist leaders of the three entities continue on with their separate domestic political agendas and national geopolitical orientations, without much trouble from the weak federal institutions. These reversed political dynamics have promoted two contradictory trends within one state: integration and fragmentation. These two contradictory trends are represented by two political mainstreams: the democratic parties represent integration, while the nationalist parties represent fragmentation. The future result of these contradictory trends is not yet clear.

So far, the institutional vacuum in Bosnia & Herzegovina, the interests of nationalist parties, and the geopolitical situation, by weakening the democratic parties and federal institutions, have created favorable conditions for nationalists to consolidate their political position. This dangerous political trend favors nationalist forces in Serbia, which are deeply interested in using the Serbian Republic in Bosnia & Herzegovina to serve their political aims over the entire region.

Unfortunately, the nationalists in Serbia, both those in government and those in opposition, seem to be inspired by the same old-fashioned political doctrines and by pursuing the same foreign policy toward Bosnia & Herzegovina. They want to keep the Serbian Republic in Bosnia & Herzegovina under their own influence, to dictate her political orientations, and to make her ignore the central state institutions and the international community.
This confidential cooperation between nationalists in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina and nationalists in Serbia proper gives war criminals Karadzic and Mladic the freedom to operate.  

II. POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN MACEDONIA

The Republic of Macedonia exhibits different political dynamics, specifically dependent on its unique origin, history, politics, and geopolitics. The name "Republic of Macedonia" pretends to continue from the old Macedonians who lived in the Balkans since the beginning of its ancient civilization. This myth of Macedonian origin historically promoted a way toward national identity. About one century ago, the myth of origin on one hand and a historical belief in it on the other both were transformed into a national political doctrine. Macedonian nationalism characterized the first and the strongest political party among Macedonians. Its political goal was to establish the independent state of Macedonia.

The dream of Macedonians to have their own symbols of identity, integral territory, and state institutions came true after the Second World War, when the communist leader of Yugoslavia, Joseph Broz Tito, established the Republic of Macedonia quite equal to the other Republics within Yugoslavia. This achievement encouraged the Macedonian nationalists to declare their independent state immediately after the dissolution of Yugoslavia at the beginning of 1990.

The Republic of Macedonia is surrounded by Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. Its population comprises two large ethnic groups—Macedonians and Albanians—as well as other minorities. The political dynamics in the Republic of Macedonia have passed through two phases and have been influenced by three main factors.

8. Nicholas Wood, 60 Bosnian Serbs Dismissed For Aid to War Crimes Figure, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at A6.

The first phase of political dynamics, starting at the end of 1991 and lasting through the end of 1999, saw the international recognition and consolidation of the independent state of Macedonia. Independence, peace, stability, and territorial integrity were the main targets of the political dynamics in Macedonia during this phase. The second phase, running from 1999 to the present, saw a clash between Macedonia and its Albanian community. Policies of force and radical agendas were the main targets of the political dynamics during this phase.

The three main factors to impact the first phase of political dynamics in Macedonia have been (1) internal political dynamics; (2) regional political dynamics; and (3) international political dynamics directed toward Macedonia.

Concerning internal political dynamics, the Republic of Macedonia over the last decade has a distinctive history. Immediately after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the collapse of the communist regime, two large ethnic communities, Macedonians and Albanians, founded their own large political parties. The Macedonians founded VMRO-DPMN, the Social-Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party. The Albanian community founded the Party for Democratic Prosperity, which was pursued later by its own faction, the Democratic Party. These were political parties of ethnic origin, composition, leadership, doctrines, and electorates.

Some additional political parties were founded based upon European models, defined not purely on ethnicity but rather on modern political alternatives. Very unfortunately, these modern political parties remained small and not influential. Thus, from the beginning, the political spectrum in the Republic of Macedonia took ethnic, rather than politically principled, shape.

As the war in Yugoslavia continued, Macedonians and Albanians, organized in their own parties, were determined to cooperate and reach a political compromise despite their unresolved problems. This policy created a temporary climate of relaxation between the two main political ethnic groups. It was reflected all over the country. This phenomenon was extremely important for the Republic of Macedonia, which as a result escaped the involvement in the larger regional conflict.

Concerning the regional political dynamics, the Republic of Macedonia faced complicated situations over the last decade. To the south, the Hellenic Republic of Greece did not immediately recognize the independence of the country because it had complaints about the name (“Macedonia”) and the national flag (red field with yellow sunshine in the middle). The Greeks considered themselves the only people descended from that era
of history. They considered the name "Macedonia" and the flag to be of Greek origin. Consequently, the temporary name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" was internationally imposed. Greece created numerous artificial obstacles at the beginning stage of the independent state of Macedonia.

The Republic of Albania pursued quite a different foreign policy toward Macedonia. Albania was among the first countries to recognize the independent state of Macedonia. The two countries established diplomatic relations immediately, which developed into cooperation on many fronts. Albania created free access for Macedonia to the Adriatic Sea, opening up a necessary economic zone. Both countries supported joint infrastructure development projects and worked together in favor of peace, stability, and cooperation in the region. By pursuing such a policy toward Macedonia, the Republic of Albania played a double role. First, it helped Macedonia to maintain its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Second, it contributed to preserving peace and stability in the Western Balkans.

In contrast, over the last decades the border between Macedonia and Kosovo has been problematic. Before June 1999, Kosovo was under the Milosevic regime's increasingly repressive policies. Under these circumstances, the way to Macedonia as well as Albania served as the path for Kosovars to get out from under Milosevic and into the rest of the region and Europe. The human relations, including immediate and extended family relations, between Kosovars and Albanians in Macedonia and the region as a whole always have been strong. One characteristic of Albanians is that in times of crises they strengthen their ethnic relations no matter where they live. Thus, during the crisis and the war in Kosovo, Macedonia saw instability from time to time, despite measures taken by the states to close borders and to adopt special security mechanisms.

With the case of Macedonia during the last decade, instability in Kosovo was clearly problematic. Conversely, a peaceful, stable, and developed Kosovo contributes to peace, stability, and development in Macedonia. The main reasons for such strong and direct bilateral impacts on political dy-

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10. In spring 1992, the Parliament of the Republic of Albania recognized the Independent State of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and established diplomatic relations via a special resolution. Albania was among the first member states of the United Nations to recognize Macedonia's independence. This move sent a very positive signal to ethnic Albanians living in Macedonia. *Newspaper Criticizes Macedonia's "Solidarity" With Serbia on Kosovo Issue, BBC Monitoring International Reports, Nov. 11, 2002*, available in LexisNexis AllNews Database and on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review ("Albania officially recognized the independence of Macedonia, whereas Belgrade and Athens have always conditioned the recognition of independence with the church or the name issues.").
namics between Kosovo and Macedonia are the geopolitical links and the Albanian human ties and relations existing on both sides of the border.

Bulgaria caused no special political impacts in Macedonia during the last decades. In spite of the historical debates between the two countries, both sides overcame that history and pursued pragmatic relations. Bulgaria was interested in escaping the Balkans’ problems and focusing on domestic reforms and integration into NATO and the European Union. Macedonia, on the other hand, needed good relations with Bulgaria because of its own complicated domestic and geopolitical situation.

For a decade following 1990, Macedonia’s other neighbor, Serbia, was fully committed in wars with Croatia, then with Bosnia & Herzegovina, and later on with Kosovo. Serbia had neither time nor opportunity to influence directly the political dynamics in Macedonia. Serbia impacted Macedonia only in terms of regional possibilities for reforms, foreign investments, and integration.

Concerning international political dynamics toward Macedonia, it is known that the Republic of Macedonia enjoyed support from the international community from the beginning. The United Nations, the European Union, the United States of America, NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Council of Europe all contributed positively toward maintaining peace and stability in this newly established independent state located within the Balkans. It is difficult to imagine how Macedonia would be today without the international community’s presence and contribution. The Macedonia case illustrates that when the international community is present and active at the beginning of a crisis, using preventive diplomacy and protective measures, peace can prevail, even in conflict areas such as the Balkans.

The second phase of political dynamics in Macedonia started in 1999 and continues today. Many factors helped the Republic of Macedonia initially to maintain peace, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The international community recognized Macedonia’s independence and took a present and active role. The two main ethnic political groups reached a compromise. The experienced leadership of the Republic of Albania and Bulgaria pursued moderate policies. This macrostability was very important not only for the country, but also for the entire region.

But this state of macrostability in Macedonia could not counterbalance for very long the cracks inside Macedonian society that started to erode democracy. Immediately after the Kosovo war, Macedonia faced waves of political problems. The Albanian community, the second largest community within Macedonia, voiced repeated requests for human, civil, and na-
tional rights within the Macedonian state, including the rights of education, language, and symbols as well as the right to participate in the army, police forces, and administration. These rights had been systematically violated or at least neglected by the Macedonian side.

The majority Macedonian side responded to the Albanian requests negatively, replacing dialogue with a policy of using force. This exercise of power in turn provoked radical reactions in the Albanian community. The main Albanian political parties lost the confidence of their people, and the situation spiraled out of control. Radical military leaders established an Albanian guerilla army (similar to the Kosovo Liberation Army, but without any connections between the two). The Albanian guerillas' political goal was to force Macedonian authorities to honor the Albanian community's repeated demands for civil, national, and human rights. Thus, the political process was replaced by armed conflict between Macedonian state institutions and the Albanian community and its guerrilla army. This conflict between these two large entities threatened to destroy everything achieved earlier.

Quick international community intervention stopped the conflict and brought the parties to the table to talk peace. The result was an international agreement known as the Ohrid Framework Agreement ("OFA"), signed on August 13, 2001 by the parties in the conflict and by representatives of the international community. The OFA begins:

The following points comprise an agreed framework for securing the future of Macedonia's democracy and permitting the development of closer and more integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community. This Framework will promote the peaceful and harmonious development of civil society while respecting the ethnic identity and the interests of all Macedonian citizens.\(^1\)

The OFA is principally a document of compromise, which obliged two large ethnic communities to pursue reforms in the form of constitutional amendments, legislation, and other confidence building measures.\(^2\)

Annex C of the OFA is an extensive schedule of confidence-building measures designed to preserve the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Macedonian State.\(^3\) Specifically, with international support the parties agree, \textit{inter alia}, to strengthen local self-government, to respect the character of a multiethnic and pluralistic democracy via equita-

\(^{1}\) Ohrid Framework Agreement, \textit{supra} note 5, at 1.
\(^{2}\) \textit{See id.} at Annexes \textit{A–C}.
\(^{3}\) \textit{See id.} at Annex C.
ble representation, and to ensure respect for human rights. The OFA, if correctly implemented, will integrate all ethnic groups, minorities, and individuals into one democratic Macedonian society.

Following the OFA, a general election took place in Macedonia. The Former Albanian army was disarmed and its leaders founded a new political party named the Democratic Party for Integration. The result of the election changed the political spectrum in the government. The Democratic Party (of Albanians) and VMRO-DPMN (of Macedonians) lost the election. The Social-Democratic League and the Liberal Party (of Macedonians) and the Democratic Party for Integration (of Albanians) won the election and formed a new coalition government. The government’s political agenda was to fully implement the OFA.

Initially, this process was touch and go. There was a lot of mistrust between the sides, misinterpretations of the principles and concepts, and slow practical adoption and implementation of the OFA. This happened because some parties who signed the OFA proceeded to change their positions. VMRO-DPMN, after losing in the election, opposed the document. The Albanian Democratic Party, despite also having lost, took the contradictory position. Both VMRO-DPMN and the Albanian Democratic Party put in doubt the possibility of establishing an integral functional Macedonian State based on multiethnic and multicultural identity. Both parties instead resurrected their previous attitudes in favor of having pure ethnic states throughout the Balkans. Availing themselves of the opportunity created by these contradictory positions within some of the OFA signatories, traditional Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian political circles used their influence to stifle the reform process. The old state administrative staff hesitated to change the structure of state institutions. Some conservatives in the army, police, and so-called “lion troops” (Macedonian paramilitaries remaining from the time of civil disturbance), resisted, in very hidden and sophisticated ways, the reforms attempted within the army and police forces.

Exactly one year later, this undesirable situation provoked the same crisis. In a dangerous regional provocation, antagonists put in doubt the OFA, threatening to initiate the formation of new purely ethnic states throughout the Balkans. But this time the crisis was managed politically without any serious negative impact. To the contrary, this last crisis prompted positive reflections by all the main state actors. There is now a better shared conception among the societies and the international commu-

14. See id. at Annex C, §§ 1, 3.3, 5, 5.3.
nity of adopting and implementing reforms derived from the OFA's principles.

Three outside components influenced the second phase of political dynamics in Macedonia as well: an improved situation in Kosovo, positive regional cooperation, and advanced steps toward the integration of Macedonia into NATO and the European Union.

The improved situation in Kosovo has a direct positive political impact in Macedonia. Even the last Kosovo crisis of March 16–17, 2004 did not cause any problems in Macedonia. That crisis remained domestic and was managed quickly by the Kosovo leadership and the international community.

Regional cooperation also influenced Macedonian political dynamics. A triangle of diplomacy developed among the Western Balkan countries of Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia, which are closely cooperating in the fields of peace, security, stability, and integration. They utilized this triangle diplomacy to sign the Adriatic Charter, a document promoting rapid integration of these three countries into NATO under U.S. leadership. Macedonia’s latest application for EU membership will further promote positive political dynamics within the country.

Political dynamics in Macedonia will continue to depend upon full implementation of the OFA, regional cooperation, and integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. During these processes of transitions and reforms, Macedonia depends on the international community’s presence and active role.

III. BULGARIAN POLITICAL DYNAMICS

Bulgaria always has been concerned about the Balkans. Being one of the oldest Balkan states and a historical actor during the most important


events of the Peninsula, Bulgaria considered herself a key country among Turkey, Greece, Romania, Serbia, and Macedonia.

Historically, Bulgaria contributed strongly to the Balkan liberation movement against the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the nineteenth century, Bulgaria was among the first provinces to become autonomous, free from the Ottomans. She participated actively in the two Balkan Wars during 1911–1913 and was very energetic during the First World War.

The main Bulgarian political objective during these wars was the unification of population and territory within one Bulgarian state. The main geographic and demographic target lay to the southwest, in Macedonia. Due solely to this old nationalistic Bulgarian dream of unification, two revolts and four wars took place within Bulgaria and around it. But Bulgaria’s dream of unification with Macedonia went unrealized, resulting in painfully splitting Macedonia between the Greeks and Serbs.

Despite historical failure, Bulgarian nationalists never gave up their dream of creating one big Bulgarian state. Between the two world wars and especially during the Second World War, the Bulgarian nationalistic political trend has been overwhelmingly directed toward correcting history by creating a greater Bulgarian state. This is precisely why Bulgaria supported Hitler during the Second World War. The war time was the only period Bulgarian nationalists temporarily realized unification of a greater Bulgarian nation.

The defeat of the Axis Powers in the Second World War caused Bulgaria to be considered internationally as a losing country. Therefore, after the war Bulgaria was designated within the socialist camp of the Soviet Union (and in its previous territory, leaving Macedonia definitively outside its border). In 1945, Macedonia established itself as a Republic within the frame of the Socialist Federal Yugoslavia under Tito’s leadership. Macedonians’ old dream for their identity began to come true.

During the Cold War, Bulgaria was one of Moscow’s most servile satellites. It remained as such until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. After the Cold War ended, and particularly during the process of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, there were some signals and even some political parties and political initiatives working toward revising the border between Bulgaria and Macedonia. Macedonian nationalists, deeply committed to proclaiming
an independent Macedonian state, strongly opposed these parties and initiatives.

Despite these nationalistic political trends, Bulgaria did not, in fact, involve itself directly in Macedonia’s conflict within Yugoslavia, as had often happened during the second half of nineteenth century and the first half of twentieth century. Consequently, the political map of Bulgaria, its territory, and its population remained unchanged from their state during the Cold War.

Bulgaria played a generally constructive role during the 1990s. Bulgaria was the first country to adopt the regional initiative towards not altering Balkan borders. At the end of 1991, Bulgaria signed treaties with Greece and Turkey and signed bilateral agreements with Romania, Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia. Bulgaria’s strategy was and still remains oriented toward integration into NATO and the European Union. The country seems committed to leaving history behind and looking to the future.

Despite this positive and constructive role toward the Balkans, Bulgaria is very sensitive about the political dynamic in the region. This sensitivity derives mostly from geopolitical circumstances. Three components influence Bulgarian geopolitics: the Turkish dimension of Bulgarian policy, including the Turkish minority living in Bulgaria; the current and future status of Macedonia; and Albanian developments in the Balkans, including ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo and Macedonia. Bulgaria has never considered any of these three components in isolation and as a result has pursued a very balanced policy toward the Balkans.

Turkey, and a sizeable Turkish minority in Bulgaria, historically have impacted Bulgarian politics and been a main concern of Bulgarian policy. Bulgaria’s positions toward the Western Balkans always have been influenced by the geopolitical implications of Turkey being in the region and especially by the political impact the Turkish minority has within Bulgaria. For example, it is precisely Turkey and the Turkish minority who influenced Bulgaria to pursue a neutral and balanced policy toward Macedonians and Albanians within Albania.

If Bulgaria were to support Macedonians while ignoring Albanians, it could face unpredictable reaction by Turkey and the Turkish minority, which are particularly sympathetic toward Albanians and Islamic peoples throughout the Balkans. Conversely, if Turkey openly were to support Kosovar and Macedonian Albanians against Macedonians, it could provoke a Macedonian reaction that could lead to a very dangerous regional conflict. Such a conflict would trigger a “domino effect,” involving the entire Balkans but with Turkey in a central role: Turkey-Bulgaria-Macedonia;
Turkey-Greece-Albania; Turkey-Macedonia-Serbia; Turkey-Macedonia- 
Greece; Turkey-Bosnia-Croatia. Cognizant of this probable scenario, Bul-
garia attempts to prevent, to the extent possible, Turkey’s involvement in 
Balkan affairs. Toward that end, Bulgaria has employed sophisticated 
methods to pave the way for the Turkish population living in Bulgaria to 
leave for Turkey. It is in Bulgaria’s interest to reduce the Turkish influence, 
presence, and role in the Balkans and to reduce the size of the Turkish mi-
nority living in Bulgaria.

Bulgaria considers the direction of the Balkans still undefined. Mace-
donian developments have a particularly important effect on Bulgarian 
political dynamics. Despite the traditional Bulgarian doctrine regarding 
Macedonia as an integral part of the Bulgarian nation, Bulgaria after the 
Second World War accepted the reality of a separate Macedonia. Although 
Bulgaria has given up a claim to Macedonia, its interest in Macedonia re-
surfaces from time to time. This was clearly evident during the latest Ma-

The 2001 conflict between Albanians and Macedonians caused a 
shock in Bulgaria. Many politicians considered it an early warning sign of a 
coming conflict within Bulgaria, similar to that within Yugoslavia. The 
political dynamic in Macedonia has always been a threat to Bulgaria. A 
move toward federalism and ultimately Macedonia’s separation into two 
ethnic communities, Macedonians and Albanians, could destabilize Bul-
garia. For Bulgarians, such a separation could on one side pave the way for 
Albanians’ demographic expansion and on the other side encourage the 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Jordan Velickov, a Bulgarian expert on inter-
national affairs, has focused attention on Albanians’ demographic devel-
opment within Macedonia as well as throughout the Balkans. Velickov, in 
accord with previous Bulgarian researchers and analysts, considers the 
Albanian-Turkish demographic fusion in the Balkans a serious threat to 
Bulgarian interests.

Bulgaria has always considered the complex question of Kosovo’s fu-
ture as critical to the entire region. Some voices in Bulgaria favor an inde-
pendent Kosovo, arguing that its independence is a prerequisite to peace 
and stability in the Balkans. However, without being against a possibly 
independent Kosovo, Bulgaria first wants Kosovo to respect the existing 
border with Macedonia. Bulgaria opposes a fusion between Kosovo and 
Albanians in Macedonia and therefore desires a very clear border between 
Kosovo and Macedonia. Bulgaria has a deep national interest in Macae-
donia. Bulgaria is ready to recognize an independent Kosovo only in ex-
change for Kosovo’s respecting its Macedonian border. Bulgaria seeks to
avoid however possible a gradual fusion of the Albanians in Kosovo with those in Macedonia and wants to cut off Albanians’ links to the Turkish minority in Bulgaria as well as to Turkey proper.

By the same logic, Bulgaria opposes breaking up Kosovo. It considers dividing up Kosovo, including Belgrade’s recent proposed division of Kosovo into various cantons, a dangerous precedent that could lead to border changes across the entire region, sparking another conflict. The country most immediately threatened would be Macedonia. Dividing up Macedonia would provoke regional confrontations among Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Albania, and Turkey. Next in line for dissolution would be Bosnia & Herzegovina, with Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians replaying the recent conflict. This chaotic scenario would produce no winners. All would be losers.

IV. SERBIAN POLITICAL DYNAMICS THROUGHOUT THE BALKANS

Serbians are among the oldest Slavic peoples in the Balkans and have been developing their identity, culture, economy, and institutions since the middle ages. As with other Balkan peoples, Serbians have survived a very difficult history.

Serbia has enjoyed independence since the Congress of Berlin in 1878, where Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey signed a treaty providing: “The High Contracting Parties recognize the independence of the Principality of Serbia, subject to the conditions set forth in the following Article.”17 Like all other Balkan countries, the Kingdom of Serbia, led by nationalists, was very active in the war against the Ottoman Empire. But when the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the Kingdom of Serbia continued its offensive strategy, replacing previous Balkan solidarity with national rivalry during the two Balkan Wars from 1911 to 1913. Serbia’s intention was to expand its territory by occupying the lands of surrounding peoples. Supported by Russia and not opposed by traditional European powers, the Kingdom of Serbia enlarged its territory to include Kosovo and Macedonia.

After the First World War, the Kingdom of Serbia initiated the creation of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian monarchy. In 1929, the monarchy changed the name of the Kingdom to the State of Yugoslavia. This was the first Yugoslavia—the first Balkan state based on federalism. In that federal state, Serbians continued to dominate important spheres such as foreign and

17. See Treaty for the Settlement of Affairs in the East, arts. XXXIV, XXXV, July 13, 1878, 153 Consol. T.S. 171, 184. This followed the Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and Turkey, which had ended the last Russo-Turkish War.
security policy. Serbians considered Yugoslavia as a matter of fact to be a continuation of the Kingdom of Serbia. This continued dominance by Serbs prompted an anti-Serb political movement. Croats and Slovenians preferred either a true democratic federal state or independence. This conflict between the Serbian authoritarian regime's philosophy and the Croats' and Slovenians' democratic federalism concepts became aggravated from time to time and was never solved by compromise.

During the Second World War, this conflict between Serbians and Croats produced two political movements in Yugoslavia: nationalism and communism. The communists, led by Tito, won the war and were in favor of federalism. They established the Yugoslav Federation, which comprised six Republics: Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia & Herzegovina. Two provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, were included within the Republic of Serbia and given special status.

Although the communists organized and managed the Yugoslav Federation's multiethnic makeup for nearly half a century, the conflict between communists and nationals was never put to rest. Immediately after the Cold War ended, this underlying sentiment erupted into armed conflict. One by one, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia & Herzegovina proclaimed independence.

Serbia opposed the dissolution of Yugoslavia and tried to impose federalism by force. Serbia justified such tactics in light of the foreign debt inherited from the communist regime and the nationalist rivalry for political dominance. Serbia's war machine abused people of different nationalities and entities, the main strategic goal being a Yugoslavia with "Greater Serbia" as its center. Milosevic, the Yugoslav leader and former communist turned nationalist, led one of the most bloody, nationalistic wars in Europe. His strategy to realize by force his nationalistic doctrine was challenged every step of the way in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia & Herzegovina. In the spring of 1999, the campaign ultimately failed as the conflict spilled over into Kosovo, where NATO intervened militarily.

Milosevic's regime fell one year after the NATO intervention. Democratic forces materialized in the Serbian political arena, attempting domestic reforms and modernization. In 2003, the Yugoslav Federation disappeared from the Balkan political map after eighty-three years of existence. A looser union called simply Serbia-Montenegro replaced the Yugoslav Federation.

Vojvodina, a Hungarian province, remains within the union. Kosovo, an Albanian province, operates under an international protectorate led by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK") and NATO's Kosovo Force ("KFOR"), in accordance with Resolution 1244.19

After the war, the political dynamic in Serbia took the form of political crises. The nationalist parties—the Socialist Party, the Radical Party, and nationalist segments of some self-dubbed democratic or moderate parties—still dominate the political arena. True democratic forces remain fragile, only mildly influential, and under strong pressure at home and from abroad. The Serbian people are demonstrating an increasing lack of confidence in national policy and boycotting massively the elections. Under such depressing political circumstances, Serbia is producing only minority governments with limited political support.

The current minority government resulted from a compromise by the Socialist Party, whose leader Milosevic is in the Hague accused of war crimes and genocide. The socialists and nationalists in Serbia, guided by the same doctrine, are using the continuing political crisis to reach their old political goals. This time their means is not a policy of force, which already failed, but the force of policy, diplomacy, and other mechanisms.

Serbian nationalists in and around the country still want Belgrade to remain the ethnocentric capital for all Serbs living in the region. They hope to realize the old Serbian dream of a “Greater Serbia,” only within a new framework and using new terminology. Serbian socialists and nationalists are very close allies. In addition, some self-proclaimed democrats are completely focused on regional geopolitics. They do not care about real domestic democratic reforms and true integration into the EU and NATO, despite the fact that more than eighty percent of Serbian citizens are very much in favor of a future with the European Union.

The old Serbian nationalist doctrine is still alive and active. It exists within different political alternatives, disguised by sophisticated terminology. The main goal is the same as it was during Milosevic’s regime: retain as much of Yugoslavia as possible and include Serbians living everywhere within the framework of this state. Serbian nationalism during recent times is growing and active in the government and political arenas.

This complicated situation has enabled Serbia to prevent almost completely any cooperation with the Hague tribunal for war criminals. In her last report to the United Nations Security Council in June 2004, Carla Del

Ponte declared that "the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro provided almost no cooperation, and this country has become a safe haven for fugitives."20 In an effort to remain in power, the Serbian government clearly has made a very dangerous concession to Milosevic’s party and its allies. This opens the door for nationalists to justify their past political activity and to legitimate their future. For democracy in Serbia, this legitimacy poses a real threat.21

The kneeling of the Serbian government in front of nationalists means the continuation of Serbia’s previous regional strategy. Serbian nationalists directly and through the kneeled government are pursuing very complicated tactics toward Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo.

Toward Bosnia & Herzegovina, Belgrade is trying to keep the Serbian Republic in Bosnia & Herzegovina separated from the federal institutions there as long as it can. It is this underground Serbian policy that influences the Serbian Republic to continue its separate activity, prevent the NATO Stabilization Force from capturing the war criminals Karadzic and Mladic, and to receive more instructions from Belgrade than from Sarajevo.22

Toward Montenegro, Belgrade is attempting all of the necessary maneuvers to prevent Montenegro’s independence from Serbia. Through the Serbian minority and political actors in Montenegro, as well as through direct pressure on Montenegro authorities, Belgrade wants to keep its strong influence, presence, and role within this small Adriatic Republic with a very old independent state tradition. But the process toward a referendum seems to be inevitable. By June 2004, Montenegro Prime Minister Djukanovic declared publicly that he was convinced that Montenegro citizens are in favor of independence.23 Even in Serbia there are many partisans believing it would be easier for Serbia and Montenegro to be


21. See e.g., Beth Kampschror, Serb Voters Reject “Greater Serbia”; Embrace Europe, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 29, 2004, at 07 (“By electing pro-Western reformer Boris Tadic, Serb voters rejected [the] Radical Party candidate ... and the ultranationalist past he sought to recover, giving Europeans a sense of relief ... [Tadic’s party was] part of the October 2000 ‘revolution’ that ousted Milosevic.”).


integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures independently rather than as a Union.

Toward Kosovo, Belgrade continues to influence domestic policy in very contradictory ways. Through the Serbian minority and its political representatives in Kosovo, through direct Belgrade intervention, and sometimes even through some segments within UNMIK in Pristina, sophisticated Serbian nationalists periodically suggest different options, models, and alternatives for a “better solution” to Kosovo’s status. Always bearing in mind ethnic lines, the latest suggestion, approved even by the Serbian Parliament, is the Draft-Proposal for the separation of Kosovo into Albanian and Serbian Cantons.

The Serbian nationalist strategy for the region, whether it is coming from political, governmental, or parliamentary sources, ultimately is to realize, by political and diplomatic means, the same goal the previous Serbian regime wanted to realize by force. Through this strategy, Serbian nationalists and other political groups want Montenegro, plus the Serbian Republic in Bosnia & Herzegovina, plus Serbian Cantons in Kosovo to be integral parts of a centralized Serbian state.

The old Serbian nationalist strategy is being pursued via dangerous new tactics. These tactics include curbing the integration of Serbian minorities into the societies and states where they are living, making Serbian political parties and associations outside the Serbian state answerable only to Belgrade, and provoking ethnic and political instability within all Balkan states where Serb minorities and Serbian nationalist parties are scattered.

Continuing the old Serbian strategy via these sophisticated tactics is curbing the democratization of the newly created Balkan states and Kosovo, is obstructing regional cooperation and Euro-Atlantic integration, and could provoke a regional crisis at any time in the future if not dealt with now. Given that nationalists and ultranationalists in Serbia are gaining momentum again and always threatening the current Serbian minority government, the regional political situation in the most fragile areas in the Balkans can be reversed at any time.

This is not an unfamiliar problem because Serbia’s current regional policy is nothing new. But it is the most dangerous political phenomenon influencing the political dynamics in the Balkans. Serbia’s continuing nationalist doctrine, supported also by other segments of Serbia’s current policy, is a direct threat to the integrity of the internationally recognized state of Bosnia & Herzegovina and to the success of the Dayton Peace Accords. It causes serious provocations in Kosovo, the territorial integrity of which is monitored by UNMIK and the Kosovo Force under United Na-
tions Resolution 1244. It creates tensions in Montenegro, whose authorities want to organize a referendum on independence from Serbia in the year 2006. It keeps tension high in Macedonia where both ethnic communities, Macedonian and Albanian, are working toward implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement to build pluralistic and multiethnic democratic institutions. For the entire Balkans, the continuation of the previous Serbian strategy through new tactics is a source of tension, instability, and possible conflict.

CONCLUSION

The above analysis shows that the situation in the Balkans remains fragile. The political dynamic is full of potential conflicts, and there is no clear, positive, and modern trend taking root across the region. How this complex political dynamic in the Balkans will affect the future is unpredictable. Under these circumstances, democratic Balkan states, new political parties throughout the region, citizens, civil societies, institutions, media, business communities, intellectuals, Western democracies, and international institutions dealing with the Balkans should be certain not to neglect this political reality unless they want history to repeat itself.

24. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 4, ¶ 9(g).