CONTENTS

SYMPOSIUM ON JOHN RAWLS’S POLITICAL LIBERALISM

Professors Stephen M. Griffin and Lawrence B. Solum

Symposium Editors

INTRODUCTION: SITUATING POLITICAL LIBERALISM  Lawrence B. Solum  549

PLURALISM AND PROCEDURALISM  Joshua Cohen  589

According to “democratic pluralism,” fundamental moral disagreement is compatible with agreement on rules of a democratic political game, but not with agreement on a more substantive conception of justice. According to Professor Cohen, this is incorrect. Procedural and substantive values stand on a common footing in democratic thought: that is a fundamental lesson of *A Theory of Justice* and *Political Liberalism*.

POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A JUST DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION  Samuel Freeman  619

This article shows how Rawls, in order to carry through his original aim of providing the most appropriate conception of justice for a democratic society, develops the ideas of overlapping consensus and public reason to compensate for a difficulty in the argument for stability in *A Theory of Justice*. Professor Freeman also discusses Rawls’s positions on judicial review and the Supreme Court’s role as the exemplar of public reason.

ON PUBLIC REASON  Kent Greenawalt  669

Professor Greenawalt focuses on Rawls’s idea of public reason. After summarizing and clarifying Rawls’s position, Professor Greenawalt makes some criticisms, which are largely directed at a distinction between constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, on the one hand, and ordinary political issues, on the other. Finally, Professor Greenawalt suggests some ways to strengthen an account of the constraint of public reasons.
In this article, Professor Griffin examines the critique of Rawls's theory of justice offered by several leading political scientists who work in the field of political theory. This critique centers on the idea that Rawls's theory is not relevant to the real world of politics. While this critique is not valid in its most general form, Professor Griffin concludes that political scientists raise interesting issues that must be confronted by anyone who engages in political philosophy.

This article assesses an objection to Rawls's political liberalism mounted by Raz, Baier, and Hampton.

Professor Martin lays out the background and main features of Rawls's new theory of justice. This is a theory he began adumbrating around 1980 and that is given its fullest statement in his book *Political Liberalism*. The article makes a critical examination of the two main patterns of justification Rawls attempts to provide for his new theory.

In his article, Professor Nickel examines and reconstructs Rawls's list of basic liberties and rights. Professor Nickel then evaluates the adequacy of the scheme Rawls provides for justifying his list and examines Rawls's account of how the basic liberties should be interpreted and applied. Finally, Professor Nickel suggests that Rawls's conception of the person should contain more than just two “moral powers.”

Critics of the role of public reason in John Rawls's *Political Liberalism* argue that it fails to account for the historical role of religious argument in rights-based dissent under American constitutionalism. In this article, Professor Richards examines the pivotal role that public reason in fact played in central forms of antislavery, antiracist, and antisexist abolitionist dissent, and shows that Rawls, in fact, offers much the better account of both the antiestablishment character and morally independent transformative power of such dissent than his critics. Professor Richards argues that abolitionist dissent cannot reasonably be interpreted on the model of conventionally mainstream religious argument.