Terrorism and a Civil Cause of Action: Boim, Ungar, and Joint Torts

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INTRODUCTION

A senseless act of terrorism violently and unexpectedly ended David Boim and Yaron Ungar’s lives. While the thousands of American families have faced the loss of loved ones through the terror of September 11, 2001, both Boim and Ungar were dead long before that mournful day. Now, as American families continue to recover from the tragedy of 9/11, David Boim’s parents and Yaron Ungar’s family have blazed a trail of civil anti-terrorism litigation that all terrorism victims’ parents, families, and spouses should adopt as their own.

The fight against terrorism at home and abroad has not been without controversy. The military conflict in Afghanistan has received a large amount of media attention—some questioning American tactics and offensives. The rights and trials of detained suspects have also presented controversy regarding the proper rights of the accused. Similarly, the Patriot Act has raised several Constitutional and civil rights issues. The controversy surrounding anti-terrorism offensives is not limited to the criminal and military actions. As Richard Milin observes, some victims of terrorism have filed controversial lawsuits against deep pockets—“airlines whose planes were hijacked, insurers, owners of bombed buildings, and even manufacturers of fertilizer that terrorists have used to make bombs.” These types of civil suits have “in effect, turn[ed] victims against other victims.” The Boims and Ungars, however, have set out upon a different course.

While the fight against Al-Qaeda and similar terrorist groups has been left to the executive branch of the government and the military, private citizens, such as David Boim’s parents, have directly implicated in civil lawsuits in federal court certain United States organizations allegedly responsible for funding these organizations. In response to violent and senseless acts of terror that have reached into the lives of peaceful civilians, the Boims and Ungars have taken up the fight against terrorism in civil court armed with two federal statutes which impose civil liability on countries and persons who provide material aid to acts of international terrorism.

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3 See Detroit Free Press, et al., v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) and North Jersey Media Group, Inc., v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002).

4 See generally David Cole, Enemy Aliens and American Freedoms: Experience Teaches us That Whatever the Threat, Certain Principles are Sacrosanct, Nation, September 23, 2002 at 20.


6 Id.
This fight against terrorism in the civil courts, though not as publicized as the previous controversies, has also presented several difficult and previously untested questions of constitutional law and statutory construction. We see many of these novel issues encompassed in the recent Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision *Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, et al.* and *Ungar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al.* from the District Court for the District of Columbia. *Boim II* addressed the previously untested 18 U.S.C. § 2333, which grants a civil cause of action to United States nationals injured “by reason of an act of international terrorism.” The Boims sued not only the gunmen responsible for their son’s assassination, but also included in their complaint American organizations accused of raising and laundering money to terrorist groups. The Seventh Circuit, in a decision certain to have repercussions in the wake of 9/11, determined that: first, funding a terrorist group without knowledge and intent to further their illicit goals does not constitute an act of international terrorism; secondly, a violation of criminal anti-terrorists provisions does constitute an act of international terrorism in respects to the civil anti-terrorism statute; third, aiding and abetting an act of terrorism is an act of international terrorism in respect to section 2333 and a viable cause of action; and, lastly, neither section 2333 or its criminal anti-terrorism counterpart violate the First Amendment freedom of association.

In *Ungar*, the court interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1607(a)(7), which allows a United States national to sue a foreign state that provides material resources for an act of terrorism. *Ungar* determined that a section 1607(a)(7) plaintiff must show that a foreign state had knowledge of the illicit activity, intended to further the activity, and that the foreign state’s material aid was the “but-for” cause of the illicit activity.

Much like the tide of an actual war, portions of the *Boim II* and *Ungar* holdings represent individual battles won by victims or defendants. Because the various theories of joint torts and their elements of knowledge, agreement, aid, and causation are less than well-settled in traditional tort law, the battlefield in this war is mysterious and unknown to both parties, as well as the detached judge. While it is too early in the conflict to declare a winner, the availability of joint torts in the context of section 2333 and 1607 actions is a valuable weapon against terrorism in the hands of plaintiffs. *Boim* and *Ungar*, however, have handicapped the effectiveness of these theories in their explanations and overbroad requirements to prove liability in the joint tort context.

This article will demonstrate that the *Boim II* decision, while a fundamentally sound first explanation of section 2333, has not properly reconciled the elements of a joint tort cause of action with the statutory language of section 2333. In a similar fashion, this article will also discuss how *Ungar* incorrectly requires plaintiffs to show that a foreign countries material aid was the but-for cause of the illicit activity. After explaining the legal fallacy in both decisions, this article will explain how courts should examine section 2333 and 1607 claims in the future and also analyze the joint tort theories likely to recover damages in a civil anti-terrorism action and the elements most

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7 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (hereinafter “*Boim II*”).
9 *Boim II*, 291 F.3d at 1028.
difficult to prove. In doing so, this article will explicate the Boim and Ungar decisions in detail. In addition, attention is given to the legislative history of the statutory authority for the two civil causes of action for terrorist activities, relevant Supreme Court authority, and the common law of joint torts, all of which play a vital role in the war against terrorism in the civil courts.

Part I of this article examines the background of the Boim decision. Section I.A. addresses the factual background leading up to the Boims’ lawsuit and section I.B. examines the procedural history and holdings leading up to the Seventh Circuit decision. Part II explains the various Boim holdings in detail, with subsections II.A., II.B., and II.C. individually examining the three questions certified for interlocutory appeal. Part III focuses on the Ungar case. Part II.A. provides the factual background to the lawsuit while section II.B. examines Ungar’s holding. Part IV provides a critical analysis of both decisions in light of the relevant statutory language and joint tort law. Part IV.A. focuses on the presence of a causation element in joint torts. Part IV.B. examines the remaining elements of a particular variety of joint tort, civil conspiracy. Part IV.C. considers another variety of joint tort, aiding and abetting liability and its respective elements. Lastly, part IV.D. focuses on the presence of an intent requirement in joint tort theory and the relevant First Amendment implications.

I. Boim: Background

I.A. Facts

[A]nother broken heart, another barrel of a gun...  

Much like the victims of 9/11, terror struck David Boim in the midst of his normal routine. A dual citizen of the United States and Israel, seventeen-year-old David was studying at a yeshiva in Israel in 1996. On May 13, 1996, while standing at a bus stop near Beit El in the West Bank, David Boim was hit by bullets fired from a passing car. He was pronounced dead within an hour of the shooting.

His two attackers were eventually identified as Amjad Hinawi and Khalil Tawfiq Al-Sharif, members of the Palestinian militant organization known as Hamas. Hinawi and Al-Sharif were eventually apprehended by Palestinian authorities. While on release awaiting trial, Al-Sharif killed himself and five civilians and injured 192 other people in a

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11 Sources have cited a similar ideal as an end goal of the Boim litigation. “The plaintiffs have two goals. The more modest of them is simply to establish a precedent that any support for a designated terrorist organization makes a person legally liable for that group’s actions.” Daniel Pipes, A New Way to Fight Terrorism, The Jerusalem Post Newspaper: Online News From Israel (May 24, 2000), at http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2000/05/24/Opinion/Opinion.7178.html.
13 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1002.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
suicide bombing in Jerusalem on September 4, 1997. Hinawi was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for the Boim shooting.

The Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiyya, or Hamas, was founded in 1987 to pursue the creation of an Islamic state. Hamas consists of a political branch and a military branch. Hamas seeks to attain its goal by acts of terrorism and violence on civilians. Like Al-Qaeda and other Middle East based terrorist organizations, Hamas allegedly has a global presence, with control centers, or cells, in the United States, Britain and several other European countries. Of key importance to the Boim’s lawsuit, they also claimed that Hamas control centers raise funds from sympathetic parties in different countries, then launder the money to operatives in the Middle East. Operatives in the Middle East, in turn, use the money to train terrorists, provide support for terrorists’ families and pay for weapons used in terrorist attacks.

I.B. Procedural History

*But the enemy I see wears a cloak of decency...*  

I.B.1. District Court Proceedings

David Boim’s parents, pitted against the faceless enemy of Hamas that took the life of their son, assigned names and faces to those who would provide money to Hamas and included ten defendants in their civil suit in the Northern District of Illinois. Defendant Qurānic Literacy Institute (“QLI”) is a non-profit organization that translates and publishes sacred Islamic texts. The Boims accused QLI of raising and laundering

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18 *Id.*

19 *Id.* The Northern District of Illinois’ initial opinion in the Boim litigation, *Boim v. Qurānic Literacy Ins.*, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (hereinafter *Boim I*) notes that Hinawi was granted leave from prison in the same month he was imprisoned. Hinawi did not return to prison and was missing for several months. The court also noted that the United States Ambassador to Israel reported that Hinawi was returned to prison in Palestine at the time of the district court’s opinion in 2001. The Israel government’s request to transfer Hinawi to its control has not been met. *Id.* For an account of the Justice Department’s actions in the Boim murder, see Nathan Lewin, *A Promise the U.S. Makes, But Does Not Keep*, Washington Post, August 25, 2002, at B01. Lewin served as the Boims’ counsel in both the civil case and criminal investigation. *Id.*

20 *Ungar*, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 94.

21 *Boim II*, 291 F.3d at 1002.

22 *Id.*

23 *Id.* See also Don Van Natta Jr., *Arrests in U.S. Break Terrorist Network Units*, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 15, 2001, at A5.

24 *Boim II*, 291 F.3d at 1002. The defendant’s appeal in *Boim II* comes from an interlocutory appeal after the denial of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. *Id.* For the purposes of ruling on this motion, the court “accept[s] all factual allegations in the complaint and draw[s] all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the Boims, the plaintiffs here.” *Id.* at 1008 (internal citation omitted). For this reason, any allegations regarding the liability of the defendants in the *Boim* litigation remain unproven allegations, taken as true only for the purposes of ruling on the motion to dismiss.

25 *Boim I*, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1005, 1010; *Boim II*, 291 F.3d at 1003-04.

26 Bob Dylan, *Slow Train in Slow Train Coming* (Columbia Records, 1979) (33 rpm L.P. recording)

27 *Boim I*, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1006-08.

28 *Id.* at 1006.
money for Hamas.\textsuperscript{29} Also named in the lawsuit was the Holy Land Relief Fund (“HLF”).\textsuperscript{30} HLF is a California corporation with offices in Illinois and Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{31} Similar to QLI, HLF is organized as a non-profit charitable organization to fund and conduct humanitarian relief and development efforts.\textsuperscript{32} The Boims accused HLF of raising and channeling funds to finance Hamas terrorist agents in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{33}

Also named as defendants in the Boims’ lawsuit were individuals Mohammed Abdul Hamid Khalil Salah and Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook.\textsuperscript{34} Additionally, American corporations Islamic Association for Palestine, American Middle Eastern League For Palestine, and United Association For Studies and Research were named defendants.\textsuperscript{35} The Boims accused these corporations of channeling money to Hamas for illicit terrorist activities.\textsuperscript{36}

The Boims brought their lawsuit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333, which provides civil remedies for those injured “by reason of an act of international terrorism.”\textsuperscript{37} The Boims sought treble damages for their injuries and an injunction against all defendants to cease collecting and channeling money for Hamas.\textsuperscript{38} The essential theory of the Boims’ case was that, although Hinawi and Al-Sharif actually committed David Boim’s murder, these two were “aided, abetted, and financed by the other defendants named in th[e] complaint.”\textsuperscript{39}

All served defendants, with the exception of the United Association for Studies and Research, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\textsuperscript{40} The moving defendants argued that “the federal statute that was invoked by the plaintiffs…does not render them [defendants] liable for the murder of an American citizen…unless they have participated directly in that murder.”\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Id.} QLI’s formal links to Hamas are also discussed in \textit{United States v. One 1997 E35 Ford Van}, 50 F. Supp. 2d 789 (N.D. Ill. 1999).


\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Boim I}, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Id.} at 1006-07. Marzook and Salah’s formal links to Hamas had been established in \textit{Matter of Extradition of Marzook}, 924 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Boim I}, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Id.} \textit{Boim I} also intricately illustrated how many named defendants were linked to each other in some manner or other. \textit{Id.} at 1008-09.

\textsuperscript{37} 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (1992). What is currently codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 – 2339B was previously known as the “Antiterrorism Act of 1990.” Congress, however, repealed the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 in its entirety in March 1991. The \textit{Boim I} court noted that the repealed sections were “essentially reenacted under a different title.” \textit{Boim I}, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1004 n.1; see also \textit{Boim II}, 291 F.3d at 1009 n.6 (noting that repealed provisions were re-enacted as part of the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992)).

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Boim I}, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1010.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Id.} Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides: “The following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: … (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The moving defendants were so confident that the plaintiffs’ claim was frivolous that they accompanied their motion to dismiss with a Rule 11 motion for sanctions. \textit{Boim I}, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 n.6.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Id.} at 1010.
section 2331. Secondly, the defendants noted that since the Boims’ complaint only accused the defendants of “aid[ing] and abett[ing] acts of international terrorism,” and that since the plain language of section 2333 does not specifically mention civil liability for such a cause of action, the Boims’ suit fails.

For reasons more thoroughly explained in section II of this article, \textit{Boim I} found that: first, funding a terrorist group, simpliciter, without knowledge or participation in the eventual violent act, does not rise to the level of an act of “international terrorism” or an “activity involving violent acts dangerous to human life” under section 2331. This would prove only a phyriss victory for the defendants, however, as \textit{Boim I} went on to hold that sections 2339A and 2339B prohibiting “material support to terrorists” would allow a civil cause of action under section 2333 for funding, provided the elements of knowledge and intent are also met. Likewise, for any funding that took place before the effective date of sections 2339A and 2339B, the Boims could proceed on the theory that the defendants aided and abetted an act of international terrorism consistent with the language of section 2331, which defines acts of international terrorism. Lastly, \textit{Boim I} held that imposing liability for providing material support or aiding and abetting an act of international terrorism does not run afoul of the freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment. In the end, the Boims had pleaded facts sufficient to satisfy a cause of action for providing material aid or aiding and abetting and act of international terrorism. To that end, the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and Rule 11 motion for sanctions were denied.

\textbf{I.B.2. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals}

Because the Northern District of Illinois’ denial of the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was neither a final decision immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or subject to

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42 \textit{Id.} at 1011.
43 \textit{Id.}
44 Though section II discusses the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in \textit{Boim II}, that decision affirms the district court in most regards. Any divergences from the district court opinion are also noted in section II.
45 \textit{Boim I}, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-15. Elsewhere, \textit{Boim I} used an alternative wording for this holding: “[A]llegations of contributions to foreign terrorists groups, without more direct dealing with the group, does not constitute an “activity involving violent acts or acts dangerous to human life.” \textit{Boim I}, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1015 (emphasis added).
46 \textit{Id.} at 1012-16.
47 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Providing material support to terrorists) was added in 1994, while 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations) was added in 1996.
48 \textit{Boim I}, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1017-18. Similar to proving civil liability for the criminal offense of providing material support to terrorists under sections 2339A and 2339B, the Boims must also prove the “knowledge and intent” elements of aiding and abetting and act of international terrorism in order to prove civil liability. \textit{Id.} at 1018. In addition, because the section 2339 and the criminal action of aiding and abetting requires “material” support, the element of a causal link to the terrorist act is also satisfied. \textit{Id.} at 1019.
49 \textit{Id.} at 1020-21.
50 \textit{Id.} at 1021.
the Cohen collateral order doctrine, the district court certified three issues for interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

(1) Does funding, simpliciter, of an international terrorist organization constitute an act of terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2331?
(2) Does 18 U.S.C. § 2333 incorporate the definitions of international terrorism found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B?
(3) Does a civil cause of action lie under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 and 2333 for aiding and abetting international terrorism? For reasons fully set forth in Section II of this article, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Rovner, held: first, that funding alone is not sufficient to constitute an act of terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2331; second, funding that meets the definitions of criminal liability under section 2339B does create liability under section 2333; and, third, funding that meets the definition of aiding and abetting an act of terrorism also creates liability under sections 2331 and 2333. In addition to answering these three certified questions, Boim II also agreed with the district court that civil liability for funding a foreign terrorist organization does not offend the First Amendment, provided plaintiffs have knowledge and intent to provide material support. In the end, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district courts denial of the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

51 For an explanation of the Cohen doctrine see Cherry v. University of Wisconsin System Bd. of Regents, 265 F.3d 541, 546-47 (7th Cir. 2001).
52 Boim v. Quaranic Literacy Institute, et al., Case No. 00-C-2905, Order (N.D. Ill. February 22, 2001). Interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is appropriate in the Seventh Circuit when: the appeal presents a question of law; it is controlling; it is contestable; its resolution will expedite the resolution of the litigation; and the petition to appeal is filed in the district court within a reasonable amount of time after entry of the order sought to be appealed. Ahrenholtz v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 219 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 2000).
53 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1007 (quoting Boim v. Quaranic Literacy Institute, et al., Case No. 00-C-2905, Order (N.D. Ill. February 22, 2001)).
54 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1028.
55 Id. at 1021-27.
56 Id. at 1028. The opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was released on June 5, 2002. Id. at 1000. The HLF’s petition for rehearing en banc was denied on July 3, 2002. Id. On July 10, 2002, the HLF, represented by Akin, Gump of Washington D.C., filed a motion to stay the mandate order under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(d)(2)(A). Boim v. Quaranic Literacy Ins., et al, 297 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2002) (hereinafter “Boim III”). Under rule 41(d)(2)(A), the court may stay a mandate order pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. The moving party, however, “must show that the certiorari petition would present a substantial question and that there is good cause for a stay.” Fed.R. App. P. 41(d)(2)(A). HLF’s attempt to show good cause was its failure to consult with its attorneys regarding whether or not to file a certiorari petition. Id. at 543. Judge Rovner flatly rejected the motion. Id. at 544.
II. **Boim II**: Holding

*But if you want money for people with minds that hate…*  

The *Boim II* panel was presented with an opportunity seldom met in our litigious culture – writing on a “tabula rasa” about the meaning and scope of federal statutes, which will certainly grow in importance in a post-9/11 America. As noted previously, the Seventh Circuit answered three certified questions. Each question relates to its companion questions and each answer builds in part on arguments and logic from other questions. For the sake of clarity, this article will address each certified question in separate sections.

II.A. Question One

The first question addressed was whether funding, simpliciter, of an international terrorist organization constitute an act of terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2331. Though section 2333 provided the actual basis for the Boims’ cause of action in federal court, its reference and incorporation of the statutory definition of international terrorism found in section 2331 necessitated the interpretation of both statutes. Section 2333 provides, in relevant part:

> Any national of the United States injured in his or her person…but reason of an action of international terrorism…may sue therefore in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.

The term “international terrorism” used in section 2333 is defined in section 2331:

> [A]ctivities that (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States of any State.

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60 *Boim II*, 291 F.3d at 1009.
Therefore, in order to implicate QLC and HLF in the act of terrorism, the Boims argued that a payment to a known terrorist group “involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life” within the meaning of section 2331. As a starting premise, Boim II did not dispute that David Boim’s murder was a “violent act.” Boim II next found an inherent ambiguity in the language of the statute concerning whether a simple provision of funds to terrorist groups “involves” a violent act. Turning to the legislative history for guidance, Boim II determined that Congress intended sections 2331 and 2333 to: “codify general common law tort principles” while “reach[ing] beyond those persons who themselves commit the violent act that directly causes the injury.”

While the statutory intent to reach persons beyond those who commit the violent act would favor the Boims’ theory of liability (that funding alone constitutes an act of terrorism), the statutory language and imported tort principles mandated a different reading. Most problematic for the Boims’ theory of liability was the statutory language “by reason of… .” Boim II noted that such statutory language indicates a proximate cause requirement. Proximate cause would rest upon whether David Boim’s murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the donation. The plaintiffs’ theory, conversely, would “hold the defendants liable for donating money with knowledge of the donee’s intended criminal use of the funds [and] would impose strict liability.” Therefore, because the statute contemplates a showing of proximate cause, the Boims’ first theory of liability, that funding simpliciter constitutes an act of terrorism, was erroneous.

Given the inherent tension between the intent to stop terrorism at all points along the causal chain and the imported common law tort elements, Boim II was careful to remark that this portion of the holding refers only to funding simpliciter, or funding a terrorist group without any knowledge or intent to further criminal acts. Liability for funding a terrorist organization with knowledge and intent to further its criminal actions is covered under question three, which discusses civil liability for aiding and abetting an act of international terrorism.

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63 Id.; Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1009.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1009-10. Boim II cites the multiple definitions of the word “involve” in the Webster’s Dictionary for proof of this alleged ambiguity. Id. at 1010.
67 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1011.
70 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1012.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. Boim II hints that if funding alone constitutes an act of international terrorism, then sections 2333 and 2331 would be subject to First Amendment Constitutional infirmities. Id. at 1011; see also DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 484 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (courts should construe statutes to avoid First Amendment problems.).
74 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1012, 1016-1021.
This portion of Boim II’s holding is relatively non-controversial, though the district court and appellate court arrived at the same conclusion via a slightly different route. In its analysis of whether ignorant funding, or funding simpliciter, constitutes an “act of terrorism” under section 2331, Boim I focused its attention on whether the party giving money to the terrorists had knowledge of the illicit activity and acted in furtherance of the illicit goal. Boim I appears to collapse these two elements into a standard of “direct dealing with the [terrorist] group.” While Boim II agreed that the statute requires some showing of “knowledge” and “intent to further…the criminal acts,” they indicate that the language “by reason of” in section 2333 also requires a showing of proximate cause. For Boim II, the elements of “knowledge” and “intent to further the criminal act” collapse into a proximate cause standard that rests on whether “murder was a reasonably foreseeable result of making a donation.” While this rationale clearly supports Boim II’s resolution of this issue, the elements of knowledge, intent, material aid, and proximate cause take on a greater importance in the examination of certified questions two and three, concerning secondary liability and aiding and abetting.

II.B. Question Two

Certified question two concerned whether the criminal violation of knowingly providing material support to terrorists, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B, also constitutes a civil cause of action under section 2333. Section 2339A prohibits the provision of material support to terrorists. Material support, in turn, is defined as:

[C]urrency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.

Section 2339B, passed in 1996, extends criminal liability to those providing material support to foreign terrorists specifically.

Whoever…knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

75 Based on the relationship between the civil and criminal anti-terrorism statutes, the Seventh Circuit requested a brief from the United States government on appeal. Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1009 n.7. The government agreed with the defendants that section 2331 and 2333 did not impose liability for funding simpliciter of a terrorist organization. Id. at 1011.
77 Id. at 1015
78 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1011.
79 Id. at 1012.
80 Id. at 1012-13.
81 Id.
Boim II observed that in enacting section 2339B, Congress “intended that the persons providing financial support to terrorist should also be held criminally liable for those violent acts.” In a similar way, the Congressional record for section 2333 indicates that Congress intended “to cut off the flow of money in support of terrorism generally.” Noting that there is no “textual, structural, or logical justification for construing civil liability imposed by section 2333 more narrowly than the criminal provisions,” Boim II determined that a violation of criminal section 2339 would be sufficient to satisfy an act of international terrorism under sections 2331 and 2333. “[I]t would be counterintuitive to conclude that Congress imposed criminal liability in sections 2339A and 2339B on those who financed terrorism, but did not intend to impose civil liability on those same persons through section 2333.” Bolstering this determination was the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) that strips sovereign immunity and attaches civil liability to countries that provide material support to terrorists.

In construing what constitutes “material support” in sections 2339A and 2339B, Boim II corrected the district court’s reference to “substantial or considerable” support. The statute defines material support as “currency or other financial securities, financial services…” but makes no mention as to the amount of support necessary. Indeed, Boim II observed that the statute contemplates the “type of aid provided rather than whether it is substantial or considerable.” Boim II also rectified the District Court’s mistake regarding the time frame in which sections 2339A and 2339B analyses are applicable. Boim I originally held that the prohibitions of sections 2339A and 2339B could not be used in a civil matter alleging material aid before the sections’ respective dates of effective passage. Boim II, however, noted that the effective dates of sections 2339A and 2339B passages are irrelevant because “we are using sections 2339A and 2339B not as independent sources of liability under section 2333, but to amplify what Congress meant by ‘international terrorism.’” “No timing problem arises because sections 2339A and 2339B merely elucidate conduct that was already prohibited by sections 2333.”

Boim II’s interpretation of the relationship amongst sections 2331, 2333, 2339A and 2339B draws upon its holding in certified question one, though it also begins to reveal inconsistencies that will continue into question three. In certified question one, Boim II held that plaintiffs were required to show that the contributing defendants had “knowledge” and “intent to further…criminal acts” before assessing liability under section 2333. Section 2339B requires an element of “knowing[ ]” and “material support,” but does not require an “intent to further … criminal acts.” Despite this

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84 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1014.
85 Id. (quoting Sen. Rpt. 102-342 at 22 (July 27, 1992)).
86 Id. at 1015.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1015 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1607(a)(7)). Section 1607 is discussed in section III of this article.
89 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1015.
91 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1015.
92 Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1016-17.
93 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1016.
94 Id.
96 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1016.
inconsistency, *Boim II* clearly held that “conduct that would give rise to criminal liability under section 2339B...meet[s] the definition of international terrorism as that term is used section 2333.”  

II.C. Question Three

The third and most difficult certified question concerned whether QLC and HLF could be held civilly liable under section 2333 for “aiding and abetting an act of international terrorism.”  

The civil cause of action for aiding and abetting and the statutory prohibitions governing the provision of material support found in sections 2339A and 2339B both impose liability on those who do not commit the violent act itself, but fund and lend material support to such acts.  

Because much of the Boims’ complaint concerned support provided before the passage of sections 2339A and 2339B, the Boims were forced to rely on section 2333 alone and an aiding and abetting cause of action.  

By the time *Boim II* reached this third certified question, it had already explained that “sections 2339A and 2339B merely elucidate[d] conduct that was already prohibited by section 2333.”  

Therefore, it was certain that *Boim II* would find that section 2333 encompassed a cause of action for “aiding and abetting an act of terrorism,” which, essentially, was the common law counterpoint for the statutory prohibitions against providing material support to terrorists. 

Though *Boim II* had already provided a strong foundation to support its answer that section 2333 allows liability for aiding and abetting an act of terrorism, *Boim II* had yet to examine the 1994 Supreme Court case *Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.* In *Central Bank,* the Supreme Court determined that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not provide a civil cause of action for aiding and abetting securities violations. 

Using the language of the Securities Exchange Act as a starting point, *Central Bank* first recognized that a civil cause of action under section 10(b) is implied, not expressly granted. 

Secondly, *Central Bank* determined that the language “directly or indirectly” in the statute does not provide a cause of action for aiding and abetting a deceptive act: “[A]iding and abetting liability extends beyond persons who engage, even indirectly, in proscribed activity.” 

QLI and HLF utilized strong language from *Central Bank* regarding statutory interpretation of aiding and abetting liability:

Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so. If, as respondents seem to say, Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we presume it would have used the words

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97 Id. at 1028.
98 Id. at 1016.
99 See id. at 1015-21.
100 Id. at 1016.
101 See id. at 1015-21.
103 Id. at 177-78.
104 Id. at 172.
105 Id. at 176.
“aid” and “abet” in the statutory text. But it did not.\textsuperscript{106}… Thus, when Congress enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant for the defendant’s violation of some statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors.\textsuperscript{107}

Based on this language from \textit{Central Bank}, \textit{Boim II} was presented with two options: distinguish and limit the holding of \textit{Central Bank} to the narrow factual scenario of the case; or presume that sections 2331 and 2333 do not allow a cause of action for civil aiding and abetting because the exact words are not found in the statute. \textit{Boim II} chose the former, distinguishing \textit{Central Bank} on four grounds.\textsuperscript{108}

First, \textit{Boim II} argued that \textit{Central Bank} addressed aiding and abetting liability for a 10(b) \textit{implied} right of action, as opposed to the \textit{express} cause of action granted in section 2333.\textsuperscript{109} This distinction was important for \textit{Boim II} because, in order to find a cause of action for aiding and abetting an act of securities fraud, \textit{Central Bank} would have been required to “pile inference upon inference in determining Congressional intent.”\textsuperscript{110} However, in section 2333, with its express cause of action for those injured by an act of terrorism, “Congress’ intent is clear from the language and structure of the statute itself as well as from the legislative history”\textsuperscript{111} – no inference piling was necessary.

The second distinguishing factor is “that the language and legislative history of section 2333 evidence an intent to import general tort law principles into the statute, a factor glaringly absent from section 10(b).”\textsuperscript{112} This distinguishing factor relied heavily on \textit{Boim II’s} previous answer to certified question one, discussing the presence of traditional tort law elements in section 2333.\textsuperscript{113} In section 10(b), however, Congress has “manifest[ed] a deliberate choice to exclude aiding and abetting liability.”\textsuperscript{114}

\textit{Boim II’s} strongest argument distinguishing \textit{Central Bank} was that “Congress also expressed an intent in section 2333 to make civil liability at least as extensive as criminal liability.”\textsuperscript{115} This argument derives its strength from the plain language of the statute. The language of section 2333 allows suit from any national “injured…by reason of an act of international terrorism.”\textsuperscript{116} Section 2331, in turn, defines “international terrorism” as “activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States.”\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Boim II} noted that “activities that ‘involve’ violent acts, taken at face value would certainly cover aiding and abetting violent acts.”\textsuperscript{118} Secondly, aiding and abetting a criminal act is also a violation of the criminal laws of the

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Id.} at 176-77 (internal citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Id.} at 182 (internal citation omitted)
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Boim II}, 291 F.3d at 1019-21.
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Id.} at 1019.
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Id.} at 1020.
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{See supra} notes 60-79
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Boim II}, 291 F.3d at 1020.
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Boim II}, 291 F.3d at 1020.
In sum, “[b]y incorporating violations of any criminal laws that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life, Congress was expressly including aiding and abetting to the extent that aiding and abetting ‘involves’ violence.”

Lastly, *Boim II* distinguished *Central Bank* on the grounds that aiding and abetting liability is necessary in order to effectuate “Congress’ clearly expressed intent to cut off the flow of money to terrorists at every point along the causal chain of violence.”

Though policy considerations were unnecessary to consider in light of plain language of section 2331, *Boim II* maintained that “the statute would have little effect if liability were limited to the persons who pull the trigger or plant the bomb.” Therefore, the only way for the statute to have any teeth at all “is to impose liability on those who knowingly and intentionally supply the funds to the persons who commit the violent acts.”

III.  *Ungar* and Section 1607(a)(7)

*Persecution, execution, governments out of control...*

III.A. *Ungar*: Facts

Yaron Ungar and his wife were killed in a terrorist machine gun attack on June 9, 1996 near Beit Shemesh, Israel. Four of the five Palestinian men responsible for the murders were apprehended and confessed to the Ungars’ murders. The Ungars’ executor and family members sued, among others, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, and three Iranian government officials. The Ungars based jurisdiction over these defendants, as well as the defendants’ ultimate liability, on a 1996 amendment the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

In 1996, as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Congress added an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Acts (“FSIA”) to allow liability against a foreign state and individual officeholders for claims

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119 Id., (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1948)).


Major Premise: Activities that involves violent acts under section 2331 are acts of terrorism under section 2333.

Minor Premise: Aiding and abetting a violent act is an activity that involves violent acts under section 2331.

Conclusion: Aiding and abetting a violent act is an act of terrorism under section 2333.

121 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1021.

122 Id.

123 Id.


125 Ungar, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 92.

126 Id. at 93.

127 Id.

arising out of state sponsored terrorism. The amendment was also enacted retroactively, encompassing causes of action arising both before and after its passage.

If a state is not entitled to immunity due to sponsorship of terrorism and State Department designation as a sponsor of terrorism, it will be held liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”

Eschewing a personal appearance in court, state sponsors of terrorism will often fail to appear, resulting in a request for a default judgment – a scenario that took place in Ungar. A default judgment may be granted, however, only if supported by “evidence satisfactory to the court.”

III.B. Ungar: Holding

In assessing whether the Ungars had produced sufficient evidence for a default judgment against Iran for sponsorship of the Ungars’ assassination, the court struggled with the legal standard necessary to implicate a state sponsor of terrorism under section 1605 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Similar to the issues presented in the discussion of Boim II and section 2333, Ungar specifically noted the ambiguity in sections 1607 and 2339 regarding what causal nexus between the support of terrorism and the specific terrorist act is necessary to trigger, first, jurisdiction, and, second, liability. While a simple allegation that the country in question provided material support that caused the plaintiff’s injury is sufficient for jurisdiction under section 1607(a), liability depends on the elusive but-for causation. Ungar describes the standard that plaintiffs must satisfy: “Plaintiffs have established that Iran provided extensive support to HAMAS, but their proof does not link that support to the Ungar murders specifically.”

The language of section 1607 provides that a foreign state is not entitled to immunity from suit for “personal injury or death that was caused by … the provision of material support or resources” to a terrorist organization. With the statute’s causation requirement in mind, the Ungars proceeded on two causes of action in order to implicate Iran in the death of Yaron Ungar. Like the Boims, the Ungars alleged that Iran aided and abetted the tortious conduct. Relying on Halberstam v. Welch, a case from the

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129 Ungar, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 91 n.3.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 98-101.
133 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976). Ungar also construes what evidentiary standard must be present to “satisfy the court” pursuant to section 1608(e). Ungar eventually settles on the standard for granting judgment as a matter of law under federal rule of civil procedure 50(a) – a legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff. Ungar, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 98.
135 Id. at 98-101.
136 Id. at 98-99.
137 Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
139 Ungar, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
District of Columbia Circuit, Ungar construed civil aiding and abetting to require: a wrongful act causing an injury aided by the defendant; the defendant’s knowledge of the act at the time he or she provided the assistance; and substantial assistance in the wrongful act. Though Ungar devoted little discussion to the application of the elements, it appears that prong one is surely met by the murder of the Yaron Ungar. Prong two, essentially a knowledge element, appears to be met as well. Iran’s formal links to the known terrorist group Hamas were well-established: “Here, plaintiffs have established that Iran provided extensive support to HAMAS…”. However, Ungar found a deficiency in prong three, the link to the wrongful act: “[t]heir proof does not link that support to the Ungar murders specifically.”

The Ungars also alleged that Iran and Hamas had engaged in a civil conspiracy to murder Yaron Ungar. Again relying on Halberstam for the elements of this cause of action, Ungar required the following proof:

(1) [A]n agreement between two or more persons; (2) to participate in an unlawful or tortious act; (3) an injury caused by an unlawful or tortious over act performed by one of the parties; (4) which was done pursuant to and in furtherance of the common scheme.

Because the civil conspiracy analysis does not require proof of “knowing and substantial assistance to a particular act,” it appears that it would be easier for the Ungars would be easier to produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the standard. Ungar, however, held that there was insufficient evidence to establish any sort of “common and unlawful plan” between Iran, Hamas and the ultimate shooters. In so holding, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment without prejudice, allowing them to renew their motion with new evidence.

140 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Halberstam’s explanation of civil aiding and abetting is explored fully in section IV of this article.
141 211 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
142 Id. See also id. at 94-97.
143 Id. at 99.
144 Id. at 100 (citing Halberstam).
145 Id. at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146 Id. In so holding, the court focused its attention on the fact that the actual shooters were only loosely affiliated with Hamas and were not full-fledged members of the group. Therefore, the court reasoned, it is unlikely that a mere henchman at the “end of a long chain conspiracy knew of the existence of the larger conspiracy.” Id. If the shooters were full-fledged, known members of Hamas, knowledge of Iranian support would surely have been more likely based upon the known link between the groups. See Mousa, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 11-12, and Eisenfield, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 7-9.
147 211 F. Supp. 2d at 100. Because of the novel nature of the questions presented concerning causation in the joint tort theories of liability, Ungar also indicated its willingness to certify a 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) interlocutory appeal. Id. at 100-01.
IV. Boim and Ungar: Their Inconsistencies and an Alternative Interpretation

There’s too much confusion, I can’t get no relief...  

Due in part, perhaps, to the phrasing of the questions certified for appeal, Boim II provides its analysis of the elements necessary to sustain a section 2333 civil cause of action in a piecemeal fashion. This section will summarize the elements outlined above, identify certain inconsistencies in the reasoning and requirements of both Boim and Ungar, and also indicate, when applicable, arguments and interpretations to maximize a plaintiff’s likelihood of recovery in a section 2333 and 1607(a) actions against those who provide material aid to terrorists.

IV.A. Joint Tort Causation

The first element that Boim II indicates must be satisfied in a section 2333 action is causation.\(^{149}\) Ungar also focused most of its attention on the factual and proximate cause requirements.\(^{150}\) In its answer to certified question one, Boim II indicates that the presence of the statutory language “by reason of” in section 2333 requires a plaintiff to show proximate causation.\(^{151}\) “The plaintiff’s must be able to show that murder was a reasonably foreseeable result of making a donation.”\(^{152}\) Boim II also cites Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,\(^{153}\) for that proposition that the statutory language “by reason of” necessitates a proximate cause requirement.\(^{154}\) Holmes clearly interprets such statutory language to require not only a proximate cause, but also factual, or but-for causation, as well.\(^{155}\) This portion of the Boim holding creates potentially irresolvable tension with its holding in question three, which holds that aiding and abetting and other forms of secondary liability constitute an “act of terrorism.”\(^{156}\) In short, because the common forms of secondary liability do not necessarily require a traditional showing of but-for and legal causation related to the aider and abetter, the statutory requirement to prove causation exceeds what a plaintiff can practically accomplish in a litigation process.

The seminal case regarding secondary liability and joint torts, Halberstam v. Welch,\(^{157}\) explains and distinguishes two of the most common forms: civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting:

\(^{148}\) Bob Dylan, All Along the Watchtower in John Wesley Harding (Sony Records, 1967) (33 rpm L.P. recording).
\(^{149}\) 291 F.3d at 1011-12.
\(^{150}\) 211 F. Supp. 2d at 98-100.
\(^{151}\) 291 F.3d at 1012.
\(^{152}\) Id.
\(^{153}\) 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The Halberstam panel is also noteworthy. Judge Wald wrote the majority opinion for future Supreme Court Justice, then-Judge, Antonin Scalia and future Supreme Court nominee Judge Robert Bork.
Civil conspiracy includes: (1) an agreement between two or more persons; (2) to participate in an unlawful act; (3) an injury caused by an unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties to the agreement; (4) which overt act was done pursuant to and in furtherance of the common scheme.

Aiding-abetting includes the following elements: (1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.

These two theories of joint liability correspond to the first two subsections of section 876 in the Second Restatement of Torts. The Restatement includes a caveat which encapsulates the ambiguity regarding causation in secondary liability: “The Institute takes no position on whether the rules stated in this Section are applicable when the conduct of either the actor or the other if free from intent to do harm or negligence but involves strict liability for the resulting harm.” While secondary liability clearly would require some sort damage resulting from an intentional injury or negligence, cases applying these legal theories and the Restatement examples clearly do not require both parties to be the factual and proximate cause of the resultant damage. As one commentator has noted: “There is no requirement that [the join tortfeasor] be the ‘but for’ cause of the accident.” W. Page Keeton similarly commented regarding proximate

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159 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(a) & (b) (1977).

160 Id. caveat.

161 See, e.g., Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822, 822-23 (N.M. App. 1979) (verbal encouragement given during battery creates joint liability for the tort).

162 See, e.g., Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grim, 440 P.2d 621, 625-26 (Kan. 1968) (boy who broke into church was jointly liable when his co-conspirator set fire to the building).

163 See Rael, 604 P.2d at 822-23, and Grim, 440 P.2d at 625-26. See also Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1035-37 (D. Mass. 1981) (joint theories of liability in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 assess liability without traditional tort causation); Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397, 400 (Okla. 1958). In Keel, the court held a defendant liable as an aider and abettor for a girl’s injury though the defendant was only handing erasers to other boys to throw across the room. Keel explicitly rejected any cause in fact requirement, noting that it was immaterial whether the defendant aided the actual boy who threw the offending eraser because of the defendant’s overall participation in the general tortious activity.

164 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. on clause (b), illus. 10: “A and B conspire to burglarize C’s safe. B, who is the active burglar, after entering the house and without A’s knowledge of his intention to do so, burns the house in order to conceal the burglary. A is subject to liability to C, not only for the conversion of the contents of the safe but also for the destruction of the house.”

cause that “[I]t makes no difference that the damage inflicted by one tortfeasor exceeds what the other might reasonably have foreseen.”

In addition to the discrepancy in reconciling this causation requirement with the elements of traditional joint torts and secondary liability, the causation element Boim II and Ungar require would be difficult to prove. American organizations that fund Hamas and other terrorist organizations do so in a covert fashion. As Boim I explained the funding process:

Hamás’ presence in the United States is significant but covert. It conducts its affairs through a network of front organizations that ostensibly have religious and charitable purposes… These organizations’ purportedly humanitarian functions mask their mission of raising and funneling money and other resources to Hamas operatives to support their terrorist campaigns.

Boim II further explains the complicated process by which American organizations fund Hamas:

The money flows through a series of complicated transactions, changing hands a number of times, and being commingled with funds from the front organizations’ legitimate charitable and business dealings. The funds are laundered in a variety of ways, including through real estate deals and through Swiss bank accounts.

Both courts also noted that Hamas receives up to one-third of its multi-million dollar budget from overseas fund-raising. Practically speaking, it would be near impossible for a plaintiff to carry its burden of proving that a monetary contribution to an American charitable organization, after passing through several laundering channels to an overseas terrorist organization, was used to finance and, ultimately, cause the violent act that forms the basis of the plaintiff’s suit. As Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, a case from the Ninth Circuit discussing section 2339, observed: “Once the support [to terrorism] is given, the donor has no control over how it is used.” In addition, sections 2339A and 2339B, which provide criminal penalties for providing material support to terrorists, do not require that the aid be proximately related to a violent act.

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166 W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton, Torts 323 n.7 (5th ed., 1984) [hereinafter Keeton et al, Torts] (citing Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950)).
167 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1005.
168 291 F.3d at 1004.
169 Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1005; Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1003.
171 Id. at 1134.
It its discussion of the criminal section 2339B,\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Humanitarian Law Project} argued that any showing of factual or proximate cause relating to a donation to overseas terrorism is practically impossible to prove.

Congress explicitly incorporated a finding into the statute that “foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.” It follows that all material support given to such organization aids their unlawful goals…Therefore, when someone makes a donation to them, \textit{there is no way to tell how the donation is used}…Even contributions earmarked for peaceful purposes can be used to give aid to the families of those killed while carrying out terrorist acts, thus making the decision to engage in terrorism more attractive.\textsuperscript{174}

The legislative history of section 2333 also recognizes that the statute does not address a typical cause of action. “Title X [section 2333] would allow the law to catch up with contemporary reality by providing victims of terrorism with a remedy for a wrong that, by its nature, falls outside the usual jurisdictional categories of wrongs that national legal systems have traditionally addressed.”\textsuperscript{175} Additionally, the legislative history indicates that this nontraditional cause of action should not necessarily require the traditional elements of factual and proximate causation. “The imposition of liability \textit{at any point along the causal chain} of terrorism…would interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of money.”\textsuperscript{176} An imposition of liability “at any point along the causal chain” stands in stark contrast to the imposition of liability at only those points proximately related to, or the but-for cause of the act of terrorism as \textit{Boim II} and \textit{Ungar} require. Likewise, the legislative history envisions that section 2333 would allow varied causes of action. “The substance of such an action is not defined by statute because the fact patterns giving rise to such suits will be as varied and numerous as those found in the law of torts.”\textsuperscript{177} Therefore, section 2333 could encompass causes of action such as a civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting, which, arguably, do not require such a showing of causation.\textsuperscript{178}

In order to rectify the inconsistency between \textit{Boim II} and \textit{Ungar}’s causation requirements and the lack thereof in joint tort theory, the “by reason of” language in section 2333, based on Supreme Court discussion of similar language in other federal statutes, may not require a rigid but-for factual causation and proximate causation in order to assess liability. This solution would fully effectuate the purposes of the act as evidenced in the legislative history while remaining within the plain language of the statute.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{173} According to \textit{Boim II}, a violation of section 2339B also leads to civil liability under section 2333. 291 F.3d at 1016. Though \textit{Humanitarian Law Project} discusses only section 2339B, its observations are relevant to a 2333 analysis as both sections prohibit the provision of material support to terrorism with corresponding criminal and civil penalties.

\textsuperscript{174} 205 F.3d at 1136 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).


\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Id.} (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Id.} at *45.

\textsuperscript{178} See, e.g., cases cited supra nn. 161-63, 166.

In *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*, the Supreme Court addressed the standard of causation required by the words “because of” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Court noted that “[t]o construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for causation’… is to misunderstand them.” In the typical but-for inquiry, “ask whether, even if that factor had been absent, the even nevertheless would have transpired in the same way.” *Price-Waterhouse* alters this inquiry slightly: “the words ‘because of’ do no mean ‘solely because of.’” Therefore, in the context of Title VII, “[w]hen…an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision was ‘because of’ sex and the other, legitimate considerations…” This approach is adaptable for analyzing the causation required by section 2333. As a preliminary consideration, there is no difference in the meaning of “because of” as opposed to “by reason of” – both contemplate the same level of causation. Based on the *Price Waterhouse* analysis, “by reason of” does not mean “solely by reason of,” nor does it require a plaintiff to show traditional but-for causation. Using the standard outlined in *Price Waterhouse*, if a plaintiff shows that terrorist organization that injured him was funded at least in some part by the defendant, then he succeeds in showing that he was injured “by reason of” the funding, though others may have also funded the act.

*Price Waterhouse* illustrates this interpretation of the causation requirement with an example of a joint tort:

Suppose two physical forces act upon and move an object, and suppose that either force acting alone would have moved the object. As the dissent would have it, neither physical force was a ‘cause’ of the motion unless we can show that but for one or both of them, the object would not have moved; apparently both forces were simply ‘in the air’ unless we can identify at least one of them as a but-for cause of the object’s movement. Events that are causally overdetermined, in other words, may not have any ‘cause’ at all. This cannot be so.

This example not only comports with the well-settled law of joint torts, but is also particularly applicable to the complex funding of terrorist organizations. As *Boim II* observed, foreign terrorist organizations receive up to one-third of their funding from overseas organizations. While this is a substantial amount, a full two-thirds is then obtained through other channels. As Judge Kozinski wrote in *Humanitarian Law*

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180 490 U.S. 228 (1988).
181 *Id.* at 279-82. As noted in *Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring*, 527 U.S. 581, 626 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting), the statutory language “because of” means “by reason of.”
182 490 U.S. at 240. For a full explanation of the alternatives to but-for causation in the cause-in-fact inquiry, see David W. Robertson, *The Common Sense of Cause in Fact*, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1765 (1997).
183 490 U.S. at 240.
184 *Id.* at 241.
185 *Id.*
186 *Olmstead*, 527 U.S. at 626 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187 490 U.S. at 241.
188 See text accompanying *supra* notes 161-66.
189 291 F.3d at 1003.
Project, “terrorist organizations do not maintain open books” – there is no practical way to determine what exact source of funding was used on specific attacks.

As the cited language indicates, it would be practically impossible to determine that any portion of the funding was the but-for cause of a terrorist attack. Without adopting a Price Waterhouse fashioned causation analysis, no portion of aid could possibly be considered the but-for cause. This incongruous result is clearly outside of Congress’ intent in enacting section 2333. Indeed, in Congressional findings accompanying the passage of the criminal counterpart to section 2333, Congress found that “foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”

A logical conclusion to such a finding eschews any proximate or factual cause requirement: “All material support given to such organizations aids their unlawful goals.”

The requirement of proximate causation in joint torts is, at best, unsettled. While the Restatement allows itself a caveat to account for this inconsistency, its examples and language allow credible arguments to be made in favor and against a proximate cause element. The Restatement offers that “a person who encourages another to commit a tortious act may be responsible for other acts by the other” and provides an example in which a joint tortfeasor is liable for an act of which he is neither the factual or proximate cause.

Immediately following this sentence and example, however, the Restatement states that “ordinarily [a joint tortfeasor is not responsible for other acts…that were not foreseeable by him]” and provides a corresponding example.

Other authorities also disagree. For example, while Keeton writes that “it makes no difference that the damage inflicted by one tortfeasor exceeds what the other might reasonably have foreseen,” the seminal case regarding joint liability, Halberstam v.

205 F.3d at 1136. Nathan Lewin, lawyer for the Boims, similarly remarked: “One argument we made was that after Sept. 11, you can’t tell what is a benign use of funds.” Stephanie Francis Cahill, Hitting Terrorists In the Pocketbook, 24 ABA J. E-Report 5 (2002) (quoting Lewin).


Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136. This argument roughly mirrors the substantial factor alternative to the traditional but-for cause-in-fact requirement. See Robertson, supra note 182, at 1775-81.

While there is no doubt that the alleged injury must be proximately caused by some action or negligence, the inconsistency regarding proximate causation in joint torts refers to whether the particular joint-tortfeasors action is the proximate cause of the injury as well. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts caveat and accompanying text.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 caveat: “The Institute takes no position on whether the rules stated in this Section are applicable when the conduct of either the act or the other is free from …negligence but involves strict liability for the resulting harm.”

Id. at cmt. on clause (b).

Id. at illus. 10. “A and B conspire to burglarize C’s safe. B, who is the active burglar, after entering the house and without A’s knowledge of his intention to do so, burns the house in order to conceal the burglary. A is subject to liability to C, not only for the conversion of the contents of the safe but also for the destruction of the house.”

Id. at cmt. on clause (b).

Id. at illus. 11: “A supplies B with wire cutters to enable B to enter the land of C to recapture chattels belonging to B, who, as A knows, is not privileged to do this. In the course of the trespass upon C’s land, B intentionally sets fire to C’s house. A is not liable for the destruction of the house.”

Keeton et al, supra note 166, at 323 n.7. See also 74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 61 (2002) (“Generally, two or more persons engaged in a common enterprise are jointly liable for the wrongful acts committed in connection with the enterprise when the enterprise is an unlawful one, although the damage done was greater than was foreseen, the particular act done was not contemplated or intended by them all, or only one
Welch, explains that “a person who assists a tortious act may be liable for … reasonably foreseeable acts…”

Boim II, in an attempt to resolve this inconsistency, appears to stand for the proposition that if a terrorism funder has general knowledge of the illicit activity and provides assistance, then the illicit act is reasonably foreseeable and causation element (related to the specific aid as opposed to the tort itself) is satisfied. The terrorist act itself (e.g. bombing, assassination), of course, must still be the proximate and factual cause of the injury, a fact presupposed in Boim II and this article as well. While Boim II and Ungar were correct to require some form of “connection” between the act of aiding and the eventual tort, joint theories of liability provide such a connection, albeit in a more attenuated fashion. The common sense justification for this relatively lax causal nexus is clear: when one joins a tortious act in an unrestricted fashion they are essentially demonstrating their intent to further tortious activity and should be held liable for the injuries of the tort. Indeed, money freely flowing to a known terrorist organization, such as Hamas or Al-Qaeda, creates countless foreseeable risks and an extremely broad class of potential injuries. In order to fully effectuate the purposes of the statutes, courts should construe the foreseeable risks and injuries broadly. As demonstrated below, a general knowledge that the joint tortfeasor will engage in some illegal activity is a necessary, but also a sufficient element to impute the remaining joint tort elements.

The requirement of a knowledge element is well-settled in joint tort law. Though some quantum of knowledge is necessary to succeed in both joint tort theories of civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting, Halberstam notes that “there is a qualitative difference between proving an agreement to participate in a tortious line of conduct, and proving knowing action that substantially aids tortious conduct.” Indeed, in examining the remaining elements necessary to prove secondary liability under section 2333 (knowledge, material aid, intent) there are subtle differences in the elements of the two primary joint tort theories, civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting. For that reason, they are examined separately.

IV.B. Civil Conspiracy: Agreement and Overt Act

As previously listed, the elements of a civil conspiracy include an agreement and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that produced an injury or damages. As opposed to aiding and abetting liability, “the element of agreement is a key distinguishing

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200 705 F.2d at 478 (emphasis in original). Halberstam insinuates that an concerted activity that results in an intentional tort would satisfy both tests for liability, whereas the tort of negligence lends itself only to the aiding and abetting theory.  
201 Id. at 477.
factor for a civil conspiracy action.” The agreement need not be explicit or expressed in words, an agreement may be implied and understood to exist from the conduct itself. The agreement alone does not lead to liability, however, without the performance of some underlying tortious act. Though Boim II discussed secondary liability solely in terms of aiding and abetting liability, the elements of civil conspiracy, as outlined above, appear to satisfy the knowledge requirement. Simply stated, an express or tacit agreement to engage in an unlawful act (funding a terrorist attack) with an overt act done in furtherance of the conspiracy (the attack) satisfies both elements of the civil conspiracy. While proving a tacit agreement to commit a terrorist attack may provide evidentiary challenges for plaintiffs, most civil conspiracy cases are proved by circumstantial evidence. “Mutually supportive activity by parties in contact with one another over a long period suggests a common plan.”

While the knowledge element appears to be a straightforward requirement for liability in a civil conspiracy, its bearing and relation to foreseeability is more discrete. While an agreement to engage in some tortious act and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is necessary, it is not necessary that the tortious action taken be the exact tortious action contemplated by the co-conspirator. Halberstam’s methodical explication of civil conspiracy precedent is particularly helpful in illustrating this distinction. For example, in Davidson v. Simmons, the defendant was held liable for his co-conspirator’s battery on a police officer during a burglary because the battery was an action in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit burglary. Davidson, in turn, cited Tabb v. Norred, which held a defendant liable for his co-conspirator’s shooting of a police officer during a burglary because the “shooting was an act which could reasonably have been anticipated when the conspiracy to commit burglary was executed.” Halberstam aptly summarizes this legal concept:

As to the extent of liability, once the conspiracy has been formed, all its members are liable for injuries caused by acts pursuant to or in furtherance of the conspiracy. A conspirator need not participate actively in or benefit from the wrongful action in order to be found liable. He need not even have planned or known about the injurious action…so long as the purpose of the tortious action was to advance the overall object of the conspiracy.

204 Id.
205 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. on clause (a).
206 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 479.
207 291 F.3d at 1028.
208 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 481.
209 Id. at 480-85.
210 280 N.W.2d 645 (Neb. 1979).
212 Davidson, 280 N.W.2d at 649 (discussing Tabb).
213 705 F.2d at 481. See also David Waksman, Student Author, Causation Concerns in Civil Conspiracy To Violate Rule 10b-5, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1505, 1513-30 (1991). Waksman criticizes the absence of causation in civil conspiracy and argues that a proximate causation element should be introduced into the civil conspiracy cause of action. Waksman focuses his discussion of civil conspiracy in the area of
As a logical result of this holding, the defendant does not need to provide substantial aid in furtherance of the particular tort committed, provided the tort is within the overall scope of the conspiracy.

These distinctions have critical importance in the context of alleging secondary liability for funding a terrorist attack. Presuming a plaintiff could properly prove a conspiracy to engage in a terrorist act through the long relationship of funding and contact between defendants, then the plaintiff need not prove that the exact funding was used in the particular terrorist attack that caused his injury. Based on the law of civil conspiracy, an agreement to further a terrorist attack would not require evidence that the conspiracy planned or contemplated the specific attack that led to the injury. Rather, any attack within the scope of the “overall object of the conspiracy” can lead to liability, hence, Ungar incorrectly required a heightened level of evidence and causation. In short, if the object of the conspiracy is terrorist activity, then any terrorist attack committed would be in furtherance of that ultimate object. It would not matter, for example, whether the funding party had particular knowledge or was the factual or proximate cause of David Boim’s murder or the 9/11 attacks. This lesser standard is of particular aid to plaintiffs requesting a default judgment against a defendant. Previously, the Ungar plaintiffs were in a catch-22 situation when they were required to produce evidence satisfactory to the court to prove that the defaulting defendants were linked to the act that injured the plaintiff without the benefit of discovery. Conversely, a civil conspiracy cause of action does not require substantial aid to a particularly contemplated tort. Provided the tort is within the scope of the agreement, this cause of action is the best possibility for relief against international funders of terrorist activities.

IV.C. Aiding and Abetting: Knowledge and Substantial Aid

As stated, Boim II directs its attention solely to the joint tort of aiding and abetting a tortious act. Boim II indicated that the elements necessary to sustain a cause of action for aiding and abetting an act of terrorism include: knowledge, substantial aid, and an intent to help the illegal activity succeed. As discussed in the context of the joint tort civil conspiracy, some quantum of knowledge about some illicit activity is necessary for the application of this tort. Similar to the analysis of civil conspiracy, the element of knowledge in the aiding and abetting context is intimately tied into reasonable foreseeability and proximate causation. Though there is a practical difference between knowledge of the illicit act and legal causation, cases applying aiding and abetting, including Boim II, insinuate that knowledge and material aid—even without legal cause per se—will suffice to assess liability.

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214 991 F.3d at 1020. See also Halberstam, 705 F.3d at 477; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (b) & cmt. on clause (b).
215 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1016-21; Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487-89; Davidson, 280 N.W.2d at 808-10; Tabb, 277 So.2d at 227-30; Am. Fam. Mu. Ins.Co., 440 P.2d at 625-26; Keel, 331 P.2d at 400-01; Thompson, 180 F.2d at 433-34.
It is easiest to describe the quantum of knowledge necessary to assess liability for aiding and abetting using case precedent as an illustrative guide. The first principle gleaned is that ignorant assistance or aid, or assistance simpliciter, as Boim II phrased it, is insufficient for liability.\textsuperscript{216} For example, in Investors Research Corp. v. SEC,\textsuperscript{217} the District of Columbia Circuit vacated a district court’s finding of aiding and abetting liability against a broker for securities violations because the district court had made no finding regarding the broker’s “general awareness” of the illegal activity.\textsuperscript{218} Investors Research explained that “any [act of aiding and abetting] can be performed in complete good faith by an actor unaware that anything improper is occurring. Where the activities of the alleged aider and abettor are in this respect innocent, it would be unjust to utilize secondary liability to impose punishment….”\textsuperscript{219}

On the other end of the knowledge continuum would be the instance in which an aider and abettor has knowledge of a specific illegal act and substantially assists that act, which is eventually carried out. In this instance, liability clearly would be assessed. The Restatement offers several examples of this scenario: “A, a policeman, advises other policemen to use illegal methods of coercion upon B. A is subject to liability to B for batteries committed in accordance with the advice.”\textsuperscript{220} In a similar fashion, in Rael v. Cadena,\textsuperscript{221} the defendant gave verbal encouragement to an assailant during a battery—thus, the Rael defendant knew of the illicit activity, gave encouragement to engage in that exact activity, and the encouraged activity occurred.\textsuperscript{222} Rael is also a fine example of how joint liability can attach without a finding of factual cause. As Halberstam notes: “The court explained that liability did not require …that the injury had directly resulted from the encouragement.”\textsuperscript{223}

While cases that fall neatly within these two extremes will yield a certain result, there is a third category of aiding and abetting knowledge in which most section 2333 cases will lie. The precise question is whether one may be liable as an aider and abettor if he has knowledge of some illegal activity, but had no knowledge of the exact activity that eventually occurred. As Halberstam phrases this question: “When is a defendant liable for injuries caused by the acts of the person assisted when the acts were not specifically contemplated by the defendant at the time he offered aid?”\textsuperscript{224} In this difficult third category, the issue of reasonable foreseeability alluded to previously enters the analysis. As outlined above, the concept of joint tort liability does not necessarily require the actions of both parties to be the factual and legal cause of the eventual injuries. While the Restatement offers examples indicating that specific knowledge of the particular tort is not necessary for liability, provided there is general knowledge of illegal activity,\textsuperscript{225} it
creates considerable tension by stating that an aider and abettor would not incur liability for acts “not foreseeable by him.” The Restatement in an effort, perhaps, to account for this tension, includes a caveat which lends credence to either interpretation. Despite the Restatement’s ostensible schizophrenia concerning this question, it appears settled that a defendant need not have particular knowledge of the tort accomplished, provided that the defendant has general knowledge of tortious activity and the tortious act was a reasonably foreseeable event based upon that knowledge.

The fact pattern of Halberstam fittingly illustrates this subtle legal principal. In Halberstam, the defendant’s live-in boyfriend engaged in a burglary enterprise for approximately four years. During this time, the defendant had knowledge that her boyfriend was engaged in some sort of illegal theft activity and she also helped administrate the illicit business involved with selling the stolen items. The boyfriend eventually killed one of his burglary victims and the defendant was sued for engaging in a civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting the murder. Halberstam affirmed the finding of the district court that “Hamilton knew about …Welsh’s illicit enterprise” and “had a general awareness of her role in a continuing criminal enterprise.” While Hamilton had no knowledge of the murder specifically, “it was enough that she knew he was involved in some type of personal property crime at night…because violence and killing is a foreseeable risk in any of these enterprises.” Similarly, in Thompson v. Johnson, the court held the defendants liable for aiding and abetting an act of battery when they prevented others from stopping the attack. Though the Thompson defendants claimed ignorance that the altercation would lead to serious bodily injury, the court held that “all are answerable for any injury done by any one of them, although the damage done was greater than was foreseen or the particular act done was not contemplated or intended by them.”

In summary, the knowledge element of aiding and abetting liability under sections 2333 and 1607 contains an element of foreseeability that provides enough leeway for plaintiffs to sue monetary contributors while still satisfying the elements of a section 2333 action as outlined in Boim. Based upon the fact that certain groups have been

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226 Id. at cmt. on clause (b); illus. 11 on clause (b).
227 Id. at caveat.
228 Halberstam at 488; see also Investors Research, 628 F.2d at 176-79 (discussing the general awareness element in aiding and abetting liability).
229 705 F.2d at 488.
230 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950) (applying Mississippi tort law).
231 Id. at 434. This language could be read to mean that an aider and abettor is liable even for acts that were not reasonably foreseeable result of the aid proffered. For the purposes of this citation, however, it, at a minimum, stands for the proposition that an aider and abettor does not need particular knowledge of the eventual tortious act. Similarly, in Keel, 331 P.2d at 400-01, the court held the defendant liable for the plaintiff’s loss of her eye due to the defendant’s handing an eraser to another student to throw across the room. Though the defendant had no intent or prior knowledge that the girl was going to be hit by the eraser, the court implies that such an activity was reasonably foreseeable based on the defendant’s general knowledge of the tortious activity taking place.
232 In Alan Bromberg & Lewis B. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A Critical Examination, 52 Alb. L. Rev. 637, 668-727 (1988), the authors examine the joint tort of aiding and abetting in the securities domain. Though the Supreme Court eventually held in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), that rule 10b-5 does not provide a cause of action for aiding and abetting, Bromberg and Lowenfels’ examination of aiding and abetting liability as a cause of action is instructive. The article actually argues that the “reasonably foreseeable” element of the cause of
designated international terrorist organizations by the Secretary of State, it is improbable that a defendant could claim that he was unaware of a certain organization’s involvement with acts of terrorism. Likewise, based on the settled law of aiding and abetting liability, a defendant need not have particular knowledge of the exact terrorist attack in order to be held liable. Rather, if a plaintiff can show that a defendant had general knowledge of the activities of the terrorist organization (and provided substantial aid, as discussed below), then the defendant should properly be held liable for every act of terrorism that was funded, or could have been funded, by their money – as any violent act was the reasonably foreseeable result of unchecked funding to an organization devoted to terrorism.

The second element of an aiding and abetting cause of action is the requirement of “substantial aid.” Boim II imparted a key distinction and slight alteration to the traditional elements of aiding and abetting liability concerning what constitutes “substantial aid.” This distinction is also applicable in assessing what constitutes material aid under section 1607. The traditional inquiry regarding what constitutes substantial aid depended upon five basic factors: the nature of the act encouraged; the amount (and kind) of assistance given; the defendant’s absence or presence at the time of the tort; his relation to the tortious actor; and the defendant’s state of mind. Boim II, however, explicitly rejects the proposition that the aid offered the act in question must be substantial, as required by traditional aiding and abetting law. Rather, the language of the statute clearly contemplates “the type of aid provided rather than whether it is substantial or considerable…. Even small donations made knowingly and intentionally in support of terrorism may meet the standard for civil liability in section 2333.”

While this portion of the holding certainly benefits plaintiffs in a section 2333 (and section 1607) actions, funding a terrorist organization could also reach the level of substantial aid under the traditional elements outlined in the Restatement. The first two factors, the nature of the act and amount and kind of assistance, are closely interrelated. Halberstam indicates that the inquiry should focus on how essential the aiding and abetting was to the ultimate tortious action. In executing a terrorist attack, funding plays an indispensable role. As Boim II explained, the funding is necessary to finance action is rooted in the “substantial aid” element rather than the knowledge element, as this article argues. Their argument, however, is not applicable to a section 2333 violation because, as Boim II explains, the statute prohibits a type of aid (such as money) rather than an amount of aid (a substantial amount).

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234 Supporting this conclusion is Prosser and Keeton's “long and firm insistence ‘that…proximate causation is a noncausal policy issue’.” Robertson supra note 182, at 1766 (internal citation omitted). Indeed, in the seminal case regarding proximate causation, Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928), Justice Andrews remarked “What is cause in the legal sense, still more what is proximate cause, depend in each case upon many considerations…. What we do mean by the word ‘proximate’ is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point”. The policy against supporting terrorism is clearly evidenced in sections 2331, 2333, 2339A and 2339B as well as the legislative history for section 2333.
235 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484.
236 Id. at 483-84 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. on clause (b)).
237 291 F.3d at 1015.
238 Id.
239 705 F.2d at 484-85.
training, weapons, lodging, explosives, personnel and compensation to the families of suicide terrorists.\(^{240}\) Considering the second inquiry (the amount and kind of assistance) in detail, the statute obviously places the kind or type of assistance above the amount.\(^{241}\) Nonetheless, because terrorist organizations receive up to one-third of their budget from overseas fundraising,\(^ {242}\) the amount of assistance is a substantial factor in the attacks. The third and fourth factors, the presence at the time of the tort and the relation to the tortfeasor, admittedly would not favor liability against an overseas funder. The fifth factor in the inquiry regarding substantial aid assesses the state of mind of the aider and abettor. This element corresponds directly to two other elements in the aiding and abetting context, knowledge and intent. While knowledge of the tort in question has been addressed above, the intent element warrants further discussion.

The question of intent in the joint tort context shades into the analysis previously conducted concerning causation and knowledge. As demonstrated above, while knowledge of some general illegal activity is necessary, liability for aiding and abetting may be assessed even without previous, particular knowledge of a specific tort. In a similar fashion, a defendant may be liable for aiding and abetting an act even if the aid offered was not the factual or proximate cause of the act. As a corollary to these principles, it follows that if a defendant can be held liable without specific knowledge of the act, which he is neither the factual or proximate cause of, then the aider and abettor can also be held liable without personally intending the tortious act. While this formulation may appear to border on strict liability, the element of some “general knowledge” of a criminal act and the provision of “aid” appears to suggest that the eventual tort was reasonably foreseeable and intended.\(^ {243}\) The link between knowledge and intent in traditional tort theory is well established. Indeed, the very definition of intent involves knowing with a substantial certainty that a tort will occur.\(^ {244}\) Though “knowing with a substantial certainty” indicates a higher burden to met in cases involving an intentional tort, case law has applied more the “reasonably foreseeable” standard to intentional torts which exceed the specific knowledge of the aider and abettor.\(^ {245}\)

The ambiguities concerning causations, knowledge, and now, intent, in the joint tort theory may all be traced back to the Restatement Caveat and contradictory examples concerning joint tort liability for unforeseen, unknown, and unintended torts committed by a compatriot.\(^ {246}\) Consistent with the formulation outlined in this article, joint tort case law has assessed liability to an aider and abettor by generally inferring, from the presence of knowledge, some general intent to further the tort committed. For example, in Halberstam, though the defendant had no knowledge and evidenced no intent to aid and abet murder, she was found liable as an aider and abettor for her co-conspirator’s murder because “her continuous participation [in the burglary venture] reflected her intent and

\(^{240}\) 291 F.3d at 1004.
\(^{241}\) Id. at 1015.
\(^{242}\) Id. at 1003.
\(^{243}\) For example, Boim II examined the allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint in order to determine if they had pled an intent element. Though the plaintiffs did not specifically plead intent, they did plead knowledge and material aid, Boim II concludes that “these allegations also implicitly assert that the defendants had the intent to further the illegal aims of Hamas…” Id. at 1025.
\(^{244}\) See, e.g., Garret v. Daily, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093-95 (Wash. 1955).
\(^{245}\) See, e.g., Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488.
\(^{246}\) See text accompanying supra notes 225-27.
desire to make the venture succeed.” Similarly, in *American Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Grim*, the court assessed liability against an aider and abettor who had no knowledge of the underlying tort (burning a building during a robbery). *Grim*, having acknowledged the defendant’s knowledge of the general burglary scheme, inferred the presence of intent: “it could be inferred that he [defendant] actively participated in the accomplishment of the overall mission … it would appear that he intended to reap the same benefits….” Lastly, *Thompson*, discussed above in the context of knowledge and causation, also assessed liability on aiders and abettors for a battery that exceeded the intent of the defendants who offered the aid.

*Boim II* created a further inconsistency regarding the intent requirement by holding that conduct which violates sections 2339A and 2339B creates liability under section 2333. Criminal sections 2339A and 2339B, however, do not contain any intent requirement. Nonetheless, *Boim II* appears to add an intent requirement in addition to the elements of section 2339 in order to assess civil liability. As demonstrated above, such a requirement was unnecessary to remain with the requirements of traditional joint tort liability and the statutory language of section 2333. *Boim II* likely included the intent requirement in order to satisfy the defendants’ First Amendment challenges.

IV.D. Intent and The First Amendment

QLC and HLF raised two separate, but closely related First Amendment freedom of association challenges to imposing liability for their alleged provision of material support to Hamas. First, they argued that the Boims sought to hold them liable for their mere association with Hamas, though they lacked any intent to further Hamas’ illicit goals. Second, they argued that criminal section 2339B, which *Boim II* examined tangentially in relation to section 2333, failed First Amendment scrutiny for its failure to consider “the intent and associational rights of contributors who donate money for humanitarian purposes.”

*Boim II* began its analysis with the well-established proposition that “in order to impose liability on an individual or association with a group, it is necessary to establish that the group possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims.” Having already held that liability for aiding and abetting an act of terrorism under section 2333 required knowledge, intent, and material aid in furtherance of an illegal act, *Boim II* logically concluded that such a showing would also satisfy the First Amendment freedom to associate as construed in *Claiborne Hardware*.

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247 705 F.2d at 488.
248 440 P.2d at 625-26 (boy who broke into church was jointly liable when his co-conspirator set fire to the building).
249 Id.
250 180 F.2d at 434 (citation omitted).
251 291 F.3d at 1016.
253 291 F.3d at 1023.
254 See supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text.
255 291 F.3d at 1021.
256 Id. at 1022 (citing NACCP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920-21 (1982))
257 Id. at 1023; Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 920-21.
Any of Hamas’ alleged humanitarian efforts were also irrelevant for First Amendment purposes “if HLF and QLC knew about Hamas’ illegal operations, and intended to help Hamas accomplish those illegal goals when they contributed money to the organization.”

The defendants also challenged the facial constitutionality of section 2339B, alleging that it “imposes liability without regard to the intent of the donor.” Boim II first noted that the criminal prohibition of section 2339B was not directly implicated in the present civil litigation. The court reformulated the challenge in such a manner to provide the defendants with the proper standing to assert a challenge: whether a section 2333 claim founded solely on conduct that would render a person criminally liable under section 2339B would violate the First Amendment. Relying on the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, Boim II found section 2339B to pass First Amendment scrutiny.

In conducting its analysis, Boim II first identified what section 2339B prohibits: the provision of material support. While Claiborne Hardware discussed liability stemming from association alone, section 2339B “does not implicate associational or speech rights.” Under both sections 2339 and 2333, anyone may join Hamas, “praise Hamas for its use of terrorism, and vigorously advocate the goals and philosophies of Hamas. Section 2339B prohibits only the provision of material support (as the term is defined) to a terrorist organization.” While advocacy warrants a high level of scrutiny under the First Amendment, a donation of money only symbolically represents advocacy and may be limited by the government accordingly. Specifically, the constitutional standard for government regulation of monetary donations is whether the State “demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”

Applying this standard, Boim II found that the “government’s interest in preventing terrorism is not only important but paramount.” In so holding, Boim

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258 291 F.3d at 1024.
259 Id. at 1025.
260 Id. (“[S]ection 2339B is relevant to the Boims’ claim only to the extent that it helps define what conduct Congress intended to include in its definition of “international terrorism.”).
261 Id.
264 291 F.3d at 1026.
265 458 U.S. at 908.
266 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1026.
267 Id.
268 See e.g., Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 907-08.
269 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1026 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1976)).
270 Id. at 1027 (citing Buckley) (internal quotation marks omitted).
271 Id. at 1027 (citation omitted).
II made its lone reference to the events of September 11, 2001, noting understatedly:

“[T]hat interest has been made all the more imperative by the events of September 11, 2001...”272 The court also held that section 2339B was narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. “Congress did not attach liability for simply joining a terrorist organization or zealously espousing its views.”273 Instead, “Congress carefully limited its prohibition on funding as narrowly as possible in order to achieve the government’s interest in preventing terrorism.”274

While Boim II did nothing more than affirm the basic reasoning of Humanitarian Law Project, the discussion was arguably unwarranted as the First Amendment challenges were not included in the questions certified for appeal.275 Additionally, the First Amendment argument the defendants posited claimed that secondary liability under section 2333 assessed liability without intent to further the organizations illegitimate aims.276 Because Boim II maintained that an aiding and abetting action required intent, there was no real need to engage in the analysis of Humanitarian Law Project outlined above. As stated in the previous section, it appears that Boim II instead contemplated that the intent requirement could be imputed from a showing of a general awareness of the criminal activity and a provision of some aid. This interpretation likely explains the presence of Humanitarian Law Project, as it clearly held that “the First Amendment does not require the government to demonstrate a specific intent to aid and organizations’ illegal activities before attaching liability to the donation of funds.”277

CONCLUSION

For the innocent victims of terrorism, monetary recovery will never fully heal the emotional, psychological, and physical wounds that terrorism suddenly and senselessly inflicted.278 As Congressman Steven Rothman has noted, the war on terrorism is not a typical war – it is fought each day on untypical fronts by soldiers and citizens alike.279 In the arena of civil lawsuits, federal statutes 2333 and 1607 provide two valuable weapons against the financial sources of terrorism. In a similar fashion, the joint tort theories of civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting liability allow plaintiffs to reach beyond the deranged attackers and gunmen themselves to the hidden funders and sources of monetary support. The union of joint tort theory and these statutes, like any new

272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 1008.
276 Id. at 1021-25.
278 For one of the more disturbing accounts of terrorist activities and their effects see Higgins v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22173 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2000).
marriage, is filled with a few problems and misunderstandings. Although, in the end, the potential for great things far outweighs the initial difficulties.

This article has examined both Boim and Ungar, cases that have both struggled to reconcile a rather unsettled concept of tort law with statutes seldom interpreted. As this article has demonstrated, Boim and Ungar set a valuable precedent for the application of joint tort theory to acts of international terrorism. Litigants, attorneys, professors, and judges are certain to debate, contemplate, and evaluate many of the issues raised by these opinions as litigation surrounding the events of 9/11 continues. While both of these cases reach cogent conclusions, this article has offered an analysis of joint tort theory in the context of the pertinent statutes that differs from these opinions in certain contexts. This article articulates arguments to, hopefully, maximize the potential for a plaintiff’s recovery. Though the two theories of joint torts and the two statutes discussed have certain differences, this article illustrates that secondary liability for terrorist activities should focus on the defendant’s general awareness of the illegal activity. Because of the unique requirements of joint torts, this article demonstrates that this general knowledge, coupled with the provision of material aid, provides enough connectivity to the tort to satisfy the statutory requirements of knowledge, causation, and intent.

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280 One group has already sued a Saudi royal family, the Sudanese government, and a Chicago based Islamic charity for damages stemming from the 9/11. Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs’ attorneys in the case cite Boim as a valuable precedent. Franklin & Cohen, supra n. 59, at 1.