Rhetoric and Its Abuses: How to Oppose Liberal Democracy While Speaking Its Language

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I. VICO AND PERELMAN

It is difficult to measure the importance of Vico’s 1708 address for our time. What he said—in particular his criticism of the Cartesian philosophy of education—has been validated many times, notably in the second part of the twentieth century. It seems thus that the revolutionary edge of his discourse has been lost precisely because of its contemporary success. Chaim Perelman began his The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, which was published just fifty years ago, by criticizing the dominant paradigm of Descartes’ idées claires et distinctes. He wanted, as it is well known, to rehabilitate the ancient, essentially Aristotelian, rhetoric, by insisting on the necessity of educating people in dealing with an existential and social reality that is inaccessible to the methodology of clear and distinct ideas. In brief, if people thought that the only authentic rationality was Cartesian, then the human and social reality would be considered to-

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1. "The publication of a treatise dedicated to argumentation and to its connection with an old tradition, namely, Greek rhetoric and dialectics, constitutes a break with a conception of reason and reasoning stemming from Descartes ..." CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, TRAITÉ DE L'ARGUMENTATION 1 (l'Université de Bruxelles, 5th ed. 1988) (1958) [hereinafter TRAIT]. "It is him [Descartes] who... wanted to consider as rational only demonstrations which, from clear and distinct ideas, transferred, with the help of apodictical proofs, the self-evidence of the axioms to all theorems." Id. at 2. For the English edition, see CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1969) (1958).

2. See TRAITÉ, supra note 1, at 6–12, where Perelman justifies the connection of argumentation with Aristotelian rhetoric rather than dialectics. The main reason for such a choice is the following: rhetoric always implies that an argumentation is developed before an audience.

3. Id. at 3 ("Must we draw the conclusion, from that evolution of logics, and the incontestable progresses it made, that reason is totally incompetent in the domains which evade calculation, and that where neither experience nor logical deduction can provide us with the solution of a problem, we have nothing left except abandoning ourselves to irrational forces, to our instincts, to suggestion or violence?"). In order to solve this central problem, Perelman tried first to discover a “logic of value judgments.” He soon abandoned that quest and looked instead for a rehabilitation of ancient rhetoric. See CH. PERELMAN, L’EMPIRE RHÉTORIQUE: RHÉTORIQUE ET ARGUMENTATION 7 (1977) [hereinafter EMPIRE].
tally irrational. Perelman’s aim was to build a new rationality—he called it the “reasonable”4—that would be less demanding in terms of conviction than geometry and formal logic.

Vico himself, in his address, insisted—as Perelman would do so many times in his work—on the middle position of the “verisimilar” (verisimili—the probable, the credible, the plausible),5 between truth and falsity. If Cartesian methodology and the notion of “hyperbolic doubt” dominate education, the probable and the false will both be rejected in the darkness of the Platonic Cave. Human action and values will therefore be considered irrational, and the space will be open for irrationalism and “decisionism.” Actually, of course, between Arnaud and Nicole’s conceptions of education and the situation after 1945, when Perelman began to write his important articles on justice, there is a meaningful difference: the authors of the Logique de Port-Royal6 thought that it was possible to apply clear and distinct ideas to the conduct of life (I do not take into account here Descartes’ morale provisoir7), whereas the neo-positivists, accepting, grossly speaking, the same paradigm, would consider it impossible to apply Cartesian rationality to values, ethics, politics, and substantive justice.8 But for Perelman, both positions, understood as they had been by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason (the dogmatic and the skeptic),9 rested on the same

5. In his address, Vico takes the example of the physician who is always obliged to adapt his acquired knowledge to a particular and changing reality. Giambattista Vico, On the Study Methods of Our Time 31–32 (Elio Gianturco trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1990) (1709) [hereinafter Study Methods]. Plato makes the same point against abstract laws in The Stateman. PLATO, The Statesman, in The Statesman, Philebus, Ion 5 (Harold N. Fowler & W.R.M. Lamb trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1925). Vico says that the closer one is to the concrete, the more the verisimilar, which is less ambitious but more efficient, prevails over the true. The verisimilar provides the politician, the judge, the physician, and even the moral theologian, with a rule for action.
7. See 6 René Descartes, Discours de la Methode, in Oeuvres de Descartes 105–08 (Charles Adam & Paul Tannery eds., 1982) [hereinafter DISCOURS DE LA METHODE] (“And finally, as it is not enough, before commencing to rebuild the house in which we live, that it be pulled down, and materials and builders provided, or that we engage in the work ourselves, according to a plan which we have beforehand carefully drawn out, but as it is likewise necessary that we be furnished with some other house in which we may live commodiously during the operations, so that I might not remain irresolute in my actions, while my reason compelled me to suspend my judgement, and that I might not be prevented from living thenceforward in the greatest possible felicity, I formed a provisory code of morals, composed of three or four maxims, with which I am desirous to make you acquainted.”).
8. “It is precisely to that conclusion that the positivists came: for them, value judgments had no cognitive value at all, no verifiable meaning.” EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 8. See the criticism of Stevenson, Hare, and Ayer by Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (1978).
intellectual soil.\textsuperscript{10} It was because the only kind of acceptable rationality was to be found in the \textit{Méditations Métaphysiques}\textsuperscript{11} and the \textit{Discours de la Méthode}\textsuperscript{12} that, philosophers having discovered that human and social reality was unamenable to it, they deemed such a reality irrational.

In the very beginning of the eighteenth century, Vico had in a certain sense predicted such a “disenchantment” of the (ethical) world,\textsuperscript{13} to use Max Weber’s formula.\textsuperscript{14} Such an assessment was already present in his address, or, to put it in a more dramatic way, in his “lament.” Arnaud was referring to Descartes in his struggle against the confusion of the mind. But Vico considered that such a method of education, far from eliminating the human predicament or alienation, would only aggravate it.\textsuperscript{15} Cartesianism excluded, he said, the \textit{topics} from the method of teaching; it was only based on what Vico called “critique” (\textit{critica}), that is, clear and distinct ideas.\textsuperscript{16} Topics are intrinsically linked to the art of acquiring knowledge and being able to use it; they are also necessary for the conduct of a good life. The topics are related to the art of asking the good questions, finding the best arguments (this goes back to Bacon), and gathering the maximum possible relevant information about a problem. Topics should come before \textit{critica} for at least two reasons. First, topics (general and particular) are related to imagination and memory, which are dominant in the minds of young people and must not be hindered by a premature resort to \textit{critica}. Second, topics are necessary for asking the good questions. In a sense, we might add from a twenty-first century perspective that \textit{critica} do not prevent us from attaining trivial and dispensable truths. Suppose they have been verified (or of a widespread scepticism. Giambattista Vico, \textit{Letter of 20 January 1726} to Edoardo de Vitry, in 16 \textit{NEW VICO STUDIES} 42 (Giorgio A. Pinton trans., 1998) [hereinafter \textit{Letter of 20 January 1726}].

\textsuperscript{10} “But whether we take into consideration rationalist philosophers or the ones that are called antirationalists, all continue the Cartesian tradition through the limitation imposed on the idea of reason.” \textit{Traité}, supra note 1, at 4.

\textsuperscript{11} See \textit{RENÉ DESCARTES, MÉDIATIONS MÉTAPHYSIQUES} (Quadrige 6th ed. 2004) (1641).

\textsuperscript{12} See \textit{DISCOURS DE LA MÉTHODE}, supra note 7.


\textsuperscript{14} In his \textit{Letter of 20 January 1726}, supra note 9, Vico describes a general exhaustion of intelligence. The Cartesian method has paralyzed the inventivity and creativity of philosophers. People do not read the classics anymore, and they rely, because of Descartes’ rejection of the tradition of scholasticism, on their intuition of the “clear” and “distinct.” Everyone breaks off with all traditions and only trusts their personal maxims, to the detriment of the common sense and the common good. The analysis of the letter can be found in \textit{OLIVIER REMAUD, LES ARCHIVES DE L’HUMANITÉ} (2004).


\textsuperscript{16} “Modern philosophical ‘critique’ is the common instrument of all our sciences and arts.” \textit{STUDY METHODS}, supra note 5, at 6; \textit{see id.} at 6 n.2 (translator’s note referencing the Cartesian method).
falsified, in the Popperian sense); they have been established by resorting to clear and distinct ideas. But they do not touch anything important. In order to attain des signes qui nous forcent à penser ("signs that force us to think"),\(^{17}\) it is necessary to enter into a reflexive process before the "critical" phase. Such a process is based on topics, memory, and imagination, which Vico thinks are essential for the education of the youths.\(^{18}\) Thus, in a certain way, the precedence of topica over critica anticipates the ascent of argumentation, even in the realm of "exact" sciences. Bacon, for instance, when he spoke of the problem of the light and the heavy, enumerated a certain number of questions that were, according to him, necessary to look at the chosen object.\(^{19}\) These questions are as essential as the answers that will be given—when possible—by using clear and distinct ideas (critica). If the critique is the art of the true discourse, Vico summarizes, so the topics are the art of the fecund discourse.

As far as good life, law, and ethics are concerned, the shortcomings and perverse effects of a Cartesian education are maybe still more visible. If one bases the reasoning on truth, one will not observe human nature because it is uncertain.\(^{20}\) This anticipates Vico's theses in the Scienza Nuova (published in 1725 and 1730), and in particular the famous motto: *verum and factum convertuntur*. We can only obtain a "Cartesian" truth (that is, a truth immunized from any, even a small, possibility of doubt) about what we have done: this is valid, for instance, in mathematics (the case of history and philology in the Scienza Nuova is more complex, but it remains that the "new" science studies the world made by human beings). Anyway, we have not "made" the human mind. We are therefore condemned to the verisimili in the conduct of our private and civic life. This reminds us of Sartre saying, in *Being and Nothingness*,\(^{21}\) that we are condemned to freedom (Vico explicitly relates the uncertainty and confusion in human life to liberty). Thus, Cartesian education prevents students from being educated into pru-

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18. *Study Methods, supra* note 5, at 13–14. Vico states:

> Just as the old age is powerful in reason, so is adolescence in imagination. Since imagination has always been esteemed a most favorable omen of future development, it should in no way be dulled. Furthermore, the teacher should give the greatest care to the cultivation of the pupil's memory, which, though not exactly the same as imagination, is almost identical with it.

The importance of "topics" is emphasized throughout Vico's text.
20. "Nature and life are full of incertitude; the foremost, indeed, the only aim of our 'arts' is to assure us that we have acted rightly. Criticism is the art of true speech; 'ars topica,' of eloquence." *Study Methods, supra* note 5, at 15.
dence (Aristotelian *phronesis*) and common sense, which are essential for individual and political life.

Cartesian education does not only “pervert” the young. It also disorients the masses, as they must be persuaded by concrete arguments, related to “occasion” and “choice”: the elite educated in the Cartesian method are not able to make an argument persuasive, that is, to make truth “probable” or credible. In short, such an elite is not able to use *verisimili*, which are of primordial importance to the social and political life.

It is here that, it seems to me, a fundamental question must be raised, which concerns both Vico and Perelman. How can we make a meaningful difference between “good” rhetoric and a confused, irrational discourse, full of *paralogisms*, that is, involuntary errors of reasoning, or—worse—a deliberately manipulated speech (*sophistry*)? This is an essential problem, as a recourse to *phronesis*, good reasons (being less powerfully convincing than mathematical rationality), and common sense gives a new legitimacy (as Hannah Arendt rightly emphasized) to *doxa*. But how can we be sure, the Cartesians will say, that the “weakening” of rationality that is entailed by new rhetoric and the use of general and particular *topica* will not open the door to demagogues and sophists? Vico was accused of being an anti-intellectualist, and of wanting to educate people to become courtiers instead of philosophers. This is a very important point: paying court to someone always involves an element of flattery, or at least of strategy. And thus, will such an education lead to the following alternative (or dilemma): domination or instrumentalization of the audience? If the latter must be persuaded, will not the orator be tempted to flatter it or to disorient it by playing on passions and emotions? Indeed, if one must persuade an audience of the validity of a position, the only possibility of avoiding blind acceptance of what the audience already knows (its own “premises”), the only possibility of getting one’s way, will be in manipulating the audience. Vico himself recognizes that there is a tension between individual judgment and authority: in his autobiography, he explicitly affirms that he does not want to go back to the domination of authority, but that he would like

22. Vico attacks both Descartes and the sophists for having broken the unity of philosophy and eloquence.


24. “To the accusation that he wants to produce courtiers instead of philosophers, Vico replies that he wants 'philosophers of the court,' who 'indeed love the truth, but at the same time love what *seems* so, followers indeed of honesty, but also followers of that which receives universal approval.'” Perkinson, supra note 15, at 41.

to find a synthesis between the latter and Descartes' individualism. Such a tension is reflected in the ambiguity of rhetoric: common sense, prudence, opinion, verisimili, etc. can be interpreted in a conservative way as involving a respect of traditions and the "authority of the eternal yesterday" (to use another Weberian expression). But on the other hand, one can develop—as Hannah Arendt did—an "open" conception of opinion, being related to the art of democratic controversy. One thing is sure: if people are educated in the Cartesian way, they will confuse the "probable" and the false; they will not be able to discriminate between sound non-formal argumentation and paralogisms or sophistry. One can at least assume that it is only if they have been trained in rhetoric that they will be able to discern the difference between, on the one hand, a reasoning that, although not based on absolute proofs and total clarity of the notions, would be sufficiently convincing to support a reasonable "civic" action, and, on the other hand, pure demagoguery.

II. TWO KINDS OF CONFUSION

I would like to apply this reflection to an analysis of the rhetoric that is being used in contemporary debates concerning the defense of the values of liberal democracy. As values are concerned, we are here in the domain of argumentation (the rhetorical "empire") in the Perelmanian sense. My main point is the following: nowadays, human rights and liberal democracy constitute as it were the fundamental values of the political sphere. Such a primacy is not only, of course, recognized in Western democracies, but also in international legal instruments such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human rights, the 1966 Covenants, respectively on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as in many other documents that deal with more specific human rights topics. But as we know, people very often only pay lip service to these political values.

26. Vico states:
We are certainly in debt to Descartes, who wanted his own feeling to be the rule of truth, because for everything to rest on authority was a servitude too vile [to endure]. We are in his debt because he wanted order in thinking, because previously men were thinking in a much too disorderly way with all those obicies secundo; but that only his judgment must be employed and only the geometrical method—that is too much.

Now would be the time to go back to a middle ground between these extremes [of authority and private judgment]: to follow one's own judgment, but with some respect for authority; to employ some order, but only one that the facts will support . . . .

Actually, schematically speaking, there are two opposed ways of trying to evade the constraints of human rights and the values of liberal democracy. I shall call the first one the “frontal attack”: the “enemy” explicitly defends values that are radically at odds with liberal-democratic principles. For instance, the opponent defends an authoritarian conception of political power (fascism, Nazism, Soviet communism . . .), or a dogmatic conception of religious power (imposition of the law of God on earth, necessary eradication of the infidels, etc.). Such a rhetoric is very influential today, for instance—but not only—in the Islamic world. As everybody knows, it raises very serious problems for peace and security. The international instruments on human rights are explicitly negated in the name of other values. But this is not my present topic.

I am interested here in the second, totally opposite, strategy: in order to be at least heard by the democratic community, the “enemy” uses the language of liberal democratic values. By doing so, he or she very often succeeds in radically distorting the language of human rights. I shall call that strategy the “Trojan horse,” or, to use another metaphor, “the wolf in sheep’s clothing.” The strategy is fundamentally related to demagoguery and, more subtly, to a sophistical distortion of reasoning. The more we consider the values of liberal democracies to be simple, “clear,” and “distinct,” the less we can see behind these apparently unproblematic notions, which so many people seem to respect, to uncover some hidden controversies, or a sheer manipulation of the language of human rights. In our times, dominated by political correctness, when so many deeply controversial notions are superficially considered clear and distinct, Vico’s lament keeps all its topicality.

Perelman once defined philosophy as “a systematic study of confused notions.”27 This definition has at least two different meanings. First, in non-formal argumentation, we are confronted with notions that are confused because the interlocutors are governed by prejudices. Prejudice is a distortion and a simplification of reality that necessarily entails confusion. Secondly, after discussing the matter, we are left with a certain “remnant” of confusion. But the latter absence of clarity and distinction is not similar to the first meaning of the term. We might say in an ironic way that “confusion” is a . . . confused notion. Before “entering” the Perelmanian “realm of argumentation,” “confusion” means prejudice; in and after the (unending) discussion, “confusion” means that there are still controversies related to a

27. “One can draw the conclusion, which might seem disrespectful, that the proper object of philosophy is the systematic study of confused notions.” CHAIM PERELMAN, De la Justice, in ETHIQUE ET DROIT 17 (1990) [hereinafter De la Justice].
certain irreducible vagueness in the terms we use. A lack of clarity in the latter sense is normal, notably in democracy: we use a language that is natural, as opposed to an artificial (formalized) language. The emphasis put on certain meanings will always be to a certain degree dependent on some irreducible feelings (a preference for liberty, or for solidarity, etc.), an immersion in a cultural tradition that we are not able to completely objectivize, some presently unfalsifiable predictions and hypotheses concerning the future, etc. This is one of the reasons why, in democracy, we need at a certain point to decide, that is, to vote. All interlocutors are equal in such a context, they share a common loyalty towards the res publica, and they enjoy the same freedom to interpret what the defense of the common good commands. Actually, there is another cause for the existence of a residual "confusion" even after a supposedly rational discussion, where the final say belongs to—as Habermas would say—"the force of the better argument": political problems (in a very general sense of the term) are necessarily more or less urgent, so deliberation and discussion must stop at a certain point. The situation is the same for judges. Of course, the idea that a discussion taking place without deadlines because of its non-urgent character would lead to complete clarity and distinctness is untenable: as Kant had seen it, metaphysicians disagree as much as do people living and acting in the world of doxa and being confronted with political problems, when time is a scarce resource.

Such a very rapidly sketched difference between two meanings of "confusion" is the point of departure for the kind of research I would like to present in this paper. Let us first briefly analyze in more detail the notion of confusion that exists before discussion.

28. See TRAITÉ, supra note 1, at 178–85 (discussing "clarification and darkening of notions").
29. “[T]he communicative structure of rational discourse can ensure that all relevant contributions are heard and that the unforced force of the better argument alone determines the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses of the participants.” JÖRGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 37 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., The MIT Press 1998) (1996).
30. That phenomenon is particularly dramatic in emergency situations, when time runs still faster than in normal situations. Vico insisted in his Address on the time factor in the context of trials. In pressing, urgent affairs, which do not admit of delay or postponement, as most frequently occurs in our law courts—especially when it is a question of criminal cases, which offer to the eloquent orator the greatest opportunity for the display of his powers—it is the orator’s business to give immediate assistance to the accused, who is usually granted only a few hours in which to plead his defense. Our experts in philosophical criticism, instead, whenever they are confronted with some dubious point, are wont to say: “Give me some time to think it over!”
31. Of course, in a sense, discussion has always already, as Heidegger would have said, begun: my idea of a confusion related to a “pure” prejudice is evidently a pedagogical, artificial device.
show, by using some contemporary examples essentially based on the (often hidden) controversies concerning free speech, that deliberative democracy is highly vulnerable to such a distortion. I said previously that there were two completely different rhetorical strategies used by the adversaries of liberal democracy to attack it. (Of course, between these two opposed poles, there are many possible intermediary positions.) The first strategy possesses at least a virtue: its real clarity. The values and aims are stated in a rather straightforward way. For instance, liberal democracy is considered by the censor to be against religion, as it replaces the law of God by the law of “We the People,” emanating from the social contract. But such a frontal attack is not convincing at all in the liberal democratic community because it challenges the very premise of any successful argument that might be made in such a context. Therefore, another approach is more and more often being used: here the opponent uses the language of liberal democracy, by subtly distorting the meaning of the concepts and values that are at the core of human rights and democracy. Such a distortion permeates the general discussion in the polis, so that at a certain point even democrats acting in good faith fall prey to such a sophistic manipulation. Of course, the strategy I call the “wolf in sheep’s clothing” has the disadvantage (for us democrats) of taking the interlocutors off-guard: as they think they are confronted with someone accepting liberal-democratic values, they do not see the danger—or at least the intellectual challenge—they are exposed to. And so, as I said in the beginning, the democratic fortress must not be stormed: the enemy is already inside, as a Trojan horse.

III. THE DANISH CARTOONS AND “TRANSLATION”

In order to develop my argument, I shall begin by reexamining a very difficult problem that concerns some specific limits to free speech that are related either to religion (blasphemy) or to race (racist speech). I would like to analyze the rhetoric which is used today not only in the public debates but also sometimes by judges sitting on a high court (at least in Europe). I shall first analyze a sequence of events that took place in 2005 when the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten published the now infamous cartoons on the Prophet Muhammad.32 Let us, as far as our problem is concerned, summarize the sequence as follows: when the Danish journalists were threatened by Muslim extremists, some newspapers in other European

countries decided to republish the cartoons, not necessarily because they thought that they revealed a good and wise editorial policy, but out of solidarity with the threatened individuals, and in defense of free speech as a central value of liberal democracies. Now, in a sense, one might easily believe that these cartoons were blasphemous. Of course, they could also be read in a political context, for instance by giving them the meaning of a critique of a “human, all too human” instrumentalization of religion. Whatever interpretation one decided to give to the cartoons (the meaning of a drawing is always still more open than the meaning of a discursive expression), freedom of expression had to be protected. From the point of view of the (more or less violent) opponents of the journalists, the meaning of the caricatures was clear: it amounted to an offense to the Prophet of Allah, that is, an insult to God—in other terms, an outrageous blasphemy. One immediately sees the danger, for the advocates of the *Jyllands Posten*, of trying to show that the drawings, after all, were not blasphemous: it would have meant that if that had been the case, the journalists would have been rightly convicted. “Another such victory and I am undone.”

Thus, it would be safer for the future of freedom of expression to accept that the cartoons can reasonably be interpreted as being blasphemous or sacrilegious, and *that this should be protected speech*. At least the situation would be intellectually clear, although defending such a position would for obvious reasons be physically dangerous. The anti-blasphemy statutes that still exist in some European countries are, as it were, remnants of a time when religion was officially “established” and protected by the secular power. The conflict was between the “dissident” individual and a theologico-political entity. Now in pluralist societies, religion in general, and a particular faith, should not be immune from criticism. The problem is not only a formal one. It is very important for us to begin with a clear characterization of the nature of the conflict that took place in Denmark, and then—this is unavoidable in an era of global communication—throughout the world. Some journalists writing (and drawing) for a newspaper exercised their right to free speech and were accused of blasphemy. For the moment, the question is not whether blasphemy is a legitimate limitation of

33. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting the notion of collective defamation used by the majority).
34. There still exist some established and official religions in Europe: Anglicanism in England, Presbyterianism in Scotland, Lutheranism in Denmark, Lutheranism and the Orthodox Church in Finland, the Orthodox Church in Greece, Romania and Bulgaria, etc. Except for the case of the Orthodox Churches, the official and established religions have been progressively stripped of their persecutory and discriminatory elements. If it had not been the case, “establishment” would have been abolished as being blatantly anti-democratic. The same argument can be made concerning the survival of constitutional monarchies. See GUY HAARSCHER, LA LAÏCITÉ (4th ed. 2008).
freedom of expression. I am only trying now to characterize the situation. Obviously, it is because Muhammad is a sacred figure in Islam that the cartoons were attacked, at least on two counts. First, they were representations of the Prophet, which, according to a dominant (but not the only) tradition in Islam, is forbidden. Secondly, the content of the drawings was blasphemous in that, for instance, one of the caricatures portrayed the Prophet wearing a bomb on his head instead of a turban.

Now everybody is entitled to give whatever meaning he wants to a drawing. A problem arises only when one considers that such an expression constitutes as such an abuse of the right and should be suppressed. We can limit ourselves to two different forms of suppression. The first one is legal censorship, that is, suppression of the “speech” sensu lato and possible punishment of the author inside the framework of the rule of law. The second one is to be situated outside the law: one tries to suppress the expression or to punish the author(s) by resorting to intimidation, threats, and even outright violence. In this article, I am only interested in the first form of suppression, that is, legal censorship. The question is thus the following: “Is it justifiable under the rule of law to censor an expression because a part of the population thinks it is blasphemous?” Let us, for the sake of argument, take the position of the advocates of censorship. Their case is of course quite easy when they act in a country where an anti-blasphemy statute is in force: one has simply to apply the law.

But, rhetorically speaking, the situation is very different—and the case becomes much harder—when there is no anti-blasphemy law on the books. We already know that some European newspapers decided to republish the drawings out of solidarity with the threatened journalists. All things considered, because there were attempts to suppress the cartoons in an illegal and violent way, they wanted to show that they would defend freedom of expression against intimidation and fanaticism. But here comes the legal form of suppression. The French newspaper Charlie Hebdo republished the cartoons. In response to this, the advocates of legal censorship brought a suit against the newspaper, trying to suppress the drawings by legal means. But here is the difficulty: France does not have an anti-blasphemy statute.

35. CHARLIE HEBDO (Paris), Feb. 8, 2006.
statute, so the case for censorship was much harder than it would have been, say, in Austria or in Britain.

But the opponents of Charlie Hebdo succeeded in bringing the case before a tribunal. In order to be entitled to proceed with their claim, they first had to translate it into the language of French law. In other words, as there was no statute providing for censorship of blasphemy, they had to find another legal basis. If one looks at the arguments that were exchanged in front of the judge and in the press, it is possible to distinguish between two different rhetorical strategies of “translation.” As I shall try to show, both of them are in a sense “perverse,” in that they transform the process of argumentation into pure sophistry; in other words, they artificially create an element of confusion.37

The first strategy looks like this: one subtly transforms the conflict between a fundamental human right (freedom of expression) and the remnants of an official religion into a conflict between human rights. Instead, therefore, of saying that the cartoons offend God, one affirms that they insult the religious feelings of a (more or less) defined community. The problem, then, is not that “God” is insulted (which was the original definition of blasphemy), but that certain individuals are (supposed to be) hurt in their religious feelings, which prevents them from exercising their right to freedom of religion. The translation works in the following way: the opposition between the individual and the order of God becomes a conflict between rights—between freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Now these rights are on the same hierarchical level: there is no priority rule (in the Rawlsian sense38) which allows us to hold one of them superior over the other. If they are of equal value, the only way of making a decision is to “balance” them against each other. In other words, since freedom of expression and freedom of religion possess the same value, the judge will have to assess whether or not one of the rights has been exercised in an “exaggerated” way (an “abuse of right”), preventing other persons from exercising the other right. There are many examples of such “systemic” conflicts, that is, conflicts arising inside the system of human rights, and not between a human right and some exterior norm. For instance, freedom of expression must be balanced against the right of the suspect or the right of the accused to a fair trial, so that the press must show some restraint; on the other hand, the journalists must inform the public of cases that are im-

37. This is the “bad” sort of confusion I mentioned earlier, when I commented on Perelman’s definition of philosophy as “the systematic study of confused notions.” De la Justice, supra note 27, at 17.

important for the democratic life of the country. Freedom of expression must also be balanced against the right to privacy or the rights in one’s reputation (e.g., the law of defamation). These are well-known examples of systemic conflicts between human rights.

My point is that in the case of free speech and freedom of religion, the systemic conflict is artificially constructed, and if one sees through it, it appears particularly absurd. One would have to argue in such a context that some drawings published in a Danish newspaper prevent Muslims anywhere in the world from exercising their right to freedom of religion; more precisely, one would have to try to show that the republication of the cartoons in Charlie Hebdo would be, as such, an abuse of freedom of expression, one which violates the rights of French Muslims as far as the free exercise of religion is concerned. If this were true (or even plausible), a judge would necessarily have to balance one right against another, as there exists no commonly accepted hierarchy between the two of them. Then we would find ourselves in a situation similar to the ones I mentioned earlier: free speech versus the right to a fair trial (or versus the right to privacy, or right to reputation, etc.). This would then confer a strong legitimacy on the limitations on free speech in the present case: not a censorship for religious-dogmatic reasons, not the crushing of human rights for the defense of the remnants of an official religion, but a systemic conflict between human rights—a conflict that would be deemed unavoidable in the absence of a principled hierarchy. But the construction is wholly artificial. At the same time, many people “buy” the argument. We must understand why.

Actually, an obvious reason for the existence of such a perverse process of translation is the following one. It is very difficult, in the context of liberal democracy, to limit the scope of human rights in order to defend a “superior” value. This is easily understandable, as human rights are considered, at least since the 1948 UN Universal Declaration,39 the moral value par excellence governing the political sphere. So the rhetorical strategy will be much more efficient if the problem is transformed into a conflict between human rights of equivalent normative value. In the present case, instead of speaking of a limitation on free speech for the sake of protecting religion (or God) from being insulted, one does not “leave” the realm of human rights: the limitation on one right is imposed in order to protect another right. The rhetoric of the censor is transformed into an argument about human rights. As I stated earlier, the fortress is occupied without

having to be stormed. But the result is exactly the same: free speech is limited.

Now one can ask whether or not such an argument can possibly convince legislators and judges. In Paris—at Philippe Val’s (the editor of Charlie Hebdo) trial—it did not work, and the advocates of a strong protection of free speech won the case. But we shall see that what I call the rhetoric of translation (blasphemy becomes an attack on the “sensitivities” of a community) has succeeded in other legal forums. Before analyzing this problem, let us briefly summarize a second strategy that was also used at the Paris trial.

The previous “translation” did not consist of abandoning the domain of free speech and religion. The argument was only about a change of “victim”: blasphemy meant that the target (the insulted “entity”) was God; “wounded religious sensitivities” signify that human beings are supposed to be affected by the discourse. The difference is essential, in that, as it were, the problem is “horizontalized”: in the case of an explicit accusation of blasphemy, the relationship is “vertical,” so to speak, between a human being who speaks (or writes, draws, etc.) and a supra-human entity. Of course, as I said before, it is difficult to argue for such a limitation (censorship) in a liberal-democratic context. But the situation is at least intellectually clear, although it is not without danger for the speaker: an essential human right is limited to protect religion and the sacred character of a divine being. When the (“perverse”) translation process occurs, there is no longer a limitation on a human right for the sake of preserving the “reputation” of God (or the Church), but a conflict of rights that has to be resolved by finding a certain equilibrium. What is assumed here to be a zero-sum game works in the following way: what free speech “wins” is “lost” by freedom of religion (and the other way around). Under these conditions, one must strike a balance for the sake of the “system” of human rights itself. The tension still exists between speech and religion, but the problem has been reformulated in terms of liberties: one liberty pitted against another. So in a certain way the victim of censorship (from the point of view of human rights) becomes the violator of the religious rights of the members of a community: he has abused his rights, “enough is enough,”—the criticism is gratuitous, and does not contribute to a debate of general interest. The attack on the convictions of a community are thus unacceptable,

but only because the exercise of the right to free speech has been abused. There is—in appearance—no violation of a human right, but a legitimate limitation on the exercise of a right for the sake of another right, that is, for the sake of consistency within the system of rights.

Now the second strategy goes farther. It consists of abandoning, as it were, the domain of religion and in reformulating the problem in “racial” terms. We can summarize the argument as follows. If you attack the convictions of a group of people in a virulent way, it is because you do not “like” them. You have fallen prey to a kind of irrational fear (phobia), which might incite you to hatred or contempt. In brief, you are a racist. This is, roughly speaking, the simplified meaning of—for instance—“islamophobia.” The republication of the cartoons by the French newspaper is thus reinterpreted in non-religious terms: racism is not about ideas, it is about a certain class of individuals who are deemed a priori inferior and should not enjoy the same rights as others. Racism is of course a very dangerous phenomenon, and racist speech is despicable. Some European countries have anti-racist speech provisions on their books.\footnote{Racist speech enjoys protection in the United States. \textit{See}, e.g., \textit{Virginia v. Black}, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003). In many European countries, it is not protected. For instance, in the United Kingdom, incitement to racial hatred is an offence under the Public Order Act 1986 with a maximum sentence of up to seven years imprisonment. \textit{Public Order Act 1986}, c. 64, § 27 (amended by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, c. 1, § 29L, sched.). In France, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Finland, etc., “hate speech” is criminalized.} I do not want to enter for the moment into the debate concerning the legitimacy of the criminalization of racist discourse. But I want to emphasize the fact that there is a fundamental difference between blasphemy and racist speech\footnote{\textit{See} Guy Haarscher, \textit{Tolerance of the Intolerant?}, 10 \textit{RATIO JURIS} 236 (1997).}—a difference which is precisely blurred by the recourse to a notion like “islamophobia.” Indeed, vigorous criticism of religion is about ideas, and notably about the complex relationships between religion, politics, and violence. The cartoons about Muhammad described the very dangerous instrumentalization of Islam by terrorist groups. On the contrary, racism is not about the ideas of the “other”: when one refuses the equality of rights to, for example, “colored people,” it is not because of the ideas they have or have not expressed. They are, so to speak, a priori excluded from the democratic forum, before they have had a chance to say anything. The prejudice plays a pre-eminent role here: the racist “knows” in advance that the other is evil, ignorant, inferior, etc.

But if such a difference between criticism of ideas and criticism of persons is quite easy to grasp in general terms, there are strong incentives to deliberately blur the distinction. If you want to immunize a religion from
criticism, you have the option of interpreting the attack as being motivated by hatred, irrational fear, and, to sum up the argument, racism. That argument pushes the translation process a little further: when blasphemy is "translated" into an exaggerated attack on the feelings and sensitivities of a (religious) group, the victim of the limitation of speech rights (here, the journalist) is (illegitimately) placed on the same footing as the potential "victim" of an attack on his or her religious convictions. The vertical relationship between the victim and the dogmatic oppressor is translated into a horizontal relationship between two potential victims. The balance of interests then allows the judge to decide in favor of one of the two rights. But in the case of a translation of the conflict into the language of racism, the positions are radically inverted. Again, we have a vertical relationship between an oppressor and a victim—but this time, the victim of dogmatic censorship (who is, so to speak, at the "bottom" of the relation) becomes the oppressor (situated at the "top," because racism is a relationship of domination). If such a rhetorical strategy succeeds, it will become more and more difficult to criticize religion—a vital activity in a democratic society.

One must not underestimate the benefits of such an argumentative strategy. Not only is the "wolf" in "sheepfold": in the case of an intra-religious translation, the wolf looks like another sheep. The censor is an individual, deeply shocked in his convictions by a speech (or an image). In the case of a translation into the language of racism, the wolf still resembles a sheep, but the "real" sheep takes the appearance of a wolf (a racist). Albert Camus said in the beginning of *L'Homme Révolté* that one of the main (and terrifying) characteristics of the twentieth century was the inversion of the respective positions of the hangman and the victim:

> But the slave camps under the banner of liberty, the massacres that are justified by the love of man or a taste for super-humanity, in a sense, make the judgment impotent. On the day when the crime wears the clothes of innocence, it is innocence which is required to give its justifications, through a curious process of inversion that is characteristic of our times.43

Here, we are confronted with the contemporary version of such a strategy. The latter is no longer used in the context of the Cold War: it no longer serves to place the Soviet totalitarian power in the position of the "encircled" victim of international capitalism and imperialism; it is no

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43. ALBERT CAMUS, *L'Homme Révolté* 14 (1951) (author's translation). The original text reads:

Mais les camps d'esclaves sous la bannière de la liberté, les massacres justifiés par l'amour de l'homme ou le goût de la surhumanité, désespèrent, en un sens, le jugement. Le jour où le crime se pare des dépouilles de l'innocence, par un curieux renversement qui est propre à notre temps, c'est l'innocence qui est sommée de fournir ses justifications.
longer used to freeze political criticism of totalitarianism and the Gulag, and to immunize Communism from rational assessment. According to Sartre, anti-Communists were “dogs,”[^44] they tried to reduce “Billancourt”[^45] to despair, that is, they crushed the hope of Western workers in a better world; they reinforced the status quo and the continued domination of the bourgeoisie. Criticizing Communism meant that one was motivated by hidden and shameful interests in the preservation of an unjust order based, as Marx wrote in *Das Kapital*, on exploitation.[^46] Today, the very fact of criticizing, say, Islam (or even only the terrorist instrumentalization of Islam), is often supposed to mean that one is motivated by “hatred,” “phobia,” and “racism,” to the detriment of an unjustly attacked “community.”

But if there are lessons to be learned from the stigmatization of anti-Communists at the time of the Cold War,[^47] they are essentially the following: contrary to what the Communists said, one could plausibly criticize the Soviet Union from the point of view of human rights and democracy regardless of one’s political positions in the domain of social redistribution and equality. By the same token, one can reasonably criticize Islam, and be a loyal Muslim; of course, one can also criticize Islam, or even all religions, from an atheist position, provided that it does not amount to a defense of official atheism, that is, the forced eradication of the “opium of the people,” as the young Marx defined religion.[^48] More fundamentally, criticizing religion (or political religion, or a particular religion) is completely different from wanting to discriminate against a group that is defined by “racial” traits. Of course, the devil is always in the details, and racists have learned


[^45]: The Seguin island in Paris was famous for the Billancourt Renault factory that was built on it. It is a place where many workers’ revolts took place. It does not exist anymore. See Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nekrassov* (1956).


[^47]: Of course, Communists were also stigmatized in the West. For a balanced approach of McCarthyism, taking into account the discovery of, notably, the “Venona documents,” see Martin H. Redish, *The Logic of Persecution: Free Expression and the McCarthy Era* (2005).

[^48]: Karl Marx, *Zur Kritik der Hegel’schen Rechts-Philosophie [Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right]*, in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher 71–72 (1844) (“Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.”); see Guy Haarscher, *L’Ontologie de Marx: Le Problème de l’Action, des Textes de Jeunesse à l’Œuvre de Maturité* (1980).
to adapt their rhetorical strategies to a changing world which becomes—happily—more and more hostile to open racism.49

But let us now consider the actual decision of the French tribunal in the case of the Danish cartoons (more exactly, their reproduction by Charlie Hebdo). So far, I have only mentioned the argumentative strategies of the advocates of a politically correct censorship, that is, a censorship which is not named as such but is translated into either the language of shocked religious sensitivities or the language of racism. Philippe Val, the editor of the newspaper, was acquitted by the Paris tribunal,50 so the arguments summarized above did not prevail. This does not deprive them from their appeal to many people acting in good faith. As far as the defense of Charlie Hebdo was concerned, the emphasis was put on the importance of free speech for a democratic society.51 Many personalities (from the left and from the right) testified in favor of the accused.52 If certain limits must be assigned to the exercise of the right, they should not prevent the press and individuals from defending opinions that are considered shocking by a part of the population. A fortiori, according to these witnesses, the free criticism of ideas, even in the form of caricatures (that by themselves imply exaggerations) should be guaranteed to avoid a “chilling” effect on the debate. Indeed, the argument goes, if one must take into consideration the sensitivities of the many groups which coexist in a pluralist society, nobody will feel safe when expressing an idea. We shall be confronted with the opposite danger: people will not speak “enough.” The accent put unilaterally on the peril of exaggeration leads to a reinforcement of political correctness, conformism, and finally, hypocrisy. John Locke previously affirmed, in one of his arguments against the use of force to impose a religious orthodoxy, that such a constraint would induce an individual to adhere to a faith for the wrong reasons—not because he was convinced by the basic tenets of the relevant religious doctrine, or because he “had the faith,” but for prudential

49. Such as is illustrated by, for example, the New Right. The major reference on the subject is PIERRE-ANDRÉ TAGUIEFF, SUR LA NOUVELLE DROITE: JALONS D’UNE ANALYSE CRITIQUE (1994). On Holocaust denial, see PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET, LES ASSASSINS DE LA MÉMOIRE (1987). The New Right is discussed in greater detail infra Part VI.


51. See sources cited supra note 40.

52. Politicians François Bayrou (President of the centrist Party UDF), François Hollande (Secretary-General of the Socialist Party) and Nicolas Sarkozy (the then President of the UMP, the Gaullist Party) came to defend Val and the value of free speech in a democratic society. See Le Bars, supra note 40.
reasons: to avoid persecution or to obtain an advantage reserved to the privileged who profess the official creed.53

IV. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND “TRANSLATION”

These are well-known arguments, and one might think that, in a contemporary liberal democracy, they would be sufficiently convincing for the case to be easily won. This is what happened, but one would be naïve to think that the defeated opinion (the “translated” thesis of the accusation) does not have the power to persuade many individuals—even non-religious or “tolerant” people (the ambiguity of the notion of “tolerance” is well documented, particularly when it is used as a Trojan horse in the process of perverse translation).54 In order to make my point, I would like to briefly summarize recent developments in the case law of two high courts in the contemporary democratic world: the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights.

The leading decision in the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court is Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson (1952).55 A film by the famous Italian movie director Roberto Rossellini, The Miracle, was censored by the New York authorities. The central character of the film was a young peasant girl. The


For no man can, if he would, conform his faith to the dictates of another. All the life and power of true religion consist in the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believing. Whatever profession we make, to whatever outward worship we conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own mind that the one is true and the other well pleasing unto God, such profession and such practice, far from being any furtherance, are indeed great obstacles to our salvation. For in this manner, instead of expiating other sins by the exercise of religion, I say, in offering thus unto God Almighty such a worship as we esteem to be displeasing unto Him, we add unto the number of our other sins those also of hypocrisy and contempt of His Divine Majesty.

Id. at 3.

54. See, e.g., Otto-Preminger Inst. v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34, 61–62 (1995) (Palm, Pekkanen, & Makarczyk, JJ., dissenting) ("Nevertheless, it must be accepted that it may be ‘legitimate’ . . . to protect the religious feelings of certain members of society against criticism and abuse to some extent; tolerance works both ways and the democratic character of a society will be affected if violent and abusive attacks on the reputation of a religious group are allowed. Consequently, it must also be accepted that it may be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to set limits to the public expression of such criticism or abuse. To this extent, but no further, we can agree with the majority.") (emphasis added). The “clear” idea of tolerance is that the shocked person should respect the dissenter as long as he does not use violent means. The “confused” idea means that the “dissenter” should respect the “reputation” of a religious group, and that “religious feelings” should be “protected.” This is very ambiguous and problematic. Concerning group libel, see Guy Haarscher, Diffamation Collective: Une Notion Irrémédiablement Confuse? (Centre Perelman de Philosophie du Droit, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Working Paper No. 2007/7, 2007), available at http://www.philodroit.be/IMG/pdf/WP-GH-Diffamationcollective.pdf.

55. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
movie suggested that she was raped by an individual she thought was Joseph, her favorite saint. The girl was expelled from the village when it was discovered that she was pregnant while still unmarried. Finally, she delivered the child in a church. The details of the case are not relevant here: we are only looking at the way the Court argues concerning an expression that was clearly considered blasphemy (or a sacrilegious act). The Justices denied the constitutionality of censorship.\footnote{Id. at 506.}

Their argument ran as follows:

In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive definition of “sacrilegious” given by the New York courts, the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies... Under such a standard the most careful and tolerant censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another, and he would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of unpopular sentiments..... Application of the “sacrilegious” test... might raise substantial questions under the First Amendment’s guaranty of separate church and state with freedom of worship for all. However, from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures.\footnote{Id. at 504-05 (emphasis added).}

This is a principled position, which consists of comparing the situation of the judge (here, the Justices) to that of a sailor who is attracted by various currents. He has no chart to help him choose a direction, and he is finally carried away by the most powerful current. Of course, the notion is used here metaphorically: if the judge decided to censor an expression because it was considered sacrilegious or blasphemous by a religious “current,” he would be dominated by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies. It is not the business of the State to suppress opinions that a religious group finds “distasteful.” If we perform a thought experiment and imagine in a counterfactual way that the Justices of the United States have to decide the Charlie Hebdo case, we can be sure that Philippe Val will be acquitted (as it actually happened in Paris): the position of the Court is stated without conditions.\footnote{"[W]ithout any ‘ifs’ or ‘buts’ or ‘whereases.’” Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (concerning “collective defamation”). This case was decided the same year as Burstyn.} The Court seems to be absolutely against censorship in matters of so-called blasphemy. We should notice that the Justices do not even
mention the possibility of translating the position of Cardinal Spellman (who acted as spokesman of one of the “most powerful orthodoxies”—and was indeed very “vocal”) into the language of human rights. The Cardinal himself did speak in a straightforward way. The opposition is clear-cut: on the one side are the religious currents that want to suppress opinions they find “repugnant”; on the other side, the advocates of free speech.

Let us now present, in a very summarized way, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the same problem. One must first note that a dictum of the European Court, in a famous 1976 case (Handyside v. United Kingdom), seems to go in the same direction as the Burstyn case. The judges say the following:

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. Subject to Article 10, it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”.

The position in 1976 seems clear: offending, shocking, or disturbing speech is protected by the Convention. The European Court began to deal with blasphemy cases in the 1990s, first in a very controversial and much
commented decision: *Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria* (1994). The aim of the Otto-Preminger Institute was to show art films that could not be seen in big theaters. As in the *Burstyn* case, a movie was considered “blasphemous.” *A Council in the Heavens*, directed by Werner Schrötter, told the story of Oskar Panizza, who had been convicted in 1894 by the Munich assizes court for blasphemy after writing a play in which God was portrayed as an impotent senile individual, Mary as a whore who kissed the devil, and Jesus as a mentally retarded youngster. A council decided to spread syphilis in order to punish humanity for its sins. The Otto-Preminger Institute decided to show the movie in Innsbruck. An anti-blasphemy criminal statute was in force in Austria, and at the request of the diocese, the public prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings against the director of the Institute, under the Austrian criminal statute, for blasphemy (the exact charge was “disparaging religious doctrines”). Otto-Preminger was convicted under that statute, the movie clearly being blasphemous. Just as it was the case in *Burstyn* (which, in a manner of speaking, took the opposite approach), the situation was clear: on the one side were the Catholic bishops (the dominant religious “current” in Austria), who wanted to enforce an anti-blasphemy statute; on the other side was the Otto-Preminger Institute, which had decided to show a movie on Panizza on censorship and the relationships between speech, art, and religion.

But when the case was brought by the association before the European Commission of Human Rights (at that time the “antechamber” to the European Court), the lawyers of Otto-Preminger were confident that they would win in Strasbourg. Why? Because the legal basis of the decision was fundamentally different. Indeed, in Austria, the judges had to apply a clear valid statute criminalizing blasphemy. In Strasbourg, judges must apply the European Convention on Human Rights, which, of course, does not contain a provision against blasphemy, but on the contrary guarantees, in its Article 10, the right to freedom of expression. Moreover, as I already said, the 1976 *Handyside* decision had created a liberal jurisprudence that made the advocates of Otto-Preminger very optimistic: speech “that offend[s],

65. *Id.* at 37–41.
67. *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights*, *supra* note 62, art. 10, § 1 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.”).
shock[s] or disturb[s] the State or any sector of the population" was supposed to be protected. But freedom of expression is not an absolute right under the Convention, and paragraph 2 of Article 10 provides some limitations on the right. But again, blasphemy—or an offense to religion—is not one of the legitimate bases for limitation that are listed in that paragraph. So how did Austria’s lawyers argue? In a very simple way: they translated the conflict (we already know how such a rhetorical strategy works) between the Otto-Preminger Institute and the State of Austria into a “systemic” conflict between rights. One of the legitimate aims in the name of which freedom of expression can be limited under the Convention (Article 10, paragraph 2) is to protect “the rights of others.” Such is the case when a conflict between rights of equal “value” occurs—but a conflict between which rights? Between, according to the majority of the sitting judges, freedom of expression (Article 10) and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 9). The Strasbourg Court held that Austria had not violated Article 10 of the Convention, but, on the contrary, had legitimately limited the right to free speech to protect the (religious) rights of the others.

But what are these “rights,” and who are the “others”? We must first emphasize a similarity between the respective situations in Innsbruck (which occurred at the end of the 1980s) and Copenhagen (in 2004): in each case, the relevant “community” did not express itself on that matter, but some very orthodox and vocal leaders spoke and acted—the bishops in Austria, as well as some radical Muslim leaders in Denmark (and elsewhere, which is unavoidable in a world of global communication). Of course, I only want here to stress a structural similarity between both situations: the attitude of the bishops is not comparable to that which took place a couple of years ago in the Muslim world (especially the violence that erupted in some parts of the Middle East). The only common element is related to the problem of representation: the “people” did not complain or initiate the process. In a later decision concerning a rather similar case, a dissenting judge noticed that “[t]he actual opinion of believers remains

69. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 62, art. 10, § 2 (“The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”).
70. Id.
unknown." Under such conditions, the translation of a blasphemy case into a systemic conflict of human rights becomes very problematic indeed: it would be difficult to affirm in good faith that the right of the Catholics to freely practice their religion was violated by the exercise of the right to free speech by the Otto-Preminger Institute. Actually, the movie was shown after 10 PM during the week, in a small theater, and it was forbidden to children and teenagers under seventeen. The advertisement had been very cautious, so it seems obvious that Catholics were not prevented from living according to their spiritual orientations just because a movie they were not obliged to see was shown in a theater. The fact is that the translation was so far-fetched that the decision aroused a virulent controversy. One can understand the situation in which Austria’s attorneys found themselves and the necessity for them to find legal arguments to support their case. What is not easily understandable is the fact that a majority of the judges sitting on the Court “bought” the argument and found that Austria had not violated the Convention.

So we can see that mavericks, bigots, or naïve leftist militants do not have a monopoly on problematic “translation.” Eminent members of the legal elite have accepted the validity of the—very controversial—reformulated argument. And there is more to the predicament: Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria was not an isolated decision. The European Court has continued to uphold its jurisprudence through the present day. But the problem is more complex than it appears to be at first glance. If we compare the 1994 decision by the Strasbourg Court to the 1952 U.S. Burstyn case, we are tempted to make a clear-cut distinction. The Justices of the United States did not translate blasphemy into the language of human rights. They described the problem in plain terms: some religious groups (here, the Catholics) did not want some sacred figures to be mocked, or even—as it took place in The Miracle—which is not at all a “caricature”—presented in a shocking or offending way. The distributor of the movie invoked his First Amendment right to free speech. The Court did not translate the problem into a “systemic” conflict between rights, but presented it in clear language and reversed the decision of the lower court. In brief, the Supreme Court took the side of free speech. At first glance, the European Court did exactly the contrary in the 1994 case. It “reconfigured”

73. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 507–08 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
the conflict in terms of a systemic tension and decided in favor of Austria. But if this were totally true (it is at least partially valid), the European Court would have had to clearly say that the Handyside jurisprudence was no longer good law. But the Court, thus far, has always affirmed the compatibility between Handyside and Otto-Preminger. How can we understand this, keeping in mind that A Council in the Heavens was obviously "offending, shocking or disturbing"? Did not the 1976 decision say without ambiguity that this was protected speech?

Actually, since 1994, the European Court has made a subtle distinction between two types of expression: one of them is protected, the other is not. Shocking speech is still protected, except if it is gratuitously offensive, that is, if it does not contribute to a debate of general interest. In other words, the shocking character of the speech must be redeemed by a certain social value. The provocation should not be unnecessary or gratuitous. (One partially similar argument was used by the United States Supreme Court, but it concerned obscenity, which is a very different matter.) But in the nineteenth century, Baudelaire and Flaubert were prosecuted in France, because describing lesbianism (in Les Fleurs du Mal) or adultery (in Madame Bovary) was considered a gratuitous provocation that did not nourish in any sense the public debate.

Let us summarize the argument. The U.S. Supreme Court does not translate blasphemy into the language of human rights. It does not make the "wolf" look like a "sheep." It does not build a Trojan horse. It defends free speech against the dogmatic claims of the religious "currents." The 1952 decision is still good law. The European Court of Human Rights does make the translation. Blasphemy is reformulated as the right of individuals not to be "gratuitously" offended in their convictions or sensitivities, without—so the judges say—any benefit in terms of public interest and debate. Thus, there is an inevitable process of balancing between two rights and two competing claims, both invoking the Convention: the first, Article 10, the other, Article 9. In some cases free speech prevails, because the Court considers the expression shocking or offensive, but at the same time finds

74. See sources cited supra notes 71–72.
76. On August 21, 1857, Baudelaire was convicted by a French tribunal for "insult to public morals" (outrage à la morale publique). The same year, Flaubert was prosecuted under the same charges, and finally acquitted.
77. Although some U.S. states still have blasphemy laws on the books from the founding days.
that it serves the democratic debate and is thus not "insulting." In other cases, the Court finds in favor of what it calls freedom of religion, and decides that the State has not violated the Convention. But this is heavily problematic, as nobody can seriously confirm that freedom of religion is hindered by the fact that a movie, a theater play, or a cartoon in a newspaper—which nobody is obliged to see—expresses ideas that are repugnant to members of some communities. We are not at all in the condition of being a "captive audience." So, obviously, this is an artificial construction, a bogus systemic conflict, which should never have been endorsed by the Strasbourg judges.

V. THE ASCENT OF THE "PSEUDO-ARGUMENT"

In the *Traité de l’Argumentation*, Perelman defines the "pseudo-argument" as follows. "It is actually possible that one seeks to obtain approval while basing the argument on premises that one does not accept oneself as valid. This does not imply hypocrisy, since we can be convinced by arguments other than the ones used to convince the persons we are talking to." I am not interested here in the possible absence of "hypocrisy," as for instance when the speaker uses a path of reasoning that is different from the one he used to convince himself (because the latter would not be understood in a specific context by a particular audience). As we saw before, it happens often, especially today, that the speaker pretends to begin with the same premises as those accepted by his audience, because it helps him penetrate the fortress. In the examples I gave before in relation to limitations on free speech, the censor pretended to begin with human rights premises: "the rights of others." He then constructed an artificial and non-credible systemic conflict between religious liberty and freedom of expression. In certain instances, he was even able to completely invert the respective positions of the "hangman" and the "victim" by accusing the one who exercised his right to free speech of being a racist (who was guilty, for instance, of "islamophobia"). The European judges never went that far, but, as I tried to show, they accepted in certain circumstances the legitimacy of the translation from blasphemy into the language of the "rights of

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80. CHAÎM PERELMAN, RHÉTORIQUES 80 (1989).
others.” Now this is precisely, in my opinion, an example of the use of the “pseudo-argument” in the Perelmanian sense. The sophist uses it in a “hypocritical” way in a deliberate attempt to confuse the audience and introduce “the wolf in sheep’s clothing.” The European judges, who of course act in good faith, fall prey to a “paralogism,” that is, an involuntary error of judgment or an involuntarily false inference. In both cases, the real controversy is obscured, as the opponent (the censor) hides his own premises and pretends to adopt the ones of the other (the liberal democratic values). It is precisely at this moment that we should listen to Vico and Perelman’s advice. One needs a very good training in argumentation and a knowledge of the art of topics to be able to distinguish between real systemic conflicts (conflicts of rights) and bogus ones. Such training is necessary to discriminate between interlocutors that actually accept the basic premises of liberal democracy, and interlocutors who just exploit the naïveté of contemporary audiences in order to promote their illiberal aims under the guise of... liberalism. Socrates was unjustly accused (first by Aristophanes,82 and twenty years later by Anytus, Meletus, and Lycon at his trial83) of corrupting the youth by making the weaker cause the stronger. Actually, the attack was aimed at the sophists, whom Socrates had virulently criticised. The comparison drawn by the accusers (and before, by Aristophanes) between Socrates and the sophists was unfounded. But as far as sophists and demagogues were concerned, the critique was perfectly apposite: as they used rhetoric in a very skillful and cunning way, they were able to pretend that they adopted the same premises as the audience, and then to draw from them pseudo-conclusions by carefully hiding the deliberately mistaken inferences and the poorly established facts. The weakness of the cause was not visible as such—it looked stronger. By the same token, the “translation” of blasphemy into the rights of the others is—as I hope to have shown—very inadequate, but for an audience that is not educated in the art of sound argumentation, the weakness is not visible.

Such a perverse use of the pseudo-argument is not limited to the realm of free speech. Actually, it is very pervasive. As I previously noted when discussing Vico’s address, there is always a danger in the realm of non-formal argumentation, namely, that the courtier replaces the intellectual. Basically, what does the courtisan do? He flatters the powerful (the king in monarchies, the “few” in aristocracies and oligarchies, and the “many” in

82. See Aristophanes, The Clouds, in Fifteen Greek Plays 545–602 (Gilbert Murray et al., trans., 1943).
democracies). One of the most efficient kinds of flattery consists of making the other believe that he is right, that you agree with his basic principles, that you adopt the same premises, that you are "like" him—in brief, that no meaningful difference exists between the two of you. Then, when the audience is lulled into complacency, you draw some conclusions from the premises using distorted arguments. The weakness of the latter is not visible, as the sophist, the courtier, or the flatterer is very apt at subtly distorting the reasoning leading to a result he actually wanted prior to entering the discussion.

If we want to put the problem in a historical perspective, we can say that it is almost always the case that, as the advocates of a position become weakened, they choose less aggressive strategies. A couple of centuries ago, the Church had no difficulty imposing a respect for God and the sacred symbols or figures on all potential dissidents or unbelievers. But increasingly, the ascent of democratic values and secularism made it more and more difficult to adopt such a radically intolerant position. So the religious authorities often used another strategy: they pretended to accept human rights and the separation of Church and State. Of course, all "retreats" are not strategic. The "conversion" to human rights and the values of liberal democracy can be sincere. But herein lies the problem: if an individual is not educated in the theory and the art of argumentation, it will be impossible for him to distinguish between an authentic inner transformation and "hypocrisy."84 One might suggest that making such a distinction requires a knowledge of the underlying motivations, which would make the whole enterprise very problematic. But I do not think that we necessarily have to sound out the hearts and fathom the intentions. Take our example of the pseudo "systemic" conflict in the abovementioned cases concerning blasphemy. It is enough here, at least in order to develop the critical sense, to point out that the so-called equivalence between "sensitivities" and freedom of religion is, particularly in such a context, unfounded. But if such an equivalence is nevertheless often made and the same "arguments" repeated time and again, we will be in the presence of a pattern. This is what I would like to show in the conclusion of this article: the "translation" defined above is pervasive; it is partly the expression of a deliberate strategy dedicated to confusing the minds and weakening the "real" defense of human rights; it is also partly related to the air du temps, to the intellectual atmosphere of political correctness and the ignorance of the public (and the elite)

84. See Perelman, supra note 80, for Perelman's use of the notion of "hypocrisy" in the analysis of the "pseudo-argument."
concerning the weakness of the arguments made in favor of a censorship supposedly exercised in the name of human rights themselves.

I mentioned earlier Camus’ statement to the effect that the respective positions of the “victim” and the “hangman” had been inverted in the twentieth century. Actually, the French philosopher had in mind the idea of “progressive” violence that was often used in the revolutionary rhetoric, at least from 1789 on. The idea was that the arbitrary use of the guillotine during the French Terreur of 1793–94, or the existence of the Gulag in the Soviet Union, were unfortunately necessary to struggle against the enemy, the exploiter, be it the Ancien Régime or capitalist imperialism. If you resisted such a trend in the name of human rights, you were inevitably considered a reactionary: your “sentimental” arguments slowed the pace of history and made universal emancipation a more remote ideal. Conversely, the revolutionary who decided to “make his hands dirty” was a progressive. The revolutionary murderer was considered to be the defender of the innocents, and the advocate of the victim was . . . the hangman of humanity. I do not pretend that such an argument is never valid: in some very limited cases, violence can be labeled a lesser evil. But likely in the majority of the cases, the argument is nothing more than an excuse, an “alibi”: it helps transform the oppressor into the advocate of the victims. This is exactly what took place in the blasphemy cases I analyzed earlier, and it very clearly shows that what Camus said was not only valid for the twentieth century (revolutionary radicalism, Cold War, etc.), but also for the twenty-first century (struggle against secularism and all “godless Constitutions”). To return briefly to the topic of Soviet Communism, let me mention the Constitutions that were adopted under, respectively, Stalin and Brezhnev: apparently, they guaranteed some first generation rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association. But at the same time the two Constitutions stipulated that the rights had to be exercised in favor of the Communist Party and the “people” it was supposed to represent—the rights had to be exercised in favor of the gov-

89. Konstitutsiia SSSR (1936) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] art. 125 (“In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed by law: freedom of speech; freedom of the press; freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings; freedom of street processions and demonstrations.”) (emphasis
erment. This is contrary to what these rights mean, namely, the protection of dissident voices in democratic societies. Thus, both Constitutions grant the rights with one hand, and withdraw them with the other. Dictatorship (that is, where every act and speech must have the approval of the government) is translated into human rights (which are “guaranteed” in the text). At least we can say that the translation is quite visible: the human rights “garment” is threadbare.

VI. CREATIONISM, HOLOCAUST DENIAL, AND “TRANSLATION”

In conclusion, let us rapidly give some contemporary examples of the process of perverse translation. As I said before, the advocates of a religious polity can defend the latter by a frontal attack or by introducing the wolf in sheep’s clothing (or the Trojan horse into the “fortress” of human rights). Very often, both strategies are used at different moments. In the classical situation, the frontal attack is chosen when the advocates of a theologico-political State are powerful; when they are no longer in a position to impose their views, they change their strategy and use the “translation” device. This is particularly visible in the debate between the Creationists and the advocates of “Darwinian” science.

Darwin decided to publish *The Origins of Species* in 1859 after waiting for almost twenty years, because he feared “the firestorm of anger that his ideas were sure to unleash.” The idea of natural selection ran counter to some basic elements of the Christian faith: human beings were no longer distinguished (as created in the “image of God” and possessing a soul) from animals; on the contrary, a continuity was established between the latter and the former through the process of evolution; evolution itself worked through the mechanism of natural selection, which was brutal and at odds with Christian values (notably, charity). To make a long story short, in the United States, the conflict became acute after the First World War. Before that, there were too few students in secondary school, and the teaching of science was rudimentary. But in the beginning of the 1920s, with “the growth of secondary education . . . more students were being exposed to evolution.” At that time, the conflict was clear, and no “translation”
was necessary. The State of Tennessee had passed a statute stipulating that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any teacher to teach any theory that denies the Story of Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended from a lower order of animal.”92 In 1925, the famous Scopes trial—the “Monkey Trial”—took place. Scopes had taught Darwinism in class and was finally convicted in Dayton for having violated the Butler Act. During the trial, former presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan exchanged arguments with Clarence Darrow, Scopes’s attorney and a well-known atheist. “The antievolution laws remained on the books, and even increased in numbers.”93 But beginning in the 1960s, after the Soviets had succeeded in launching the Sputnik, the science curriculum in secondary school was considerably strengthened, including the teaching of biology. Creationists tried to suppress that teaching. They lost before the Supreme Court.94 The Justices considered the prohibition against teaching Darwinism in public schools in the name of Creation theory to amount to an establishment of religion. So the Creationists adopted a different strategy. The “translation” process had begun. They required “equal time and emphasis” or “balanced treatment”95 for both Creationism and Darwinism. This means that Creationists no longer wanted (because at that time they did not have the power to do so) to suppress the teaching of “Darwinian” doctrines (that is, science); instead, they invoked liberal-democratic values, that is, equality and pluralism. The Court struck down a Louisiana statute providing for equal time and emphasis.96 The reasoning was that putting a scientific theory and a religious doctrine on the same level amounted to an establishment of religion, and therefore was contrary to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.97 Then the advocates of Creationism changed their strategy again, and went further in the process of “transla-

Although textbooks at the turn of the century included evolution, few students were exposed to the evolution contained in these books: in the late nineteenth century, high school education was largely limited to urban dwellers and the elite. . . . But high school enrollment approximately doubled during each subsequent decade, so that by 1920, there were almost 2 million students attending high school.

Id. at 93 (quoting Tennessee’s Butler Act of 1925).
Id. at 97.
U.S. CONST. amend I: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The process of adoption via ratification by the requisite number of states was completed on December 15, 1791.
tion.” They tried to introduce Intelligent Design (ID) into schools. That doctrine is supposed to be based on purely scientific arguments. ID theorists believe that the complexity of life and living organisms is not understandable without the presupposition of a “Designer.” Religion as such is no longer invoked, because they want to avoid the establishment objection. ID advocates reformulate the argument based on equality and pluralism: this time, the translation of the tension between free scientific inquiry and religious dogmatism seems to be perfect, as the opposition is considered to be a “systemic” conflict between two scientific conceptions of life.

It is worth while remembering that the same strategy had been used in blasphemy cases in Europe. A conflict between liberal-democratic values and theologico-political claims had been translated into a conflict taking place inside the democratic and secular sphere, that is, a perfectly normal scientific controversy. In 2004, in Pennsylvania, the Dover Board of Education decided that at the beginning of biology courses, a short statement should be read to the students letting them know that there existed another acceptable scientific conception of life, that is, Intelligent Design. A federal judge, after long debate (notably involving questions related to the definition of science), finally decided that introducing ID into public schools—even under the very “modest” form of a preliminary statement—was, again, an establishment of religion.

Thus, for the time being, the strategy adopted by the opponents of scientific biology (Darwinism) is completely different from the one that they used, say, in the 1920s. One no longer speaks of censorship, or even of equal time and emphasis for Darwinism and Creationism. Balanced treatment between Darwinism and ID is not even required any more: ID advocates “just” wanted a short statement to be read to the students at the beginning of the first class. Even such a modest demand was rejected by a federal judge as amounting to an establishment of religion. The controversy is far from over, but it shows very well how the strategy of translation actually works. Incidentally, it also shows that the federal courts do not seem ready to accept the arguments flowing from such a strategy.

Finally, another domain where “translation” is very present is racism. Today, racists are deprived of legitimacy in the democratic debate. Again, “in the beginning,” the problem was clearly enunciated. Racism is the exact opposite of human rights: the latter presuppose universalism (the human being as such is the repository of certain basic rights grounded in the equal dignity of all individuals). Racism is totally different from such a concep-

98. For a good explanation of Intelligent Design, see SCOTT, supra note 90, at 113–31.
tion: it fragments humanity into two (or several) parts, and it interprets such a particularization in a biological and hierarchical sense. Nineteenth century racism, when it began to be systematized, ran counter to our modern universalistic moral intuitions. In its most brutal form, racism is as old as humanity: a group spontaneously tends to underrate the “other” and stigmatize the “alien” by affirming the latter’s inferiority. The opposition is clear—on the one hand, we have a particularistic, communitarian, and hierarchical conception of humanity, and on the other hand we have a universalistic, individualist, and egalitarian view.

In the nineteenth century, however, racism as an explicit ideology developed on the basis of illegitimate extrapolations from philology and biology, that is, from “science.” Indeed, as we have seen, racism was opposed to the moral values underpinning liberal democracy and constitutionalism. But the new claim was that it was grounded in scientific inquiry, an activity also intimately linked to modern values. Now scientific activity “disenchants” the world: science is the opposite of wishful thinking, and its results can frustrate our most cherished expectations. Thus, the theorists of nineteenth century racism could begin to translate the conflict between human rights values and brute racial prejudice into a kind of “systemic” conflict between two modern values: universal human dignity and the “scientific” theory of racial superiority. After 1945, the process of translation was considerably radicalized. Indeed, after Nazism and the Shoah, racist pseudo-scientific ideas were definitively rejected on two counts. First, biology (in particular, population genetics) had refuted racism in the field of science itself; second, the tragic effects of racist policies had reinforced, on a universal level (through, for instance, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights), the values of liberalism and democracy. So another strategy was devised, notably in France, which led to the ascent of the New Right (Nouvelle Droite). That new orientation had the following advantage: it did not rely on biological, hierarchical, racism. On the contrary, it was based on two fundamental transformations imposed on the old pseudo-scientific racism. On the one hand, the various human groups were no longer considered in biological terms as being characterized by unchangeable natural traits. Instead, the Nouvelle Droite spoke of cultures, that is, of communities grounded in different traditions and defending different values and worldviews. On the other hand, the hierarchical element,

101. See Memmi, supra note 100.
102. See Taguieff, supra note 49.
which was of course central in nineteenth century racism, was abandoned and replaced with an apparently egalitarian view: New Right advocates affirmed that all cultures were equal. But they added a third (essential) element to their intellectual construction: cultures are fragile organisms, they should not be mixed in a reckless way, they must be preserved from métissage ("mongrelization"—a term used in the United States at the time of Segregation\textsuperscript{103}). Thus, as far as immigrants coming from other parts of the world were concerned, the theory was different from old "scientific" racism, but in practice it remained identical. Culturalism and differentialism led to the same conclusion: the "other" should not mix with us. By speaking the language of culture and equality, the "wolf" of racism had entered the "sheepfold" of liberal-democratic values. The language of the opponent was now our own language and the values he professed were our own values. Again, the fundamental premises of liberal democracy had been sophistically perverted by a Perelmanian pseudo-argument, as defined above.

But as far as racism is concerned, there is another post-Second World War translation strategy. Instead of speaking the language of cultures and equality (as opposed to the language of biological races and natural hierarchy), Holocaust deniers argue that the gas chambers never existed.\textsuperscript{104} The idea is to challenge the factual basis of the reaffirmation of human rights after the Second World War. Here, the strategy does not rely on cultures; it puts the scientist in the position of the victim, that is, a new Galileo who is supposedly confronted with—and persecuted by—a new dogmatism. Holocaust deniers replace Ptolemaism and geocentrism with "Exterminationism" (which actually is simply the scientific description of historical reality). Of course, the writings of Holocaust deniers are no more scientific than the ones of ID advocates. And they serve much more evil ends: after all, the intolerance and bigotry of Creationists and "Designers" pale before the hidden racism of Holocaust deniers.

\textsuperscript{103} The derogatory term was used in particular by the Ku Klux Klan. See Michael Newton, The Ku Klux Klan: History, Organization, Language, Influence and Activities of America’s Most Notorious Secret Society (2007).

\textsuperscript{104} See Vidal-Naquet, supra note 49.
I might lengthen the list of fields in which the translation strategies work today. But I just wanted to signal the importance and the power of Perelmanian pseudo-arguments in contemporary controversies. If the advocates of liberal democracy are not able to refute these sophisms (and first to see them as such), Vico’s lament will continue to haunt us well beyond the beginning of the twenty-first century.