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Todd Haugh

IIT-Chicago Kent College of Law, thaugh1@kentlaw.iit.edu

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SENTENCING THE WHY OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME

Todd Haugh*

ABSTRACT

“So why did Mr. Gupta do it?” That question was at the heart of Judge Jed Rakoff’s recent sentencing of Rajat Gupta, a former Wall Street titan and the most high-profile insider trading defendant of the past 30 years. The answer, which the court actively sought by inquiring into Gupta’s psychological motivations, resulted in a two-year sentence, eight years less than the government requested. What was it that Judge Rakoff found in Gupta that warranted such a modest sentence? While it was ultimately unclear to the court exactly what motivated Gupta to commit such a “terrible breach of trust,” it is exceedingly clear that Judge Rakoff’s search for those motivations impacted the sentence imposed.

This search by judges sentencing white collar defendants—the search to understand the “why” motivating defendants’ actions—is what this article explores. When judges inquire into defendants’ motivations, they necessarily delve into the psychological justifications defendants employ to free themselves from the social norms they previously followed, thereby allowing themselves to engage in criminality. These “techniques of neutralization” are precursors to white collar crime, and they impact courts’ sentencing decisions. Yet the role of neutralizations in sentencing has been largely unexamined. This article rectifies that absence by drawing on established criminological theory and applying it to three recent high-profile white collar cases. Ultimately, this article concludes that judges’ search for the “why” of white collar crime, which occurs primarily through the exploration of offender neutralizations, is legally and normatively justified. While there are potential drawbacks to judges conducting these inquiries, they are outweighed by the benefits of increased individualized sentencing and opportunities to disrupt the mechanisms that make white collar crime possible.

INTRODUCTION

As he peered over his bench, Judge Jed Rakoff, senior district judge for the Southern District of New York, faced one of the most high profile defendants of his long career. Rajat Gupta, the former managing director of the global investment bank Goldman Sachs, the former head of the global management consulting firm

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law; 2011–12 Supreme Court Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States.

McKinsey & Company, and a former board member of Proctor & Gamble, stood before the court to be sentenced. Gupta, wearing a slight frown, looked haggard after his month-long trial and conviction for passing inside information to hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnum, including about a \$5 billion investment in Goldman by Warren Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway that allowed Rajaratnum to make millions in illegal trades in less than two days.¹ "After carefully weighing all . . . relevant factors," stated Judge Rakoff, "the Court concludes that the sentence that most fulfills all requirements . . . is two years in prison."²

Although he gave no visible reaction to the sentence, only rocking back slightly on his heels, Gupta should have been relieved. He was the most high-profile defendant in a four-year-long investigation of insider trading on Wall Street that had already seen 68 others plead guilty or be convicted, 37 of which would be serving prison time, including an 11-year sentence for Rajaratnum.³ The federal sentencing guidelines called for a much longer term, between six-and-a-half and eight years.⁴

¹ See Petter Lattman, *Ex-Goldman Director to Serve 2 Years in Insider Case*, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Oct. 24, 2012, 4:17 PM), <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/rajat-gupta-gets-2-years-in-prison/>; Michael Rothfeld & Dan Strumpf, *Gupta Gets Two Years for Leaking Inside Tips*, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2012, at 2, available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203897404578077050403577468.htm>.

² Sentencing Memorandum and Order at 14-15, *United States v. Gupta*, No. 11 CR 907 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2012).

³ See Rothfeld, et al., *supra* note [], at 2.

⁴ For an overview of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and an explanation of how they operate to calculate a defendant's sentence, see Frank O. Bowman, III, *Pour Encourger Les Autres: The Curious History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed*, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 380-82 (2004).

The government, citing Gupta's "special responsibility that came with being in such an extraordinary position of trust," wanted ten.⁵

What was it that Judge Rakoff found in Gupta that warranted such a modest sentence? While the answer undoubtedly involves a "large complex of facts and factors,"⁶ at least part of the reason rests on the court's search for the "why" of Gupta's crimes. Throughout the sentencing hearing, Judge Rakoff struggled to understand what motivated Gupta's actions. Why had an incredibly wealthy man in the uppermost-echelon of American financiers, who by all accounts had lived an exemplary life and given so much to "humanity writ large,"⁷ committed a crime that provided him no direct benefit? As the court put it bluntly, "So why did Mr. Gupta do it?"⁸ In attempting to answer that question, Judge Rakoff probed Gupta's statements and letters from his supporters, speculating about a host of possible motivations why this "good man" committed such a "terrible breach of trust."⁹

While it was ultimately unclear to the court exactly what motivated Gupta to commit

⁵ Government's Sentencing Memorandum, at 6, *United States v. Gupta*, No. 11 CR 907 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2012). Most sentencing pundits predicted a four or five year sentence. *See e.g.*, Douglas A. Berman, *Any early federal sentencing predictions after quick conviction in Gupta insider trading case?*, SENT'G L. & POL'Y BLOG (June 16, 2012), <http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/2012/06/any-early-federal-sentencing-predictions-after-quick-conviction-in-gupta-insider-trading-case.html> (placing the "over/under betting line for Gupta's sentencing at around 5 years' imprisonment" and then revising it to four years).

⁶ Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 1.

⁷ Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 11.

⁸ Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 12. The government's contention that Gupta was motivated by simple greed did not seem plausible to Judge Rakoff given Gupta's estimated net worth of \$130 million and that he received no direct benefit from the insider trades. *See* Petter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, *Rajat Gupta Convicted of Insider Trading*, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (June 5, 2012, 12:05 PM), <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/rajat-gupta-convicted-of-insider-trading/>.

⁹ Lattman [*Ex Goldman Director*], *supra* note [] (quoting Judge Rakoff).

the crimes he did, it is exceedingly clear that Judge Rakoff's search for those motivations impacted the sentence imposed.¹⁰

This search by judges sentencing white collar defendants—the search to understand the “why” motivating defendants' actions—is what this article aims to explore. When Judge Rakoff sought to understand Gupta's motivations, he necessarily delved into the psychological justifications white collar defendants employ to free themselves from the social norms they have previously followed, thereby allowing themselves to engage in criminality. Criminologists call these justifications “techniques of neutralization,” and they are precursors to white collar crime.¹¹ Whether he was aware of it or not, Judge Rakoff's search for Gupta's motivations resulted in a judicial evaluation of the neutralization techniques Gupta employed. The court's crediting of these neutralizations as mitigating sentencing factors was key to Gupta's lenient punishment.

For example, in arriving at the two-year sentence, Judge Rakoff found Gupta's record of philanthropy to be a mitigating sentencing factor. After listening to Gupta's recitation of his prior good works during the sentencing hearing and

¹⁰ See Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 10 (“Thus, at the very outset, there is presented the fundamental problem of this sentence, for Mr. Gupta personal history and characteristics starkly contrast with the nature and circumstances of his crimes.”); see also David A. Kaplan, *Jed Rakoff: The judge who rules on business*, FORTUNE, at [] (Jan. 24, 2013) (quoting Judge Rakoff as stating, “But also because of what I think is an appropriate way to look at sentencing, which is there are defendants who are good people who have nevertheless done some bad things.”), available at <http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2013/01/24/judge-jed-rakoff/>.

¹¹ See generally, Shadd Maruna & Heith Copes, *What Have We Learned from Five Decades of Neutralization Research*, 32 CRIME & JUST. 221, 228-34 (2005) (providing an overview of neutralization theory and its place in criminology); Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, *Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency*, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 664, 667 (1957) (originally positing neutralization theory and setting out five major types of neutralizations).

reading hundreds of supportive letters, Judge Rakoff concluded that he had “never encountered a defendant whose prior history suggests such an extraordinary devotion . . . to individual human beings in their times of need.”¹² While crediting a defendant’s good deeds at sentencing is common in white collar cases, Judge Rakoff did something uncommon—he suggested Gupta’s extensive good works may have played a role in allowing his “aberrant behavior” to go forward.¹³ By doing so, the court identified and validated a neutralization technique white collar offenders employ called the “metaphor of the ledger,”¹⁴ in which a defendant—*prior* to engaging in the criminal act—internally catalogs his good works and compares them to his potential criminal conduct.¹⁵ This allows the defendant to rationalize his

¹² Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 11; *see also* Rajat Gupta’s full statement in court, NDTV.COM (Oct. 25, 2012), available at <http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/rajat-gupta-s-full-statement-in-court-284090>; Michael Rothfeld, *Dear Judge, Gupta Is a Good Man*, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2012, at 1, available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444657804578052990875489744.htm> (describing and linking to letters submitted on Gupta’s behalf by Microsoft founder Bill Gates, former secretary-general of the United Nations Kofi Anon, and alternative medicine guru Deepak Chopra).

¹³ *See* Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 12-13 (Judge Rakoff stated that “Gupta, for all his charitable endeavors, may have felt frustrated[.]”).

¹⁴ *See* MARK LANIER & STUART HENRY, *ESSENTIAL CRIMINOLOGY* 171 (2004) (describing metaphor of the ledger neutralization and eight others that have been identified as “free[ing] the delinquent from the moral bind of the law so that he or she may now choose to commit the crime”).

¹⁵ Much has been made in the criminological literature regarding whether offenders’ explanations of their behavior are after-the-fact justifications or pre-act neutralizations. *See* Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 271 (calling sequencing the “most significant stumbling point for neutralization theory”). As explained in Parts II(A) and III(B)(1), *infra*, this is ultimately inconsequential. Any post-offense justifications offered by an offender, what we commonly call “excuses,” are premised on beliefs drawn from “society rather than something created de novo.” *Id.* at 230 (quoting Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 669). Therefore, offenders’ post-offense justifications express their pre-act rationalizations. These pre-act rationalizations—neutralizations—allow the illegal act to proceed. *Id.* at 271. Put another way, “neutralizations might start life as after-the-fact rationalizations but become the rationale . . . facilitating future offending.” *Id.* Given that motivations,

future anti-normative behavior, thereby “blunt[ing] the moral force of the law” and allowing the criminal behavior to proceed.¹⁶ Gupta’s use of this technique may have allowed him to see himself as someone who had done more good in life than bad, thereby reconciling the criminal acts he was committing with his self-image as an upstanding member of society, a critical step in the process of committing a white collar crime.¹⁷

The court’s acceptance of Gupta’s neutralization and the positive impact that had at sentencing raises a host of questions. For one, how large an impact did crediting this single neutralization have on the final sentence? Did the court understand how this particular neutralization technique affected the etiology of Gupta’s white collar crime? Did the court consider other neutralizations Gupta may have employed?¹⁸ If so, were they credited or rejected by the court and to what degree? More broadly, do judges’ considerations of neutralizations favor particular groups of defendants? Does this lead to unwarranted sentencing disparity? Broader still, what are the potential costs and benefits of basing sentencing decisions on inquiries into defendants’ neutralizations? What place, if any, does this type of inquiry have in white collar sentencing, or sentencing as a whole?

justifications, rationalizations, and neutralizations are so closely intertwined, the terms will be used interchangeably unless otherwise indicated.

¹⁶ Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 230. *See also* Michael L. Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvement in a White-Collar Crime*, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 583, 584 (1985) (analyzing neutralizations used by four groups of white collar offenders).

¹⁷ *See* Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind*, *supra* note [], at 584.

¹⁸ *See* Part II(B), *infra*, for a taxonomy of white collar neutralization techniques.

These questions, and the associated normative implications, have been largely unexamined in legal scholarship.¹⁹ This is particularly troubling because judges' search for why defendants commit white collar crime necessarily confronts offender neutralizations. Although this article does not endeavor to address all the questions raised above, it does attempt to rectify the absence in scholarship by drawing on established criminological theory and applying it to three recent high-profile white collar cases.

Ultimately, this article concludes that judges' search for the "why" of white collar crime, which occurs primarily through the exploration of neutralizations defendants employ, is legally and normatively justified. While there are potential drawbacks to these inquiries, they are outweighed by the benefits of increased individualized sentencing, the importance of which has been recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in *Pepper v. United States*.²⁰ And, although counterintuitive, neutralization inquiries may even disrupt the future commission of white collar crime. When judges inquire into defendants' neutralizations and then reject them as

¹⁹ While some fascinating work has been done regarding the role of motive in criminal law and punishment, *see e.g.*, Carissa Byrne Hessick, *Motive's Role in Criminal Punishment*, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89 (2006), there has been almost no discussion of how judges use evidence of motive to make sentencing decisions, let alone the more specific issue of judicial inquiry into white collar offender neutralizations. *See also* Ellen Podgor, *The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing*, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 731, 747-48 (2007) (discussing how motive may be, although often is not, a factor in punishment). As more fully developed in Part II, *infra*, the neutralization processes defendants undertake, and on which courts appear to base part of their sentencing determinations, are distinct from motives. A white collar defendant's motive is broader than the neutralizations he employs, although both are related to the mental process facilitating an offense. Neutralizations are accounts or verbalizations that *allow* an offender to act on his or her motives. *See* Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 14-15 (describing an offender's motivation to commit a crime as involving three "essential kinds of psychological processes," one of which is a neutralization).

²⁰ 131 S.Ct. 1229 (2011).

sentencing mitigators, this may lessen the ability of future potential offenders to use those neutralizations to free themselves from the “moral bind of the law.” Yet for these benefits to be realized in a fair and transparent way, judges must be better educated as to the etiology of white collar crime, understand how neutralizations are used by defendants, consider the costs and benefits of basing sentencing decisions on defendants’ neutralizations, and explain their decision-making processes.

Part I of this article analyzes the sentencings of three high-profile white collar offenders—Gupta, Peter Madoff, and Allen Stanford—highlighting the courts’ inquiries into the defendants’ justifications of their conduct. Part II draws on established criminological theory to provide a framework for understanding the role of neutralizations in white collar sentencing. It also provides a taxonomy of neutralization techniques that are at the heart of these judicial inquiries. Part III addresses the legal and normative implications of courts taking defendants’ neutralizations into account at sentencing, concluding that the practice is justified yet not without costs.

I. JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE WHY OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME

Sentencing is not easy. This we know.²¹ Part of the reason sentencing is so difficult is that it compels a judge to try and understand what motivated a defendant

²¹ Justice Kennedy, during a recent oral argument, stated the following: “The hardest thing—as we know in the judicial system, one of the hardest things is sentencing.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, *Dorsey v. United States*, No. 11-5683 (argued Apr. 17, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-5683.pdf.

to commit the crimes charged.²² Sometimes there is an obvious reason—addiction, mental health problems, an extensive social history of abuse and neglect.²³ But most often, a defendant’s motivations are less clear, forcing the court to delve into the defendant’s personal history and statements made at sentencing.²⁴

The court’s inquiry is particularly difficult in white collar cases,²⁵ in which a judge is often faced with a seemingly successful defendant with much to lose who has nonetheless committed a serious crime. In these instances, the judge’s search for the defendant’s motivations necessarily confronts the defendant’s own

²² In theory, a judge could avoid this inquiry by basing the sentencing decision only on the harm caused by the defendant. However, even judges taking a strictly retributivist approach to sentencing must confront a defendant’s motivation to correctly assess blameworthiness, a central focus of the retributivist when determining the proper level of just punishment. See Hessick, *supra* note [], at 112. Most federal judges consider a combination of retributivist and consequentialist purposes when sentencing. See Results of Survey of United States District Judges: January 2010 through March 2010, U.S. SENT’G COMM. at Table 13 (June 2010), available at

http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Projects/Surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf.

²³ See Todd Haugh, *Can the CEO Learn from the Condemned? The Application of Capital Mitigation Strategies to White Collar Cases*, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2012) (discussing the use of social history investigations in white collar cases).

²⁴ The main tool by which courts investigate defendants’ motivations is the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). Conducted by the United States Probation Office, the PSR is a confidential document prepared for the sentencing judge that details the offense conduct, impact to victims, defendant’s criminal history, and defendant’s personal characteristics. See OFFICE OF PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERVICES, PUBLICATION 107, PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT (2006), available at <http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics---sentencing/the-presentence-investigation-report.pdf?sfvrsn=4>. The defendant’s characteristics section includes information about personal and family data, physical condition, mental and emotional health, substance abuse, education and vocational skills, employment, and financial condition. *Id.* at II(2)-(15). Letters submitted to the court on behalf of the defendant are another way courts learn about the defendant and his or her background.

²⁵ There is a long-standing debate concerning the definition of “white collar crime.” See Gilbert Geis, *White-Collar Crime: What Is It?*, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 31, 31-48 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992) (explaining origins of various definitions). Because the focus of this article is on sentencing white collar offenders, it adopts the definition used by the United States Sentencing Commission. See *White Collar Sentencing Data: Fiscal Year 2005-Fiscal Year 2009*, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 127, 127 (2009) (including most offenses punished under the fraud, antitrust, and tax guidelines, but excluding offenses such as simple theft, shoplifting, failure to pay child support, etc.) [hereinafter *White Collar Sentencing Data*].

justifications of his conduct. The following descriptions of three recent white collar sentencings demonstrate that judges are not only trying to understand offender motivations, but are crediting some justifications as sentencing mitigators and rejecting others. The sentencings of Gupta for insider trading, Peter Madoff for aiding his brother's Ponzi scheme, and Allen Stanford for fraud and money laundering highlight this judicial inquiry and its variable effects on white collar sentences.²⁶

A. Rajat Gupta

Indicted in October 2011, Gupta was the most high-profile defendant charged with insider trading since junk bond king Michael Milkin.²⁷ The charges against Gupta centered around his alleged leaking of boardroom secrets about Goldman and Procter & Gamble to Rajaratnam, co-founder of the hedge fund Galleon Group and

²⁶ The three sentencing "case studies" offered here are not intended to serve as a substitute for a more robust qualitative or quantitative analysis of white collar sentencing or judicial decision making. Instead, the descriptions, drawn from cases that vary in terms of offense conduct, geographic location, and procedural posture, are intended only to highlight the searches judges undertake in white collar sentencings. Whether they are representative of more white collar sentencings will depend on the results of a more comprehensive review. That said, based on the author's study of many white collar sentencings, and his decade of experience defending white collar clients, these courts' inquiries do appear to be common in white collar cases. *See e.g.*, *United States v. Milne*, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1312 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (addressing defendant's use of fraudulently obtained bank loan to prop up failing business, rather than for personal luxury items).

²⁷ Sealed Indictment, *United States v. Gupta*, No. 11 CR 907 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011) (charging Gupta with six counts of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud). The government filed a superseding indictment, expanding its allegations of securities fraud in January 2013. Superseding Indictment, *United States v. Gupta*, No. 11 CR 907 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2013). *See also* Michael Bobelian, *The Obscure Insider Trading Case That Started It All*, FORBES, Nov. 30, 2012, at 1, available at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelbobelian/2012/11/30/the-obscure-insider-trading-case-that-started-it-all/>.

Gupta's longtime friend and business associate.²⁸ According to the government, Rajaratnum gained over \$15 million in illegal trades based on Gupta's tips.²⁹ The government alleged Gupta was "motivated to assist" Rajaratnum and others at Galleon because Gupta shared business interests with the hedge fund.³⁰ The jury ultimately found Gupta guilty of providing confidential information related to two trades Rajaratnum made.³¹ At sentencing, the government asked for a prison term of 97-121 months, the range specified by the sentencing guidelines.³²

Gupta, not surprisingly, argued for a drastically different sentence. On the basis of over 400 letters submitted to the court, including by Bill Gates, Kofi Annan, Deepak Chopra, and other luminaries in medicine, finance, and government, the defense sought a sentence of probation with a significant community service

²⁸ See Superseding Indictment, *supra* note [], at 6; Patricia Hurtado, David Glovin & Chris Dolmetsch, *Ex-Goldman Director Gupta Indicted on Fraud Charges*, BLOOMBERG.COM, at 1 (Oct. 26, 2011), available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-26/ex-goldman-sachs-director-gupta-is-charged-by-u-s-with-securities-fraud.html>.

²⁹ Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 9. Judge Rakoff ultimately rejected this amount, finding Gupta's tips generated only \$5 million in illegal gains.

³⁰ Government's Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 3-4 (contending Gupta invested tens of millions of dollars with Galleon-related entities and stood to make substantial profits if the hedge fund was successful).

³¹ Hurtago, et al., *supra* note [], at 1; Chris Isidore, *Gupta convicted of insider trading*, CNNMoney.com (June 15, 2012), available at <http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/15/news/companies/gupta-verdict/index.htm>. The jury rejected the defense's contention that there were "legitimate reasons" for Gupta and Rajaratnum to be communicating. Gupta was also acquitted of two counts.

³² Government's Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 12. The range was driven primarily by the monetary gain to Rajaratnum caused by Gupta's tips. See Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 9 (the gain amount was calculated by the probation department and adopted by the government). According to the government, a ten year prison sentence was necessary to "reflect the seriousness of Gupta's crimes and deter other corporate insiders in similar positions of trust from stealing corporate secrets and engaging in a crime that has become far too common." Government's Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 1. The government further argued that despite Gupta's apparent "deviation from an otherwise law-abiding life," his two-year conspiracy to tip Rajaratnum "displayed an above-the-law arrogance." *Id.* at 8.

component.³³ In letter after letter, writers detailed Gupta's extensive humanitarian efforts, including as chairman of three international organizations.³⁴ Gupta's attorney called his client's removal from these organizations and various company boards a "fall from grace of Greek tragic proportions," contending that Gupta had "suffered punishment far worse than prison already."³⁵ Gupta's family members also submitted letters to the court, relating personal stories of Gupta's individual acts of kindness.³⁶

Gupta addressed the court at his sentencing hearing. He began by focusing on the harm caused to his reputation "built over a lifetime" and the "devastation" to his family by the verdict.³⁷ Gupta also spoke of his many good deeds, highlighting individual acts ("I mentored many young people, and many more view me as a role model") and larger acts of philanthropy ("I also often thought in particular about three not-for-profit organizations that I was fortunate to help create").³⁸ While not citing the defense letters specifically, Gupta stated he was grateful for family and

³³ Government's Reply Sentencing Memorandum, *United States v. Gupta*, No. 11 CR 907 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2012). Gupta's sentencing memorandum and the accompanying letters to the court were filed under seal; however, some letters and excerpts from the defense memorandum were reported by the media. See Rothfeld et al., *supra* note [], at 3 (Gupta's attorneys argued for a sentence of probation and "rigorous" community service in rural Rwanda).

³⁴ See Letters of Bill Gates and Kofi Annan, *available at* <http://www.scribd.com/doc/110075296/guptaletters-1-6#fullscreen>. Gupta served as chairman of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; the Public Health Foundation of India; and the United Nations Association of America. The letters also referenced Gupta's involvement with the Pratham Foundation, which provides education to underprivileged children in India, and the Rockefeller Foundation. See Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 10.

³⁵ Rothfeld, et al., *supra* note [], at 2.

³⁶ See e.g., Letter of Anita Gupta, *available at* <http://www.scribd.com/doc/110076942/Gupta-Letters-2#fullscreen>.

³⁷ NDTV.COM, *supra* note [], at 1.

³⁸ NDTV.COM, *supra* note [], at 1-2.

friends that continued to support him.³⁹ Notably, Gupta never admitted wrongdoing. The most he offered was that “the overwhelming feeling in [his] heart [was] of acceptance of what ha[d] happened.”⁴⁰

From the outset of Judge Rakoff’s remarks, which he read from a prepared memorandum, it was clear he would not be imposing a sentence within the guidelines range. Judge Rakoff began by rejecting the guidelines’ heavy reliance on monetary gain to establish the sentencing range for an insider trading offense.⁴¹ The court reasoned that the heart of Gupta’s offense, the abuse of his position of trust, was given too little weight by the guidelines.⁴² Equally as important, the court found, the guidelines range did not “rationally square with the facts of the case.”⁴³ In other words, Judge Rakoff was searching for something more than expressed in the guidelines when making his sentencing decision.

The court then turned its discussion to the nature and circumstances of the offense and Gupta’s personal history.⁴⁴ No longer tied to a mechanical guidelines calculation, Judge Rakoff began freely speculating about the motivations underlying

³⁹ NDTV.COM, *supra* note [], at 2.

⁴⁰ NDTV.COM, *supra* note [], at 2. It is not surprising Gupta did not admit wrongdoing, as he had maintained his innocence throughout the trial and filed an appeal of his conviction immediately after the verdict.

⁴¹ *See* Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 3-9 (calling reliance on gain “arbitrary” and “unsupported by any empirical data,” and calling into question the “huge increase” in sentencing ranges for economic crimes since 1987).

⁴² *See* Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 2.

⁴³ Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 9.

⁴⁴ *See* Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 9. Section 3553 of the Sentencing Reform Act—the “bedrock of all federal sentencing” according to Judge Rakoff—requires judges to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence imposed, the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established, the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparity, and the need to provide victim restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).

Gupta's crimes. The court's inquiry began with an acknowledgment of a "fundamental problem": how to sentence a defendant who was a "good man," but that had committed a bad act.⁴⁵ In an effort to reconcile this duality, the court rhetorically asked why Gupta "did it."⁴⁶

Judge Rakoff offered two possible reasons. One was that Gupta felt frustrated in "not finding new business worlds to conquer," allowing himself to be enticed into sharing information with Rajaratnum, a fellow South Asian executive on Wall Street who offered exciting new business opportunities.⁴⁷ The second is less clear. Hinting at information presented to the court under seal, Judge Rakoff speculated that Gupta had "begun to loosen his self-restraint in ways that clouded his judgment."⁴⁸ The court suggested, based on an "implicit suggestion,"⁴⁹ that Gupta may have acted improperly because he "longed to escape the straightjacket of overwhelming responsibility."⁵⁰ While the court ultimately could not pinpoint what "was operating in the recesses of [Gupta's] brain," Judge Rakoff believed Gupta's criminal acts were motivated by the prospect of "future benefits, opportunities, and even excitement."⁵¹

⁴⁵ Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 10. Although not stated in the written memorandum, it was widely reported that Judge Rakoff called Gupta's crime "disgusting in its implications." Rothfeld, et al., *supra* note [], at 2.

⁴⁶ Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 12.

⁴⁷ See Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 12 (Judge Rakoff called Rajartnum a "clever cultivator of persons with information"). See also *Every bloody Indian co-operated to nail me: Raj Rajaratnam*, TELEGRAPH INDIA (Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1111028/jsp/frontpage/story_14677090.jsp.

⁴⁸ Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 12.

⁴⁹ Although unclear, this suggestion likely came from Gupta's sentencing memorandum filed under seal or letters from family members.

⁵⁰ Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 12.

⁵¹ Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 12.

Its inquiry of Gupta's motivations complete, the court briefly discussed additional sentencing factors, and then imposed a two year sentence. Although Judge Rakoff rejected Gupta's argument for a probationary sentence because of its lack of deterrent value,⁵² the sentence was still strikingly lenient given the guidelines range and the government's request.⁵³ Exactly to what extent Judge Rakoff's inquiry into Gupta's motivations impacted the final sentence is difficult to quantify, but the court's statements indicate there was an impact. In fact, the court appeared to directly credit two of Gupta's expressed justifications as mitigating sentencing factors: his relationship with and feelings of loyalty to Rajaratnum, and his extensive good works compared to his aberrant criminal behavior.⁵⁴ In addition, the court intimated that it also found mitigating Gupta's justification that he earned the right to engage in risky or unethical behavior based on his many years of doing the right thing by caring for others—the "loosening of self-restraint" as Judge Rakoff put it.⁵⁵ In Gupta's case, then, the court's sentencing determination appears to have been directly impacted by the justifications offered by the defendant. Those justifications were credited by the court, resulting in a well-below guidelines sentence.

⁵² See Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 13. (rejecting the idea of rigorous international community service in place of imprisonment as "a kind of 'Peace Corps for insider traders'" (quoting Rothfeld, et al., *supra* note [], at 3)).

⁵³ See Larry Neumeister, *Ex-Goldman exec's 2-year sentence draws scrutiny*, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 25, 2012, available at <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ex-goldman-execs-2-year-sentence-draws-scrutiny>.

⁵⁴ See Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 12-13.

⁵⁵ Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 12.

B. Peter Madoff

If Gupta's case demonstrates how a defendant's justifications for his crimes may be credited by the court at sentencing, Peter Madoff's case demonstrates how a court may credit some justifications and reject others, resulting in little net impact at sentencing. The story of Peter Madoff's brother, Bernard, and his massive Ponzi scheme is well known.⁵⁶ Beginning in the 1970s and ending in December 2008, Bernie Madoff, founder of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, ran the largest Ponzi scheme in history, bilking thousands of individual and institutional investors out of \$65 billion dollars.⁵⁷ In June 2009, the 71-year-old former chairman of the Nasdaq was sentenced to 150 years in prison and ordered to forfeit \$170 billion.⁵⁸ The sentencing judge called his crimes "extraordinarily evil."⁵⁹

While public outrage over the Madoff fraud focused on Bernie, questions arose about who else knew his investment company was a sham.⁶⁰ At the time of his arrest, Bernie told investigators that only he was to blame.⁶¹ But, three years to the

⁵⁶ See JAMES B. STEWART, TANGLED WEBS 363-432 (2011), for a comprehensive analysis of Bernie Madoff's scheme and the lies he told investors and regulators.

⁵⁷ See Steve Fishman, *The Madoff Tapes*, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Feb. 27, 2011, at 1, available at <http://nymag.com/print/?/news/features/berniemadoff-2011-3/>. Madoff's crimes are considered the "largest, longest, and most widespread" Ponzi scheme in history. See Diana B. Henriques, *Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 30, 2009, at 1, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html?pagewanted=print>.

⁵⁸ Henriques, *supra* note [], at 1; Patricia Hurtado, *Peter Madoff, Bernie's Brother, to Plead Guilty*, BLOOMBERG, June 28, 2012, at 2, available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-27/peter-madoff-brother-of-bernard-will-plead-guilty-u-s-says.html>.

⁵⁹ Transcript of Plea Hearing, *United States v. Madoff*, No. 09 CR 213 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009), at 18-21, on file with the author.

⁶⁰ See *Bernie Madoff: Lord of the lies*, THE ECONOMIST, May 19, 2011, at 1, available at <http://www.economist.com/node/18709609> (recounting journalist Diana Henriques' search for who else knew of Madoff's fraud).

⁶¹ Hurtado, *supra* note [], at 2.

day since his brother's sentencing, Peter, the company's chief compliance officer, pleaded guilty to falsifying investment records and tax returns that enabled the fraud.⁶² Peter also admitted to Judge Laura Swain that he prepared over \$300 million in investment redemptions to select employees, family, and friends after his brother's confession to him—three days before going to prosecutors.⁶³ However, Peter denied knowing that Bernie had been operating a Ponzi scheme until his confession.⁶⁴ Pursuant to a plea agreement, Peter consented to a \$143 billion forfeiture order and a ten-year prison sentence.⁶⁵

Because he had entered a plea agreement stipulating his sentence, Peter's statements to the court were aimed at ensuring Judge Swain accepted the plea.⁶⁶ Beginning with his plea allocution and throughout the sentencing hearing, Peter

⁶² See Peter Lattman & Ben Protess, *In Guilty Plea, Peter Madoff Says He Didn't Know About the Fraud*, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (June 29, 2012, 8:16 PM), <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/in-guilty-plea-peter-madoff-says-he-didnt-know-about-the-fraud/>.

⁶³ See Transcript of Plea Hearing, *United States v. Madoff*, No. 10 Cr. 228 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012), at 38-39, on file with the author [*Peter Madoff Plea Transcript*]; Lattman, et al., *supra* note [], at 3.

⁶⁴ See Peter Madoff Plea Transcript, *supra* note [], at 30 (“[I]t is important for your Honor to know that at no time before December 2008 was I ever aware that my brother Bernard Madoff, or anyone else at BLMIS, was engaged in a Ponzi scheme.”).

⁶⁵ Peter Madoff Plea Transcript, *supra* note [], at 22, 46. The \$143 billion forfeiture amount does not reflect what Madoff could pay, only the amount of money that passed through the investment company. Even the widely-reported \$65 billion figure is misleading because it includes the paper profits victims believed they held in the fund. According to bankruptcy trustee Irving Picard, Madoff customers had actual cash losses of \$17.3 billion. See Peter Lattman & Diana B. Henriques, *Peter Madoff Is Sentenced to 10 Years for His Role in Fraud*, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Dec. 20, 2012, 5:59 PM), <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/peter-madoff-is-sentenced-to-10-years-for-his-role-in-fraud/>.

⁶⁶ Despite a plea agreement between the defendant and the government, the sentencing judge is the final arbiter of the defendant's sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c). Peter Madoff's plea agreement acknowledged that the court was not bound by the agreement between the parties and the final sentence would be determined “solely” by Judge Swain. Letter Agreement, *United States v. Madoff*, No. 10 Cr. 228 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012), at 5, on file with the author.

took responsibility for the crimes to which he pleaded guilty.⁶⁷ However, he did offer a series of justifications. Stating that he wanted to make the court aware of “some important background facts that do not excuse my conduct, but that may help [the court] understand why I am here today,” Peter described his relationship with his brother.⁶⁸ He explained that he always admired and looked up to Bernie, who was seven years his senior, and believed him to be a “brilliant securities trader.”⁶⁹ He said he trusted Bernie “implicitly” during the almost 40 years he worked for him.⁷⁰ But he also described how Bernie controlled and demeaned him, personally and professionally.⁷¹ Numerous letters from family, friends, and business associates confirmed that even though Bernie was often “abus[ive]” to him, Peter “seemed to be blind to his brother’s flaws.”⁷² Peter stated that after Bernie told him of the

⁶⁷ See Peter Madoff Plea Transcript, *supra* note [], at 29-30 (“Your Honor, I am here today to plead guilty to conspiracy and falsifying records of an investment advisor and to accept responsibility for what I have done.”); Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Madoff, No. 10 Cr. 228 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2012), at 3, on file with the author [hereinafter *Peter Madoff Sentencing Memorandum*] (“Peter Madoff acknowledges without reservation that his offense conduct was wrong, is deeply ashamed, and struggles to comprehend his circumstances and his own conduct”); Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, United States v. Madoff, No. 10 Cr. 228 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2012), at 22, on file with the author [hereinafter *Peter Madoff Sentencing Transcript*] (“I accept full responsibility for my actions that have brought me before your Honor today and I am here to accept my punishment from this Court.”).

⁶⁸ Peter Madoff Plea Transcript, *supra* note [], at 30.

⁶⁹ Peter Madoff Plea Transcript, *supra* note [], at 30, 31.

⁷⁰ Peter Madoff Plea Transcript, *supra* note [], at 30, 33. Peter explained how he convinced other family members to invest millions in Bernie’s investment fund, which was lost when the fund collapsed.

⁷¹ Peter Madoff Plea Transcript, *supra* note [], at 33. The most obvious way was Bernie’s refusal to give Peter a financial interest in the company he had helped build; another was Bernie’s criticism of Peter’s family and religious devotion. See Peter Madoff Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 21. Peter also recounted that “Bernie was the boss,” and “[w]hen it came to business, no one could question Bernie; Bernie would always have the last say: ‘My name is on the door.’” *Id.*

⁷² Peter Madoff Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 21. One letter, which Peter stressed at sentencing, is particularly telling of the relationship between the Madoffs:

fraud, he was “shocked and devastated, but nevertheless I did as my brother said, as I consistently had done for decades.”⁷³

Peter also highlighted his extensive good deeds. Through his sentencing submissions, Peter recounted how he used his experiences as a cancer survivor to help family members fight the disease, including his son and a young niece and nephew.⁷⁴ He also detailed his service to a facility aiding the elderly and to many causes related to the Jewish community.⁷⁵ Peter’s statements were buttressed by 63 letters from family and friends describing his individual good deeds.⁷⁶ This was in stark contrast to Bernie’s sentencing, in which not a single supporting letter was submitted, a fact Peter made clear to the court.⁷⁷ Peter concluded by saying he was a “good man who made serious mistakes.”⁷⁸

While not as explicitly as Judge Rakoff, Judge Swain also searched for an explanation as to what motivated Peter to commit his crimes. In determining

When he spoke about Bernie, it sometimes sounded as if Peter was a young boy, speaking about his idol. . . . I only knew Bernie as seen through Peter’s eyes. He was the older brother who, when it came down to it, Peter worked for. The brother Peter always wanted to please, the brother who would never really let Peter in, the brother with the power Peter wanted to please others, and couldn’t see himself as anything but the younger fat brother looking for approval from his idol.

Id. at 22.

⁷³ Peter Madoff Plea Transcript, *supra* note [], at 38-39.

⁷⁴ See Peter Madoff Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 24.

⁷⁵ See Peter Madoff Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 34-35 (calling Peter a “selfless and dedicated” board member of the Old Westbury Hebrew Congregation, a “trusted participant” of the Central Synagogue in Manhattan, and a “steady hand” on the board of the Lower East Side Tenement Museum).

⁷⁶ See Reed Albergotti, *Support for Madoff Brother*, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2012, at 1, available at

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324907204578185970484898366.html> (describing letters and providing link to them).

⁷⁷ See Lattman, *supra* note [], at 1.

⁷⁸ Peter Madoff Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 42.

whether the ten-year sentence was appropriate, Judge Swain discussed at length the duality of Peter's life.⁷⁹ Alternatively applauding him for his devotion to family and scolding him for enabling his brother's fraud, Judge Swain ultimately found Peter's behavior "remarkable, but not unique."⁸⁰ She suggested that only Peter could truly know the "story" behind his actions, and she urged him to share it as a way to make amends for his behavior.⁸¹ During one part of the hearing, Judge Swain even suggested that Peter should become more introspective so that he might understand the motivations underlying his own criminal conduct.⁸²

The court's search for Peter's motivations did not translate into a lower sentence. The court imposed the ten-year term of imprisonment as agreed to by the parties.⁸³ Yet it does appear Judge Swain credited at least two of Peter's justifications. The first was his subservient relationship with his brother. Judge Swain stated explicitly that the court "underst[ood] that Peter Madoff's relationship with his brother was unhealthy."⁸⁴ Second was Peter's extensive history of good works compared to his criminal acts. The court found "much that is good in [his] life," specifically referencing his combination of community work and devotion to family.⁸⁵ At the same time, the court rejected Peter's contention that he was not responsible for his brother's fraud because he had been misled. Calling him a

⁷⁹ See Peter Madoff Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 29.

⁸⁰ Peter Madoff Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 29.

⁸¹ Peter Madoff Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 29, 30.

⁸² See Peter Madoff Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 29 (stating, "I recognize that you want to understand what has happened," and urging him to look inward).

⁸³ Peter Madoff Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 32.

⁸⁴ Peter Madoff Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 28. The court was quick to state that the brothers' relationship "cannot excuse Peter Madoff's conduct." *Id.*

⁸⁵ Peter Madoff Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 30-31.

“sophisticated person who knew and knows right from wrong,” Judge Swain found Peter’s contention that he did not know of the Ponzi scheme implausible.⁸⁶ Judge Swain then challenged him to “be honest about all that you have done and all that you have seen, in other words, about all that you know.”⁸⁷ In addition, Judge Swain rejected an implicit justification that Peter appeared to be making—that his fraudulent acts were minor and somehow acceptable when compared to the enormity of his brother’s Ponzi scheme.⁸⁸

As with the Gupta case, the exact impact of the court’s inquiry on Peter’s final sentence is unclear. It is evident, however, that the court grappled with understanding the defendant’s motivations and justifications. The court’s acceptance of the ten-year sentence, despite conducting a lengthy inquiry into Peter’s motivations, suggests Judge Swain may have viewed his justifications as offsetting. The court may have credited two justifications (his relationship with his brother and his prior good works), but offset them by rejecting two others (denial of full responsibility and claim of relatively acceptable conduct), resulting in no net change to the agreed-upon sentence.

⁸⁶ Peter Madoff Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 27-28. The court said Peter’s claim to have lacked knowledge of the scheme was “beneath the dignity of the former vice chairman of NASD, governor of the National Stock Exchange and corporate director, community pillar and family paradigm about whom I have read so much.” The court added, “It is also, frankly, not believable.” *Id.* at 28.

⁸⁷ Peter Madoff Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 30.

⁸⁸ See Peter Madoff Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 28; Peter Madoff Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 20-23 (drawing comparisons between Peter and Bernie Madoff).

C. Allen Stanford

The sentencing of Allen Stanford provides a third example of a court's consideration of a white collar defendant's justifications of his conduct, albeit with a much different result. Stanford, a brash Texas financier and former chairman of Stanford Financial Group, was convicted in March 2012 of orchestrating a twenty-year-long Ponzi scheme selling high-interest certificates of deposit.⁸⁹ Although his attorneys portrayed him as a "visionary entrepreneur," evidence at trial showed Stanford's financial empire that stretched from the United States to Latin America and the Caribbean was a sham.⁹⁰ Stanford used money invested in CDs issued by his Antigua-based bank to fund a string of bad business ventures and real estate deals, while at the same time buying multimillion dollar yachts, a fleet of jets, and a professional cricket team.⁹¹ Following a six-week trial, a jury found Stanford guilty of defrauding nearly 30,000 investors in 113 countries out of \$7 billion.⁹²

⁸⁹ See Nathan Vardi, *Allen Stanford Convicted In \$7 Billion Ponzi Scheme*, FORBES, Mar. 6, 2012, at 1, available at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2012/03/06/allen-stanford-convicted-in-7-billion-ponzi-scheme/>.

⁹⁰ See Juan A. Lozano, *Allen Stanford Sentenced To 110 Years In Prison For \$7 Billion Ponzi Scheme*, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (June 14, 2012 6:15 P.M.), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/14/allen-stanford-sentenced-prison-jail-ponzi-scheme-110-years_n_1597286.html.

⁹¹ See Lozano, *supra* note [], at 1.

⁹² Clifford Krauss, *Stanford Convicted by Jury in \$7 Billion Ponzi Scheme*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/business/jury-convicts-stanford-in-7-billion-ponzi-fraud.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1360443630-Fk3gFLJBzXgbp6J+uyny3A. The government alleged that at the height of the fraud, Stanford was stealing \$1 million a day from the bank to prop up his failing personal businesses. See David Benoit, *Allen Stanford Sentencing: The Arguments From Both Sides*, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2012, at 1, available at <http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/06/14/allen-stanford-sentencing-the-arguments-from-both-sides/>.

Repeatedly invoking comparisons to Bernie Madoff, prosecutors sought a prison term of 230 years.⁹³ Stanford asked for time served.⁹⁴

If Peter Madoff provides an example of a defendant accepting responsibility for his conduct, Stanford provides the counter-example. Through his sentencing submissions, Stanford vehemently denied that he operated a Ponzi scheme.⁹⁵ He contended his company “actually made investments” and had real value.⁹⁶ In fact, he asserted the company would have been able to fully meet its liabilities but for the government’s intervention.⁹⁷ In addition, he argued he never actually promised depositors he would make them profits or that any profits made would come directly from their deposits.⁹⁸ Stanford’s sentencing submissions also attacked the government, accusing it of causing the company’s downfall, of “spinning” the evidence to suggest a non-existent Ponzi scheme, and of engaging in “double-talk.”⁹⁹ Finally, Stanford suggested the government had targeted him to deflect attention

⁹³ United States’ Sentencing Memorandum, *United States v. Stanford*, No. 09-CR-342 (June 6, 2012), at 1 [hereinafter *Stanford Sentencing Memo*]. The first line of the government’s sentencing memorandum read, “Robert Allen Stanford is a ruthless predator responsible for one of the most egregious frauds in history, and he should be sentenced to the statutory maximum sentence of 230 years’ imprisonment.” See Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings, *United States v. Stanford*, No. 09-CR-342 (June 14, 2012), at 40 [hereinafter *Stanford Sentencing Transcript*], on file with author (victim advocate arguing Stanford more culpable than Madoff).

⁹⁴ Stanford Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 1.

⁹⁵ See Defendant’s Response to the Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, *United States v. Stanford*, No. 09-CR-342 (June 13, 2012), at 2 [hereinafter *Stanford Response Memo*].

⁹⁶ Stanford Response Memo, *supra* note [], at 3-4 (contending Stanford Financial Group held, among other things, an equity interest in Liat Airline).

⁹⁷ See Stanford Response Memo, *supra* note [], at 4 (“The fact is that right up to the intervention by the United States the Bank had sufficient assets to meet its liabilities when taking into account liquid and non-liquid assets.”).

⁹⁸ See Stanford Response Memo, *supra* note [], at 5.

⁹⁹ Stanford Response Memo, *supra* note [], at 4-5.

away from its failure to “uncover[] the shenanigans of the banks and other financial institutions in 2008 and 2009.”¹⁰⁰

At his sentencing hearing, in what can only be described as a “rambling” address, Stanford denied he defrauded investors and attacked the government for over 40 minutes.¹⁰¹ He explained to Judge David Hittner that he “was not a thief”; instead, it was the government’s “Gestapo tactics” and insistence on making him a “scapegoat” for the “worldwide economic collapse” that “destroyed a business that had real value.”¹⁰² He stated he “worked tirelessly and honestly” for 30 years building a “world class financial services global company,” and that his bank was no different than “the big banks whose CEOs and chairmen sit on the board of directors of the Federal Reserve.”¹⁰³ In addition, Stanford suggested he had been signaled out for prosecution because of his lack of political connections.¹⁰⁴ He concluded by saying he was “at peace” with the way he “conducted himself in business.”¹⁰⁵ In response, the government called Stanford’s version of events “obscene,”

¹⁰⁰ Stanford Response Memo, *supra* note [], at 6.

¹⁰¹ Krauss, *supra* note [], at 1. At one point, the sentencing judge called a sidebar, saying, “All right. I want to get this on the record. Mr. Stanford now is starting to ramble.” Stanford Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 40. Stanford explained at the hearing’s outset that he had trouble organizing his thoughts after being severely injured in a prison brawl and developing an addiction to painkillers. *See id.* at 26-29 (calling his ability to remember events “Swiss cheese”).

¹⁰² Stanford Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 31.

¹⁰³ Stanford Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 32, 37.

¹⁰⁴ *See* Stanford Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 42 (“I was a formerly very rich, colorful, maverick Texan living in the Caribbean who was a target and an easy target . . . not part of the Wall Street crowd. . . . What I’ve seen very now close and personal is how that really works more so than I ever thought. It’s who you know.”).

¹⁰⁵ Stanford Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 43.

commenting that the “best argument for a guideline sentence of 230 years just came from Allen Stanford.”¹⁰⁶

Judge Hittner did not pause long before imposing sentence. He said the evidence at trial demonstrated Stanford committed his crimes with the “precise aim of amassing billions of dollars to fund a personal business empire and to support an extraordinarily lavish lifestyle.”¹⁰⁷ He then sentenced Stanford to 110 years in prison.¹⁰⁸ While not addressing Stanford’s allocution in detail, it is evident that Judge Hittner rejected Stanford’s expressed justifications for his conduct.¹⁰⁹ By framing Stanford’s motivations as driven solely by greed, Judge Hittner dismissed three of Stanford’s justifications: that others were responsible for investor losses, that his investors were sophisticated and he was actually the real victim, and that the government wrongly targeted him. Stanford also appeared to be offering a fourth justification for his conduct by suggesting he had achieved much good in life by building a successful international business, a justification Judge Hittner also rejected.

¹⁰⁶ Stanford Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 44.

¹⁰⁷ Stanford Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 71.

¹⁰⁸ Stanford Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 71. This places Stanford fourth on the list of the longest white collar sentences, one below Madoff. *See* Liz Moyer, *It Could Have Been Worse For Madoff*, FORBES.COM (June 29, 2009, 11:35 AM), <http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/24/bernie-madoff-prison-sentence-business-beltway-madoff.html> (describing longest sentences of white collar offenders).

¹⁰⁹ Through his questioning of the government’s counsel and Stanford’s attorney at various times during the sentencing hearing, Judge Hittner appears to have been considering Stanford’s justifications as they were raised, but quickly rejecting each of them. *See e.g.*, Stanford Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 47-52 (court questioning whether Stanford’s fraudulent conduct met the definition of a Ponzi scheme and how much knowledge depositors possessed).

Stanford's sentencing offers an example of a court considering but rejecting the defendant's proffered justifications for his conduct, leading to an extremely lengthy sentence. This is in stark contrast to Gupta's sentencing, in which the court credited the defendant's justifications (even independently suggesting some) to impose a lenient sentence. Peter Madoff's sentencing falls somewhere in between—the court accepted some justifications and rejected others, which likely had a negligible net impact at sentencing. Common among each of these cases is the court's inquiry to determine the defendant's motivations—as expressed through the defendant's justifications of his conduct—and that the inquiry impacted the sentencing calculus. Assuming this is occurring in other white collar cases, the next task is to understand exactly what judges are searching for and what they may be finding that affects their sentencing decisions. Criminological theory concerning the etiology of white collar crime offers a compelling framework through which to analyze this aspect of white collar sentencing.

II. NEUTRALIZATIONS IN WHITE COLLAR SENTENCING

A judge's search for the "why" underlying a defendant's white collar crime necessarily begins with an inquiry into what motivated the defendant's actions. Prosecutors, such as those in the Stanford case, tend to argue white collar defendants are motivated by simple, overwhelming greed.¹¹⁰ This explanation,

¹¹⁰ See Stanford Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 43 (government arguing that Stanford was "one of the greediest criminals ever to appear for sentencing in a criminal case"). Professor Craig Haney has identified this type of description as part of the "crime master narrative" prosecutors adopt to sway sentencers. Craig Haney, *Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and Logic of Capital Mitigation*, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 841 (2008).

while having broad public appeal, is simplistic.¹¹¹ Judges realize, as evidenced by their willingness to consider defendants' motivations at sentencing, that what causes a person to commit a white collar crime is varied and nuanced.

Criminological theory provides a framework to understand the causes of white collar crime. In turn, neutralization theory helps illuminate what judges may be finding during their sentencing inquiries that impact the sentences imposed.

A. Neutralization Theory

Understanding neutralization theory and how it helps explain white collar sentencing begins with the work of criminologist Donald Cressey. Cressey, a former student of Edwin H. Sutherland, whose groundbreaking work “invented the concept” of white collar crime, used a study of embezzlers to develop a social psychological theory regarding the etiology of “respectable” crime.¹¹² Building on Sutherland’s theory of differential association, which posited that criminal behavior involves “motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes favorable to the violation of law,”¹¹³ Cressey determined three key elements are necessary for violations of a financial trust—considered the essence of white collar crime—to occur.¹¹⁴

First, Cressey theorized that an individual must possess a non-shareable financial problem, *i.e.*, a financial problem that the individual feels cannot be solved

¹¹¹ See Bowman, *Pour encourager*, *supra* note [], at 431-35 (describing public and legislative reaction to the Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco corporate scandals).

¹¹² DONALD R. CRESSEY, *OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY* X, 12 (1973); Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 13.

¹¹³ Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 664; EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, *WHITE COLLAR CRIME* 240 (1983).

¹¹⁴ See Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 14.

by revealing it to others.¹¹⁵ Second, the individual must realize that the financial problem can be solved in secret by violating a trust, typically by appropriating funds to which the individual has access through her employment.¹¹⁶ Third, the individual must verbalize the relationship between the non-shareable financial problem and the illegal solution in “language that lets [her] look on trust violation as something other than trust violation.”¹¹⁷ Put another way, the individual uses words and phrases during an internal dialogue that makes the behavior acceptable in her mind (such as by telling herself she is “borrowing” the money and will pay it back), thus keeping her perception of herself as an honest citizen intact.¹¹⁸

Cressey called the verbalizations described in his third element “the crux of the problem.”¹¹⁹ According to him, the words the potential white collar offender uses during her conversations with herself are “actually the most important elements in the process which gets [her] into trouble, or keeps [her] out of trouble.”¹²⁰ Cressey did not view these verbalizations as simple, after-the-fact rationalizations that offenders used to relieve their culpability upon being caught.

¹¹⁵ See Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 14. Cressey explained that the problem may not seem dire from the outsider’s perspective; “what matters is the psychological perspective of the potential embezzler.” *Id.* Thus, problems may vary in type and severity, from gambling debts to business losses to credit card debt that the individual is ashamed to reveal. Cressey’s definition of a non-shareable problem encompasses notions of greed. See JAMES WILLIAM COLEMAN, *THE CRIMINAL ELITE* 195 (2002) (arguing that of Cressey’s three elements, the first is the “most questionable, for there appears no necessary reason why an embezzlement must result from a nonshareable problem instead of a simple desire for more money”).

¹¹⁶ See Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 14-15; Lanier, et al., *supra* note [], at 168.

¹¹⁷ Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 15.

¹¹⁸ See Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 15.

¹¹⁹ Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 15.

¹²⁰ Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 15.

Instead, he found the verbalizations were “vocabularies of motive,” words and phrases not invented by the offender “on the spur of the moment,” but that existed as group definitions labeling deviant behavior as appropriate.¹²¹ This meant, he suggested, that an offender may prepare a rationalization *before* acting. “The rationalization is [her] motivation”—it not only justifies her behavior to others, but it makes the behavior intelligible, and therefore actionable, to herself.¹²² Cressey explained that verbalizations permit behavior that would otherwise be unavailable or unacceptable to the offender.¹²³

Shortly after Cressey published his theories concerning offender rationalizations, Gresham Sykes and David Matza advanced a sophisticated theory of delinquency focusing on how juvenile delinquents justify their behavior. Their influential study found that great flexibility exists in criminal law; values and norms appear not as absolutes, but as qualified guides for action.¹²⁴ Pointing to the various defenses to criminal liability, such as necessity, insanity, and self-defense, they argued that this flexibility allows juveniles to avoid moral culpability and negative

¹²¹ Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 15. Cressey’s discussion of vocabularies of motives drew from the work of C. Wright Mills and Sutherland’s “definitions favorable to violations of law.” Cressey, *Other People’s Money*, *supra* note [], at viii.

¹²² Cressey, *Other People’s Money*, *supra* note [], at 94, 95. Cressey explained that his interviews of embezzlers revealed “significant rationalizations were always present *before* the criminal acts took place, or at least at the time it took place, and, in fact, after the act had taken place the rationalization often was abandoned.” *Id.* at 94.

¹²³ See Cressey, *Other People’s Money*, *supra* note [], at ix. Cressey conducted interviews with inmates at three penitentiaries who were incarcerated for crimes defined as “the criminal violation of financial trust.” *Id.* at 22. One hundred at thirty-three inmates were interviewed multiple times and for multiple hours to understand the motivations underlying their crimes. *Id.* at 25. Although criminological studies such as Cressey’s often rely on qualitative interviews, concerns regarding sample selection and generalizability should not be ignored. See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 260-70 (discussing the pros and cons of interview-based, survey-based, and quantitative neutralization research).

¹²⁴ See Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 666.

societal sanctions by demonstrating their lack of criminal intent.¹²⁵ Sykes and Matza believed that most anti-normative behavior was based on “what is essentially an unrecognized extension of defenses to crimes, in the form of justifications for deviance that are seen as valid by the delinquent but not by the society at large.”¹²⁶ In other words, delinquents justify or rationalize their behavior to fit it within a “defense” they deem valid but society may not.¹²⁷

Like Cressey, Sykes and Matza found that while rationalizations occur following deviant behavior, they also *precede* behavior and make it possible.¹²⁸ By rationalizing their conduct and creating a type of pre-act defense, offenders are able to neutralize the “[d]isapproval flowing from internalized norms and conforming others in the social environment.”¹²⁹ Sykes and Matza called these justifications “techniques of neutralizations,” and they believed they explained the episodic nature of delinquent behavior more completely than competing theories.¹³⁰ Neutralizations explained how offenders could “remain committed to the dominant normative system,” yet qualify that system’s imperatives in a way to make periodic violations “‘acceptable’ if not ‘right.’”¹³¹ Neutralization theory and its core idea—that the justifications offenders use to rationalize their behavior are a critical

¹²⁵ Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 666.

¹²⁶ Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 666.

¹²⁷ Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 666.

¹²⁸ See Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 666.

¹²⁹ Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 666.

¹³⁰ Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 667.

¹³¹ Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 667. Key to neutralization theory is the concept of “drift,” which Matza developed in his solo work. The idea is that offenders are able to drift in and out of delinquency by using neutralization techniques that “free the individual from the moral bind of law and order.” Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 231.

component in the etiology of criminal behavior—has greatly influenced the study of crime.¹³²

Although neutralization theory was specifically developed in the context of juvenile delinquency, it has particular force in explaining white collar crime. As an initial matter, neutralization theory has its roots in the study of “respectable” crime. The theory stems from Cressey’s ideas on the verbalizations trust-violators employ, which he identified as the most important of the elements leading to embezzlement, a typical white collar crime.¹³³ Indeed, Sykes and Matza recognized that neutralization techniques might be used not only by juveniles, but also by adults engaged in general forms of deviance, including those committing crimes in the workplace.¹³⁴

More fundamentally, neutralization theory seems especially applicable in describing the etiology of white collar crime given that “almost by definition white-collar offenders are more strongly committed to the central normative structure.”¹³⁵

¹³² See Maruna et al., *supra* note [], at 222. Shadd Maruna and Heith Copes state that the “influence of this creative insight has been unquestionable.” *Id.* Indeed, Sykes and Matza’s article is one of the most-cited explanations of criminal behavior in the first part of the twenty-first century, and their theories have been applied in variety of contexts. *Id.* at 222-23 (“It is clear that neutralization theory ‘transcends the realm of criminology.’”).

¹³³ See Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 14, 16 (calling verbalizations the “key to his [the embezzler’s] dishonest conduct”). While acknowledging his theories were developed only to fit the crime of embezzlement, Cressey believed “the verbalization section . . . will fit other types of respectable crime as well.” *Id.* at 16. This makes sense given Cressey’s theories arose out of Sutherland’s work on white collar crime. Sykes and Matza cited to both Sutherland and Cressey in their seminal article, which contained a total of just fourteen citations. See Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 664 n.1, 669 n.14.

¹³⁴ See William A. Stadler & Michael L. Benson, *Revisiting the Guilty Mind: The Neutralization of White-Collar Crime*, 37 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REVIEW 494, 496 (2012) (explaining the applicability of Sykes and Matza’s theories to white collar offending).

¹³⁵ Michael L. Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvement in a White-Collar Crime*, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 583, 587 (1985); Stadler, et al., *supra* note [], at 497 (citing a series of studies showing “white-collar offenders almost always deny their own criminality”).

They are older, more educated, better employed, and have more assets than other offenders.¹³⁶ These factors suggest white collar offenders are able to conform to normative roles and have a self-interest in doing so—they have a “greater ‘stake’ in conformity” than other deviants.¹³⁷ It is therefore reasonable to assume that many white collar offenders must rationalize their behavior through “elaborate neutralization processes prior to their offenses.”¹³⁸ Without employing neutralizations, white collar offenders would be unable to “bring [their] actions into correspondence with the class of actions that is implicitly acceptable in [] society.”¹³⁹ Not surprisingly, numerous studies have documented the use of neutralizations by white collar offenders.¹⁴⁰

In addition, neutralization theory is particularly compelling in the context of white collar crime because of where neutralizations originate. Criminologists believe that the justification and rationalizations offenders use are not created in a

¹³⁶ See Benson, et al., *supra* note [], at 51-52.

¹³⁷ Scott M. Kieffer & John J. Sloan, III, *Overcoming Moral Hurdles: Using Techniques of Neutralization by White-Collar Suspects as an Interrogation Tool*, 22 SECURITY JOURNAL 317, 324 (2009).

¹³⁸ Benson, *supra* note [], at 587.

¹³⁹ Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind*, *supra* note [], at 588.

¹⁴⁰ See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 223. See also Benson, *supra* note [], at 591-98 (finding antitrust, tax, financial trust, fraud, and false statements offenders were “nearly unanimous” in neutralizing their criminal conduct by “denying basic criminality”); Stadler, *supra* note [], at 496-98 (listing the domains in which researches have explored the use of neutralizations, including occupational deviance, corporate crime, and other forms of white collar offending); Petter Gottschalk, *Rotten Apples versus Rotten Barrels in White Collar Crime: A Qualitative Analysis of White Collar Offenders in Norway*, 7 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SCIENCES 575, 580-81 (2012) (applying neutralization theory in study of Norwegian white collar offenders); Kieffer et al., *supra* note [], at 318-24 (arguing neutralizations are particularly important for white collar offenders); Paul M. Klenowski, *Other People’s Money: An Empirical Examination of Motivational Differences Between Male and Female White Collar Offenders*, at iv (2008), unpublished doctoral dissertation, on file with author (study of neutralization techniques employed by male and female white collar trust violators).

vacuum; instead, offenders find the “vocabularies” they use to neutralize their future criminal behavior from their environment.¹⁴¹ Cressey explained that these rationalizations are “taken over” from “popular ideologies that sanction crime in our culture.”¹⁴² Sykes and Matza suggested neutralizations are learned from the legal system itself. With its reliance on lack of intent defenses, they contended, “[t]he law contains the seeds of its own neutralization.”¹⁴³ This seems particularly true for white collar crimes, in which intent is almost always an offense element and on which most defenses are premised.¹⁴⁴ Also, the environments in which white collar offenders operate provide a source of learned neutralizations. This could be the corporate capitalist environment¹⁴⁵ or a specific occupational subculture in which an offender works.¹⁴⁶ These environments provide its “members with a set of

¹⁴¹ Lanier, et al., *supra* note [], at 169-70; Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 15. Michael Benson stated it this way: “[T]he offender . . . must bring his actions into correspondence with the class of actions that is implicitly acceptable in his society. For this reason, accounts should not be thought of as solely individual inventions.” Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind*, *supra* note [], at 588.

¹⁴² Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 15. Cressey argued that once anti-normative verbalizations, such as “all people steal when they get in a tight spot,” are assimilated and internalized by an individual, they take on a more personal bent, allowing the individual to act without disrupting her self-perception as an honest individual. *Id.*

¹⁴³ DAVID MATZA, *DELINQUENCY & DRIFT* 61 (2009). *See also*, Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 666; Lanier, et al., *supra* note [], at 170.

¹⁴⁴ *See e.g.*, *Q&A With Morgan Lewis' Eric Sitarchuk*, LAW360.COM, Feb. 28, 2013, at 1 (“In white collar cases . . . the issue is often whether a crime even occurred — which often turns on a careful analysis of what the circumstantial says about criminal intent[.]”).

¹⁴⁵ *See* Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind*, *supra* note [], at 588 (“The widespread acceptance of such concepts as profit, growth, and free enterprise makes it plausible for an actor to argue that governmental regulations run counter to more basic societal values and goals. Criminal behavior can then be characterized as being in line with other higher laws of free enterprise.”).

¹⁴⁶ *See* Colman, *supra* note [], at 199; Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind*, *supra* note [], at 591-98 (describing occupational cultures that promote specific neutralization techniques); Kieffer, et al., *supra* note [], at 324 (“[A] group in which the offender has membership may sanction a particular trust violation, and the offender may then take that general acceptance, apply it to his or her own situation, and thus rationalize it because the *group*

appropriate rationalizations . . . [and] help isolate them from contact with those who would pass harsher judgment on their criminal activities.”¹⁴⁷

B. Taxonomy of White Collar Neutralizations

Sykes and Matza originally identified five major types of neutralization techniques that allow offenders to engage in criminal conduct.¹⁴⁸ As neutralization theory has expanded, researchers have identified more than a dozen additional techniques.¹⁴⁹ However, certain neutralizations are particularly applicable to white collar crime. The following is a taxonomy of white collar neutralization techniques, many of which will be familiar from the discussion of the Gupta, Madoff, and Stanford cases. The list also provides insight into which justifications judges may be crediting or rejecting as part of their sentencing decisions.¹⁵⁰

Denial of Responsibility. Called the “master account,” the denial of responsibility neutralization entails the offender defining his situation in a way that relieves him of responsibility, thereby mitigating “both social disapproval and a

sanctioned it. This concept is especially applicable to white-collar crime, where learning neutralizations may take place as part of routine professional socialization processes that occur in complex organizations.”).

¹⁴⁷ Colman, *supra* note [], at 199.

¹⁴⁸ Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 667-69. Sykes and Matza’s “famous five” neutralizations are the first five discussed below. As neutralization theory has progressed, some criminologists have criticized the list as not conceptually distinct, causing problems for future research. See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 284 (arguing that the original list of five techniques are not theoretically precise).

¹⁴⁹ The total list of techniques now sits at between fifteen and twenty; it is difficult to make a definitive count because some techniques appear to overlap or are described inconsistently by researchers. See Klenowski, *supra* note [], at 67; Maruna, *supra* note [], at 234; Stadler, *supra* note [], at 496-97.

¹⁵⁰ Why certain neutralizations are credited by judges as sentencing mitigators and others are not is beyond the scope of this article. The author hopes to address that issue and others as part of a larger empirical study of the role of neutralizations in sentencing.

personal sense of failure.”¹⁵¹ Generally, offenders deny responsibility by claiming their behavior is accidental or due to forces outside their control.¹⁵² White collar offenders deny responsibility by pleading ignorance, suggesting they were acting under orders, or contending larger economic conditions caused them to act illegally.¹⁵³ The complexity of laws regulating many white collar crimes and the hierarchical structure of companies offer offenders numerous ways to diffuse their responsibility.¹⁵⁴ Both Peter Madoff and Allen Stanford appear to have neutralized their conduct by denying responsibility—Madoff by asserting his brother misled him and Stanford by asserting the global financial downturn and government intervention caused investor losses. Neither Judge Swain nor Judge Hittner appears to have accepted this neutralization as a mitigating sentencing factor.¹⁵⁵

Denial of Injury. This neutralization technique focuses on the injury or harm caused by the illegal act.¹⁵⁶ White collar offenders may rationalize their behavior by

¹⁵¹ Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 231-32.

¹⁵² See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 232; Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 667 (“By learning to view himself as more acted upon than acting, the delinquent prepares the way for deviance from the dominant normative system without the necessity of a frontal assault on the norms themselves.”).

¹⁵³ See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 232; Kieffer, et al., *supra* note [], at 321 (explaining how white collar offenders blame violations on personal problems, such as alcoholism, drug addiction, or perceived financial difficulties).

¹⁵⁴ See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 232 (describing how an engineer at B.F. Goodrich failed to inform his supervisor of the reporting of false documents because he “learned a long time ago not to worry about things over which I have no control”). See also Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind*, *supra* note [], at 594 (reporting income tax offender referring to criminal behavior as “mistakes” resulting from ignorance or poor bookkeeping).

¹⁵⁵ As the “master account,” the denial of responsibility neutralization necessarily encompasses aspects of all neutralization techniques. For example, descriptions of the defense of necessity neutralization in the white collar context are very similar to the denial of responsibility neutralization. See Coleman, *supra* note [], at 196-97 (describing different versions of the defense of necessity technique).

¹⁵⁶ Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 667.

asserting that no one will “really” be harmed.¹⁵⁷ If an act’s wrongfulness is partly a function of the harm it causes, an offender can excuse or mollify his behavior if no clear harm exists.¹⁵⁸ The classic use of this technique in white collar crime is an embezzler describing his actions as “borrowing” the money—by the offender’s estimation, no one will be hurt because the money will be paid back.¹⁵⁹ Offenders may also employ this neutralization when the victim is insured or the harm is to the public or market as a whole, such as in insider trading or antitrust cases.¹⁶⁰

Although seemingly available to him given his offense conduct, it does not appear Rajat Gupta neutralized his conduct by denying his acts caused injury.¹⁶¹

Denial of the Victim. Even if a white collar offender accepts responsibility for his conduct and acknowledges the harm caused, he may neutralize the “moral

¹⁵⁷ Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 232.

¹⁵⁸ See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 232.

¹⁵⁹ See Kieffer, et al., *supra* note [], at 321-22; Cressey, *supra* note [], at 15.

¹⁶⁰ See Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind*, *supra* note [], at 598 (bank fraud offender arguing there was no harm because the bank “didn’t lose any money . . . What I did was a technical violation.”); Coleman, *supra* note [], at 196 (price fixing offender asserting that while his conduct may have been “illegal,” it was not “criminal” because “criminal action meant damaging someone, and we did not do that”).

¹⁶¹ Why Gupta did not neutralize his conduct this way, even though it would seem particularly appealing to do so given his offense, is an interesting question. It could be that Gupta *did* neutralize his conduct by denying there was an identifiable victim, but he did not make that known to the court. In other words, he may have made an after-the-fact decision to hide his pre-act rationalization because he believed Judge Rakoff would reject it as a mitigating sentencing factor (and possibly even view it as an aggravator). On the other hand, it could be that Gupta *did not* neutralize his conduct this way because he understands that insider trading does cause injury to the market and other investors. Thus, the denial of injury verbalization did not offer him a “defense” and would have had no neutralizing effect to lessen the disconnect between his contemplated illegal behavior and his self-perception as an upstanding citizen. This inquiry highlights some of the challenges in determining the neutralizations offenders employ, but also some of the benefits. If potential offenders can be made aware that a neutralization is not valid, it ceases to be the critical component allowing white collar crime. Put another way, by “neutralizing the neutralizations,” crime can be prevented. Maruna, et al, *supra* note [], at 240. See also Cressey, *supra* note [], at 15 (proposing educational programs that demonstrate the true harms of white collar crime so potential offenders will reject available neutralizations).

indignation of self and others” by insisting the injury was not wrong by denying the victim.¹⁶² This occurs in two ways. One is when the offender contends that the victim acted improperly and therefore deserves the harm.¹⁶³ The offender claims rightful retaliation or punishment, and then denies the victim aggrieved status.¹⁶⁴ The second is when the victim is absent, unknown, or abstract, which is often the case in property and economic crimes.¹⁶⁵ In this instance, the offender may be able to minimize his internal culpability because there are no visible victims “stimulat[ing] the offender’s conscience.”¹⁶⁶ White collar offenders may use this neutralization in frauds against the government, such as false claims or tax evasion cases, and other crimes in which the true victim is abstract.¹⁶⁷ Stanford appears to have rationalized his conduct by denying the victim. He asserted that depositors knew the risks of investing and therefore were not innocent victims, and that he was the true victim. Judge Hittner rejected both of Stanford’s proffered justifications.

Condemnation of the Condemners. White collar offenders may also neutralize their behavior by shifting attention away from their conduct on to the motives of the persons or groups expressing disapproval, such as regulators, prosecutors, and government agencies.¹⁶⁸ By doing so, the offender “has changed the subject of the

¹⁶² Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 668.

¹⁶³ Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 232.

¹⁶⁴ See Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 668 (“By a subtle alchemy the delinquent moves himself into the position of an avenger and the victim is transformed into the wrong-doer.”); Kieffer, et al., *supra* note [], at 322 (describing physicians committing Medicare fraud as claiming the excess reimbursements they submitted were “only what they rightfully deserved for their work”).

¹⁶⁵ Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 233; Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 668.

¹⁶⁶ Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 233.

¹⁶⁷ Kieffer, et al., *supra* note [], at 322.

¹⁶⁸ Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 233; Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 668.

conversation”; by attacking others, “the wrongfulness of his own behavior is more easily repressed.”¹⁶⁹ This neutralization technique takes many forms: the offender calls his critics hypocrites, argues they are compelled by personal spite, or asserts they are motivated by political gain.¹⁷⁰ The claim of selective prosecution is particularly prominent in this neutralization.¹⁷¹ In addition, white collar offenders may point to a biased regulatory system or an anti-capitalist government.¹⁷² Stanford’s sentencing allocution provides a study in the use of this neutralization technique. In his 40-minute speech, Stanford attacked the government for causing his bank to fold, argued he was being made a scapegoat for the financial collapse, and suggested his prosecution was a result of his lack of political clout. The court summarily rejected these rationalizations.

Appeal to Higher Loyalties. The appeal to higher loyalties neutralization occurs when an individual sacrifices the normative demands of society for that of a smaller group to which the offender belongs.¹⁷³ The offender does not necessarily reject the norms he is violating; rather, he sees other norms that are aligned with his group as more deserving or compelling.¹⁷⁴ In the white collar context, the group could be familial, professional, or organizational. Offenders rationalizing their behavior as necessary to provide for their families, protect a boss or employee, shore up a failing business, or maximize shareholder value are employing this

¹⁶⁹ Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 668.

¹⁷⁰ See Kieffer, et al., *supra* note [], at 323.

¹⁷¹ See Kieffer, et al., *supra* note [], at 323.

¹⁷² See Kieffer, et al., *supra* note [], at 323.

¹⁷³ Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 669.

¹⁷⁴ See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 233.

neutralization technique.¹⁷⁵ Notably, female white collar offenders have been found to appeal to higher family loyalties more than their male counterparts.¹⁷⁶ Both Gupta and Madoff expressed higher loyalties as a justification for their crimes. Gupta suggested his long-time personal and business relationship with Rajaratnum facilitated his behavior; Madoff suggested his brother's domineering relationship over him influenced his conduct. The judges in both cases appeared to credit these justifications as mitigating sentencing factors.

Metaphor of the Ledger. White collar offenders may accept responsibility for their conduct and acknowledge the harm caused, yet still rationalize their behavior by comparing it to all previous good behaviors.¹⁷⁷ By creating a "behavior balance sheet," the offender sees his current negative actions as heavily outweighed by a lifetime of good deeds, both personal and professional, thus minimizing moral guilt.¹⁷⁸ It seems likely that a large number of white collar offenders employ this technique, or at least have it available to them, as evidenced by current sentencing practices—almost every white collar sentencing is preceded by a flood of letters to the court supportive of the defendant and attesting to his good deeds.¹⁷⁹ It appears

¹⁷⁵ See Kieffer, et al., *supra* note [], at 323 (describing anti-trust offender who justified conduct by saying, "I thought . . . we were more or less working on a survival basis in order to try and make enough to keep our plant and our employees").

¹⁷⁶ See Kathleen Daley, *Gender and Varieties of White Collar Crime*, 27 *CRIMINOLOGY* 769-94 (1989) (finding female embezzlers were twice as likely to justify their conduct based on family needs than male embezzlers); *but see* Klenowski, *supra* note [], at 233 (finding appeal to higher loyalties "with even greater frequency" for males than female participants, calling the finding "one of the most salient discoveries" of his study).

¹⁷⁷ LAWRENCE M. SALINGER, *THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME* 797 (2005); Klenowski, *supra* note [], at 67.

¹⁷⁸ Salinger, *supra* note [], at 797.

¹⁷⁹ See e.g., Ron Kampeas, *Sharansky, 173 others plead leniency for Libby*, *JWEEKLY.COM*, June 8, 2007, at 1, available at <http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/32649/sharansky->

Gupta and Madoff used this technique to minimize their relative culpability, and both of their judges found it compelling. However, Judge Hittner appeared to reject Stanford's attempts to justify his conduct based on a record of business achievements alone.

Claim of Entitlement. Under the claim of entitlement neutralization, offenders rationalize their conduct on the grounds they deserve the fruits of their illegal behavior.¹⁸⁰ This neutralization is particularly common in employee theft and embezzlement cases, but is also seen in public corruption cases.¹⁸¹ Although he based it only on an "implicit suggestion,"¹⁸² Judge Rakoff appears to have at least partially credited Gupta's justification that he earned the right to engage in unethical behavior because he had cared for others for so many years.

Claim of Relative Acceptability/Normality. The final white collar neutralization technique entails an offender justifying his conduct by comparing it to the conduct of others. If "others are worse" or "everybody else is doing it," the offender, although acknowledging his conduct, is able to minimize the attached moral stigma and view his behavior as aligned with acceptable norms.¹⁸³ In white collar cases, this neutralization technique is often used by tax violators and in real

[173-others-plead-leniency-for-libby/](#) (describing the Scooter Libby sentencing, in which Libby submitted 174 letters appealing for leniency when facing just a 37-month sentence). Gupta, of course, submitted over 400 letters; Peter Madoff submitted 63.

¹⁸⁰ Colman, *supra* note [], at 198.

¹⁸¹ See Coleman, *supra* note [], at 198 (describing a former city councilman who explained his involvement in corruption as due to his low salary and lack of staff); Klenowski, *supra* note [], at 209-10.

¹⁸² Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 12.

¹⁸³ Coleman, *supra* note [], at 197; Klenowski, *supra* note [], at 67, 209-10.

estate and accounting frauds.¹⁸⁴ Both Madoff and Stanford implicitly rationalized their conduct by comparing it to others. By referencing his brother's fraud, Peter Madoff drew a distinction between his relatively minor offenses and Bernie's massive Ponzi scheme. Stanford, on the other hand, seemed to be asserting that his bank was doing nothing different than other international lenders. Neither Judge Swain nor Judge Hittner found these justifications to be mitigating sentencing factors.

The above discussion highlights a few additional points about neutralization theory. First, although there seems to be a compulsion among criminologists to categorize neutralization techniques (one this article indulges in), that there are differing types of neutralizations is not all that remarkable. In fact, if it is true as some argue that rationalizing bad behavior is "part of being human,"¹⁸⁵ it follows that the list of neutralization techniques will continue to grow as researchers study more offenders in differing occupations. Put another way, "what is interesting about neutralization theory is . . . what the neutralizations *do*, not the flavors it comes in."¹⁸⁶

At the same time, if there are demographic differences in neutralization use, that may provide insight into the differing self-narrative processes offenders use, which is valuable information.¹⁸⁷ For example, antitrust offenders neutralize their

¹⁸⁴ See Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind*, *supra* note [], at 594 (describing tax offenders claiming that "everybody somehow cheats on their taxes"); Coleman, *supra* note [], at 197 (describing real estate agent rationalizing fraud as rampant).

¹⁸⁵ Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 285 (quoting STANLEY COHEN, *STATES OF DENIAL* 37 (2001)).

¹⁸⁶ Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 284 (emphasis added).

¹⁸⁷ See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 284 (arguing future research should investigate the nature of neutralizations in contrasting situations, circumstances, contexts, and cultures).

conduct differently than embezzlers.¹⁸⁸ Women embezzlers neutralize their conduct differently than male embezzlers.¹⁸⁹ It is possible that women embezzlers of different ages, races, and socioeconomic backgrounds neutralize their conduct differently. A judge that understands the neutralization techniques most often employed by specific types of white collar offenders would be a better-educated sentencer in those cases. This highlights the need for additional study of how and why white collar offenders neutralize their conduct.¹⁹⁰

Second, neutralizations are not one-size-fits-all. Offenders employ neutralizations in different degrees, combine them with other neutralizations, and use them at different times. Moreover, the exact verbalizations an offender uses to neutralize his behavior will be specific to his circumstances, because they are part of his internal dialogue influenced by his environment.¹⁹¹ The above list demonstrates that many of the neutralization techniques partially overlap and offenders may use multiple techniques. For example, Madoff appears to have used at least four neutralizations to minimize his guilt; Stanford may have used five or more. Some of these are of the same category, but they are tailored to the defendant. Thus, understanding offender behavior requires a global view of the possible neutralizations, as well as of the offender's conduct.

Michel Benson's research finding that white collar offenders use different neutralization techniques depending on the type of offense committed is just this type of work. See Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind*, *supra* note [], at 591.

¹⁸⁸ Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind*, *supra* note [], at 605.

¹⁸⁹ Klenowski, *supra* note [], at 233.

¹⁹⁰ See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 289-300 (listing areas of study for the "next generation of neutralization research").

¹⁹¹ See Lanier, et al., *supra* note [], at 169-70.

Relatedly, the “toxicity” of neutralizations may vary. While neutralizations are often described as universally bad in that they all allow criminal behavior to proceed, the issue is likely not so black and white. It may be that neutralization techniques are arranged on a gradient, from benign to highly criminogenic.¹⁹² Some neutralizations appear to be particularly offensive because they dehumanize victims or convert shame into anger, both of which may suggest aggressive future offending.¹⁹³ Other neutralizations may be more neutral or benign, suggesting only episodic offending.¹⁹⁴ This could explain why judges are willing to credit some offender neutralizations as sentencing mitigators, but reject others (even viewing them as aggravators).¹⁹⁵ If, for example, the appeal to higher loyalties neutralization is relatively benign, that could be why Judges Rakoff and Swain viewed it as a valid and mitigating explanation of Gupta’s and Madoff’s conduct.¹⁹⁶ Likewise, if

¹⁹² See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 290 (describing that the “working assumption” in neutralization research is that all neutralizations are bad, but suggesting a gradient from benign to “most toxic”).

¹⁹³ See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 290. For example, the “denial of humanity” neutralization identified in the context of the crime of genocide is seen as “the worst of the worst” because it promotes and allows for further atrocities. *Id.* See also Alexander Alvarez, *Adjusting to Genocide: The Techniques of Neutralization and the Holocaust*, 21 SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY 139, 166 (1997) (study focused on techniques of neutralization and the holocaust).

¹⁹⁴ Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 290. Some argue denying responsibility by labeling oneself as an addict helps offenders by allowing them to see their past actions as symptoms of a disease, rather than a lifelong character flaw, which reduces future offending. *Id.* at 291. Critics contend that the disease label “comes at too high a cost” because it allows for perpetual relapse into negative behavior patterns. *Id.*

¹⁹⁵ See note [around 148], *supra*.

¹⁹⁶ An even more recent example of the appeal to higher loyalties neutralization being credited at sentencing is in the Kenneth Miller kidnapping case. Although Judge William Sessions III sentenced Miller, a Mennonite pastor, to 27 months in prison for aiding a born-again Christian woman in kidnapping her daughter from a former same-sex partner, the judge said he admired Miller for the depth of his convictions. See Wilson Ring, *Virginia pastor credits ‘the mercy of God’ in custody dispute at sentencing*, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Mar. 4, 2013, at 1. Sessions then released Miller while his appeal is pending, despite Miller

condemning one's condemners is more "toxic," that may explain why Judge Hittner rejected it in Stanford's case. Again, this suggests those evaluating neutralizations must not only fully understand the underlying theory but also how specific offenders are using neutralizations to facilitate their criminal conduct.¹⁹⁷ It also suggests a need for further research into the relative harmfulness of neutralizations and if that corresponds with how judges credit or reject neutralizations at sentencing.

III. THE ROLE OF NEUTRALIZATIONS IN WHITE COLLAR SENTENCING

The preceding discussion demonstrates that a white collar defendant's sentence will likely be impacted by the court's inquiry into what motivated the defendant's conduct. Judges appear to credit some justifications defendants offer and reject others, all of which factors into the final sentence. The court's evaluation of a defendant's justifications necessarily confronts the neutralization techniques employed by that defendant, techniques that have particular salience in white collar cases. Yet the broad question posed at the outset of this article remains: What place, if any, does all this have in white collar sentencing?

The answer requires a two-part analysis. The first addresses whether judicial inquiry into offender neutralizations is consistent with current sentencing

saying "he couldn't promise he would not again aid in international parental kidnapping."
Id.

¹⁹⁷ Maruna and Copes suggest that the importance of neutralization theory is not necessarily that neutralizations occur or occur often, but that they occur in some instances to allow for offending and not in others. They suggest neutralizations should be thought of not as direct causes of criminality, but as explanations of the persistence or desistence of crime. Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 271. Under their view, whether certain neutralization techniques allow for the persistence of crime more than others is an open question that demands further research. *Id.* at 290.

law. The Supreme Court's recent decision in *Pepper v. United States*, which re-establishes the importance of individualized sentencing under the Sentencing Reform Act, indicates that it is. The second part addresses the more difficult normative question of whether judicial inquiry into offender neutralizations is appropriate. While there are potential drawbacks, neutralization inquiries increase individualized sentencing and provide opportunities to disrupt white collar crime—benefits that weigh in favor of the practice.

A. Legal Justification for Judicial Inquiry into Offender Neutralizations

The Supreme Court's *Pepper* opinion provides a strong jurisprudential justification for judges inquiring into offender neutralizations. Before discussing *Pepper* in detail, however, a bit of background is necessary.

1. *Evolution of white collar sentencing*

For twenty years prior to 2005, federal sentences were determined almost exclusively by the United States Sentencing Guidelines.¹⁹⁸ Promulgated under the authority of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,¹⁹⁹ the guidelines had the goal of creating honesty in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentencing disparities prevalent in the indeterminate, parole-based scheme operating at the time.²⁰⁰ The guidelines replaced the indeterminate system with one in which judicial sentencing discretion was significantly reduced by establishing narrow sentencing ranges

¹⁹⁸ See Bowman, *Pour Encourger*, *supra* [], at 380.

¹⁹⁹ Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. (1987).

²⁰⁰ See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Ch. 1, Pt. A, at p. 3 (2010) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES]; Paul J. Hofer and Mark H. Allenbaugh, *The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines*, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 19, 20 (2003); KATE STITH AND JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 38-77 (1998) (providing a comprehensive history of federal sentencing).

based on a series of factors, including the type of offense, adjustments related to characteristics of the victim and offender, and the defendant's criminal history.²⁰¹

From their inception, the guidelines were heavily criticized. One of the primary arguments against the guidelines was that they were too rigid.²⁰² Part of that rigidity came from the guidelines' sharp limitations on the factors judges could consider at sentencing. Dozens of guidelines provisions directed judges to consider a range of aggravating factors, but at the same time to ignore many in mitigation.²⁰³ While departures outside the calculated sentencing range were contemplated by the guidelines, they were only allowed when the circumstances of a case were not adequately taken into consideration by the guidelines (*i.e.*, when the case was outside the "heartland" of typical cases).²⁰⁴ Departures were rarely granted, and when they did begin to increase Congress attempted to limit their use.²⁰⁵

Another criticism of the guidelines was that they were too harsh.²⁰⁶ Particularly as to white collar offenders, the guidelines operated as a one-way

²⁰¹ See SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1B1.1; Stephen Breyer, *The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest*, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 6-8 (1988).

²⁰² J.C. Oleson, *Blowing Out All the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth Birthday of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984*, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 723-28 (2011).

²⁰³ See *e.g.*, SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5H1.2, 1.4-1.6, 1.10-1.12 (explaining specific offender characteristics not ordinarily relevant in sentencing); see also Justice Steven Breyer, *Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited*, 11 FED. SENT'G REP. 180, at 5 (1999) (explaining that compromises by the Sentencing Commission, the agency responsible for promulgating the guidelines, resulted in leaving out mitigating personal characteristics of the defendant in favor of using criminal history to increase sentences).

²⁰⁴ *Koon v. United States*, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996); SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5K2.0(a)(4).

²⁰⁵ See Oleson, *supra* note [], at 713, 724 ("At one point, House Majority Whip Tom DeLay threatened, 'The judges need to be intimidated. . . . They need to uphold the Constitution. If they don't behave, we're going to go after them in a big way.' And in what sometimes seemed like a battle between branches of government, some legislators threatened to strip judges of *all* discretion, enacting broad slates of mandatory minimums." (internal citation omitted)).

²⁰⁶ Oleson, *supra* note [], at 707-12.

“upward ratchet,” continually driving sentencing ranges higher.²⁰⁷ Indeed, one of the compromises “embodied in the Guidelines” concerned increased penalties for white collar defendants.²⁰⁸ Between 1987 and 2001, sentencing ranges climbed from those initially-elevated levels as the “loss table,” the main determiner of offense level for white collar crimes, was repeatedly adjusted upward.²⁰⁹ A series of aggravating specific offense characteristics was also added to the economic crime guidelines, which increased sentencing ranges even more.²¹⁰ This trend continued in the early 2000s as Congress, through its Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, directed heightened penalties for economic crimes in the wake of the Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco corporate scandals.²¹¹ The result was a set of guidelines for white collar offenders that limited probation, increased average sentences, and exposed high loss defendants to decades of imprisonment.²¹²

²⁰⁷ See James E. Felman, *The Need to Reform the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for High-Loss Economic Crimes*, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 138, 138 (2010).

²⁰⁸ See Breyer, *supra* note [], at 20; Alan Ellis, John R. Steer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, *At a “Loss” for Justice*, 25 CRIM. JUST. 34, 36 (Winter 2011). While the sentencing ranges for most crimes were determined by analyzing pre-guidelines sentences and then establishing sentencing ranges based on past practices, the sentencing ranges for economic crimes were set higher than in the past based on policy decisions made by the Sentencing Commission.

²⁰⁹ See Ellis, *et al.*, *supra* note [], at 36. The loss table increases offense level, which is one of two factors that determines the sentencing range (the other is criminal history), as the loss to the victim increases. The current table has 15, two-level increases, up to 30 offense levels for a loss of more than \$400,000,000. Each increase of six offense levels approximately doubles the sentence. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2B1.1(b)(1).

²¹⁰ See Bowman, *supra* note [], at 387-91.

²¹¹ See Bowman, *supra* note [], at 432-35.

²¹² See Frank O. Bowman, III, *Sentencing High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds After Booker*, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 168-69 (2008) (charting increases in hypothetical corporate defendant’s sentence from 1987 to 2007). These increases continue today. In a series of amendments taking effect in November 1, 2012, the Commission increased penalties for “organized” insider trading offenses and added an upward departure provision for offenses that risk a significant disruption of a national financial market. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, at 5, 18 (April 30, 2012), available at <http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Amendments/Reader->

Then, in 2004, the entire landscape shifted. Beginning with *Blakely v. Washington*,²¹³ the Supreme Court began questioning the fundamental premises on which guidelines sentencing rested. *Blakely* considered whether under the Sixth Amendment a Washington state sentencing judge could increase a defendant's sentence above a prescribed sentencing range based on an aggravating factor found only by the judge.²¹⁴ Justice Scalia, writing for a 5-4 majority, found that any sentencing increase based on judge-found facts that took a sentence beyond the presumptive guideline range was unconstitutional because it deprived defendants of their Sixth Amendment jury trial rights.²¹⁵ The Court held that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that raises the penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.²¹⁶

A year later, in *United States v. Booker*,²¹⁷ in another 5-4 decision, the Court found that the federal sentencing guidelines also violated the Sixth Amendment.²¹⁸ The Court found "no distinction of constitutional significance between the Federal

[Friendly/20120430 RF Amendments.pdf](#); *but see id.* at 5 (adding departure language applicable when the cumulative impact of the loss table and the victims table overstates the seriousness of an offense).

²¹³ 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

²¹⁴ *See Blakely*, 542 U.S. at 298.

²¹⁵ *See Blakely*, 542 U.S. at 313-14. The decision in *Blakely* was an extension of principles set forth in *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). *Apprendi* "declared unconstitutional a New Jersey hate crime enhancement that enabled a sentencing judge to impose a sentence higher than the otherwise available statutory maximum for various crimes based on a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that an offense involved racial animus. The *Apprendi* Court asserted the hate crime sentencing enhancement was constitutionally problematic because, '[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Berman, *supra* note [], at 672 (quoting *Apprendi*, 530 U.S. at 490).

²¹⁶ *See Blakely*, 542 U.S. at 301.

²¹⁷ 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

²¹⁸ *See Booker*, 543 U.S. at 226.

Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington procedures at issue” in *Blakely*.²¹⁹ In its opinion, the Court reiterated that any fact (other than prior conviction) necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by facts established in a guilty plea or by jury verdict must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.²²⁰

Because the guidelines were mandatory, thereby requiring judges to increase a defendant’s “statutory maximum for *Apprendi* purposes” based on factual findings not submitted to a jury, they violated the Sixth Amendment.²²¹ The Court remedied the guidelines’ constitutional infirmities by excising two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, thereby rendering the Guidelines advisory.²²²

Suffice it to say, the *Booker* decision drastically altered federal sentencing. Instead of simply following a mandatory set of guidelines, under *Booker* district judges must now follow a three-step process when sentencing a defendant.²²³ First, the judge must calculate the applicable guidelines range.²²⁴ Then, the judge must determine whether to depart from the sentencing range in situations falling outside the “heartland” of cases to which the guidelines were intended to apply.²²⁵ Third, after the sentencing range is calculated, the judge must then consider “all of the [Sentencing Reform Act’s] § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the

²¹⁹ *Booker*, 543 U.S. at 233.

²²⁰ *Booker*, 543 U.S. at 230-32.

²²¹ *Booker*, 543 U.S. at 232 (internal quotations omitted).

²²² *See Booker*, 543 U.S. at 245. Because the now-advisory guidelines did not create “statutory maximums” under *Apprendi* and *Blakely*, no Sixth Amendment concerns were implicated. *See id.* at 264-65. Thus, the Court remedied the constitutional infirmities of the guidelines without completely destroying the federal sentencing scheme that had been in place for the past 20 years.

²²³ *See Rita*, 551 U.S. at 351 (setting out three-step analysis).

²²⁴ *See Rita*, 551 U.S. at 351; *Gall*, 552 U.S. at 49 (“the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark” at sentencing).

²²⁵ *Rita*, 551 U.S. at 351.

sentence requested.”²²⁶ It is here that a judge is free to provide a “variance” if he decides an outside-guidelines sentence is warranted.²²⁷

2. Pepper’s impact on white collar sentencing

While *Blakely* and *Booker* recrafted federal sentencing into an advisory guidelines system, not until *Pepper* did the Court unequivocally establish the breadth of district courts’ sentencing discretion.²²⁸ This wide discretion is what allows courts to inquire into defendants’ neutralizations at sentencing.

In *Pepper*, the issue before the Court was whether a district court could consider evidence of a defendant’s postsentencing rehabilitation at resentencing.²²⁹ Jason Pepper had originally been sentenced, pursuant to a large downward departure under the sentencing guidelines, to 24 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.²³⁰ The government appealed, arguing the departure was too great.²³¹ After a *Booker* remand,²³² the district court resentenced Pepper to the original sentence, this time based partly on his postsentencing rehabilitation, which included successful drug treatment, a straight-A performance as a full-time college student, steady employment, and strong family

²²⁶ *Gall*, 552 U.S. at 49-50.

²²⁷ *Gall*, 552 U.S. at 50.

²²⁸ 131 S. Ct. at 1235.

²²⁹ 131 S. Ct. at 1236.

²³⁰ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1236.

²³¹ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1236.

²³² *Booker* remands occurred in cases that were pending when the *Booker* decision was decided, necessitating a remand to determine if the court had enhanced the applicable sentence through judge-found facts not agreed to by the parties. See e.g., *United States v. Goldberg*, 406 F.3d 891, 892, 984 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing procedures and pitfalls under *Booker* remand).

support.²³³ The government appealed again. The Eighth Circuit determined that “evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation ‘is not relevant and will not be permitted at resentencing,’” and the case was once again remanded.²³⁴ Without the benefit of his postsentencing rehabilitation arguments, Pepper was resentenced to 65 months’ imprisonment.²³⁵ Pepper appealed again; this time the Eighth Circuit sustained the sentence.²³⁶

Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, overturned the Eighth Circuit’s decision. The Court’s opinion began by recognizing the right of each defendant to be sentenced individually:

It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.²³⁷

The Court went on to state that it was “‘essential’”²³⁸ that the district court “consider the widest possible breadth of information about the defendant” to ensure that the sentence “‘will suit not merely the offense but the individual defendant.’”²³⁹

²³³ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1236-37.

²³⁴ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1237 (quoting *United States v. Pepper*, 486 F.3d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 2007)) (a policy statement in the Guidelines against considering postsentencing rehabilitation, § 5K2.19 (Post-Sentencing Rehabilitative Efforts), formed the basis of the Eighth Circuit’s decision).

²³⁵ Because he had already served his original 24-month sentence, Pepper would have had to surrender to the Bureau of Prisons for an additional 41 months, likely losing his job and apartment in the process. *Id.* at 1238.

²³⁶ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1237. Pepper had an intervening trip up to the Eighth Circuit and back down for resentencing; all told, the case was before the Eighth Circuit four times and the Supreme Court twice. *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1238-39.

²³⁷ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1239-40.

²³⁸ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (quoting *Williams v. New York*, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).

²³⁹ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (quoting *Wasman v. United States*, 468 U.S. 559, 564 (1984)).

The Court found that the language of the Sentencing Reform Act surviving after *Booker* did not constrain judicial sentencing discretion; indeed, it “preserved the traditional discretion of sentencing courts to ‘conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited’” in the kind of information that may be considered.²⁴⁰

In determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, *without limitation*, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law.²⁴¹

The Court therefore held that a district court may consider a defendant’s postsentencing rehabilitation at resentencing and grant a downward variance when appropriate as part of the court’s consideration of the Sentencing Reform Act’s section 3553(a) factors.²⁴² Because this conclusion conflicted with a statutory provision that precluded a court on resentencing from imposing a sentence outside the guidelines range except upon a “‘ground of departure’ that was expressly relied upon in the prior sentencing,” the Court invalidated the provision as inconsistent with *Booker*.²⁴³

Pepper provides strong support for judicial inquiry into offender neutralizations. Most fundamentally, as the *Booker*-through-*Pepper* line of cases explain, courts now have almost unrestrained discretion to impose a sentence. This means there is no more forced “rigidity” in sentencing. *Pepper* confirms that *Booker* eliminated the required adherence to the guidelines and their proscription on

²⁴⁰ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (quoting *United States v. Tucker*, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)).

²⁴¹ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (quoting USSG § 1B1.4 (2010) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2010))).

²⁴² *See Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1246.

²⁴³ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1247, 1249.

considering certain offender characteristics.²⁴⁴ Pursuant to *Booker*, adherence to the guidelines was replaced with discretion bounded only by the broad statutory sentencing factors underlying the Sentencing Reform Act.²⁴⁵ And that language, contained in section 3553(a), makes clear that judges are permitted to consider defendants' neutralizations at sentencing.

Section 3553(a) begins with an overarching mandate: "court[s] shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes [of the statute]."²⁴⁶ The statute goes on to direct courts to consider almost anything related to the defendant or his potential punishment:

The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider--

- (1) *the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;*
- (2) *the need for the sentence imposed--*
 - (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
 - (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
 - (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
 - and
 - (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
- (3) the kinds of sentences available;
- (4) the kinds of sentence and the [Guidelines] sentencing range***
- (5) any pertinent policy statement [contained in the Guidelines]***

²⁴⁴ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1241-42, 1247.

²⁴⁵ See Amy Baron-Evans, *Rita, Gall and Kimbrough: A Chance for Real Sentencing Improvements*, Sentencing Resource Page of the Office of Defender Services (2008), available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/Rita%20Gall%20Kimbrough%20Sentencing%20Strategies.5.11.08.pdf.

²⁴⁶ § 3553(a). This provision embodies the "parsimony principle," which has been described as requiring "a sentencing court when handing down a sentence [to] be stingy enough to avoid one that is too long, but also that it be generous enough to avoid one that is too short." *United States v. Irey*, 612 F.3d 1160, 1197 (11th Cir. 2010). See also Nancy Gertner, *Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A View from the Bench*, 29 HUM. RTS. 6, 6 (2002).

- (6) *the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities . . .*; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.²⁴⁷

In addition, a companion provision states that, “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”²⁴⁸ Accordingly, courts have essentially “no boundaries” under current federal law that would constrain their inquiries at sentencing, including inquiries into the neutralization techniques defendants may be employing.²⁴⁹

In fact, the “shall consider” language of section 3553(a) suggests courts are compelled to consider defendants’ motivations, which necessarily include the neutralizations employed. How a defendant neutralizes his behavior so that his criminal conduct can proceed touches on at least three of section 3553(a)’s factors. The type of neutralization a defendant employs is part of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant—it is the psychological mechanism that makes the offense possible.²⁵⁰ A defendant’s use of neutralizations also impacts the need for the sentence imposed, particularly when courts are considering issues of deterrence and rehabilitation. Indeed, the role of neutralizations in offender treatment was one of the practical implications

²⁴⁷ § 3553(a) (emphasis added).

²⁴⁸ § 3661.

²⁴⁹ See Sean D. O’Brien, *When Life Depends on It: Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases*, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 713 (2008) (“the scope of mitigation evidence [is] ‘potentially infinite’” and “‘anything under the sun’” can be tendered by the defense in mitigation of punishment”). Of course, there are bounds to what evidence an advocate may introduce at a sentencing hearing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(2) (2010).

²⁵⁰ See Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 667.

Cressey highlighted in his initial study.²⁵¹ Finally, if some judges are inquiring into offender neutralizations and factoring them in to sentencing determinations, the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities consideration is also implicated.

Pepper supports judicial inquiry into offender neutralizations in another, less direct way. *Pepper's* holding has the practical effect of refocusing sentencing on the section 3553(a) factors. But the normative basis of the Court's opinion is also important. Justice Sotomayor began her analysis by recognizing the right of each defendant to be sentenced as an individual, stating that "[i]t has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue."²⁵² Underlying this tradition, she found, was the principle that punishment should be tailored to the offender, not just the crime.²⁵³ This principle, which "justice generally requires," stems directly from the Court's prior rejection of

²⁵¹ See Cressey, *Other People's Money*, *supra* note [], at 153-57 (suggesting that treatment of white collar offenders should include methods that would "most effectively prevent further trust violation" by causing offenders to "readopt the values of those groups with which he identified before he came to conceive himself as a criminal"). Oddly enough, Cressey did not believe his theories had much practical use. *Id.* at 153 ("The theory which we have presented has few practical implications either for prevention and detection of trust violators or for treatment of apprehended offenders."). Luckily, others (including the author) disagree. See *e.g.*, Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 299-300 (discussing how neutralizations may impact offender treatment and other criminal justice practices).

²⁵² *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1239-40.

²⁵³ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1240. The Court cited *Williams v. New York*, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949), which relied on a number of social science texts extolling the virtues of individualized sentencing. See *e.g.*, Sheldon Glueck, *Principles of a Rational Penal Code*, 41 HARV. L. REV. 453, 463-64 ("In a word, individualization is necessary on the part of the court and other institutions dealing with the offender; and effective individualization is not based on guesswork, mechanical routine, 'hunches,' political considerations, or even (as so many judges seem to think) on past criminal record alone. It must rest on a scientific recognition and evaluation of those mental and social factors involved in the criminal situation which make each crime a unique event and each criminal a unique personality.").

determinate sentencing schemes and is consistent with the now widely accepted view of sentencing as most just when it contemplates both the offense and the offender.²⁵⁴ This requires judges to consider, “*without limitation*,”²⁵⁵ any mitigating or aggravating evidence concerning the defendant in order to achieve a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”²⁵⁶ How and why a defendant neutralizes his behavior to allow for criminal conduct is evidence important to the individualized sentencing process *Pepper* envisions.

B. Normative Justification for Judicial Inquiry into Offender Neutralizations

While judicial inquiry into offender neutralizations is permissible, and likely compelled, under current sentencing law, whether it is normatively appropriate is a separate question. The practice raises a number of potential positives and negatives. Ultimately, the benefits of increased individualized sentencing and opportunities to disrupt the mechanisms of white collar crime outweigh the possible negatives associated with the practice. The reasons, some of which are counterintuitive, are set forth below.

1. *Increased individualized sentencing*

The most direct benefit of judges inquiring into how defendants neutralize their conduct is the one just discussed: increased individualized sentencing. *Pepper* reestablishes that individualized sentencing is the most just way to impose

²⁵⁴ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1240. *But see id.* at 1252 (Breyer, J., concurring) (contending that individualized sentencing is not the only relevant tradition: “A just legal system seeks not only to treat different cases differently but also to treat like cases alike. Fairness requires sentencing uniformity as well as efforts to recognize relevant sentencing differences.”).

²⁵⁵ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1236.

²⁵⁶ § 3553(a).

punishment—that a fair sentence considers both the offense and the offender.²⁵⁷ At the same time, criminological theory explains that neutralizations are an integral component of both white collar offenses and the offenders who commit them. The verbalizations a defendant uses to neutralize his anti-normative behavior and bring it in-line with society are one of the three causal elements of any white collar crime; therefore, neutralizations may be viewed as fundamental to white collar offenses.²⁵⁸ While neutralizations are not explicit offense elements, they are causal, and thus should be considered by judges when punishing criminal conduct.²⁵⁹ Yet, as discussed above, neutralization techniques may vary by offense type.²⁶⁰ Thus, in order to fully understand and properly sentence the offense committed, a judge must understand the neutralizations that preceded it.

Neutralizations are also critical to understanding the offender.

Neutralizations explain the psychological processes an offender undergoes in order to commit the offense—they are part of the explanation of how the offender “bec[ame] delinquent.”²⁶¹ Of course, not all offenders will employ the same neutralization techniques. Despite all being high-profile white collar defendants,

²⁵⁷ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1239-40.

²⁵⁸ *Cressey, The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 15; Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 667.

²⁵⁹ While neutralizations *per se* are not elements of white collar offenses, that defendants internally justify their conduct allows offenses to occur. Therefore, neutralizations are implicit in all white collar offenses. Some white collar criminal statutes do make defendants’ motivations, and therefore their justifications and neutralizations, more explicitly part of the offense elements. See *Hessick*, *supra* note [], at 96-97 (describing how obstruction of justice and bribery offenses contain elements requiring the defendant to act with corrupt or improper purposes, necessarily requiring an evaluation of the defendant’s reasons for acting).

²⁶⁰ See *Benson, Denying the Guilty Mind*, *supra* note [], at 605; *Klenowski*, *supra* note [], at 233.

²⁶¹ Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 667.

Gupta, Madoff, and Stanford neutralized their criminal conduct much differently—the techniques used were unique to each offender’s background and character, influenced by their personal and professional environment.²⁶² It follows that a judge inquiring into a defendant’s neutralizations will be better educated as to the “unique . . . human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment.”²⁶³ Neutralization inquiries, therefore, lead to more individualized sentences.

Moreover, courts that understand defendant neutralizations will have more insight when considering appropriate rehabilitative programs.²⁶⁴ If neutralizations allow individuals to construct self-narratives enabling the commission of white collar crime, helping individuals realize their neutralizations are justifying criminal acts may break the causal chain—neutralizations can be neutralized.²⁶⁵ A number

²⁶² See Lanier, et al., *supra* note [], at 169-70. For example, Peter Madoff attempted to neutralize his conduct through the claim of relative acceptability technique, which was tailored to his brother’s conduct and their professional environment. See Peter Madoff Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 28; Peter Madoff Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 20-23. Stanford employed a similar technique, but the focus was different because he saw himself operating in the global banking environment. See Stanford Sentencing Transcript, *supra* note [], at 32, 37.

²⁶³ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1239-40.

²⁶⁴ Courts are required to consider rehabilitation at sentencing. See §3553(a)(2)(D) (when imposing a sentence, the must consider how the sentence will “provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”).

²⁶⁵ Under Cressey’s theory, eliminating any of the three elements of white collar crime—development of a non-shareable financial problem, position of trust, or verbalizations—would reduce recidivism. Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 14. However, Cressey believed only two could be “effectively blocked” to impede white collar crime. *Id.* at 15. He argued that companies, through workplace education and counseling, could reduce the number of employees possessing non-shareable financial problems. *Id.* He viewed this as a front-end crime prevention issue, not necessarily a treatment issue. He did not believe the position of trust element could be addressed because of the prevalence and necessity of trust in the workplace. Cressey, *Other People’s Money*, *supra* note [], at 154-55. He viewed the elimination of verbalizations as the most appropriate target for rehabilitative penal

of current penal programs tangentially address offender self-narratives and neutralizations, including targeted community service, victim-offender mediation, victim-impact classes and panels, sentencing circles, and other restorative justice initiatives.²⁶⁶ Cognitive therapies that employ direct offender confrontation may more aggressively address neutralizations.²⁶⁷ Placing a defendant into a facility with the right program (or any program at all) to address his specific neutralization techniques will likely result in more effective punishment and lower rates of recidivism.²⁶⁸

Judicial inquiry into offender neutralizations may also help mitigate against what many consider to be an overly harsh sentencing scheme for white collar offenders. As explained above, although *Booker* rendered the federal sentencing guidelines advisory, they are still the “initial benchmark” at sentencing and carry

programs. *Id.* at 155. He cautioned, however, that prison environments could cause offenders to replace one set of neutralizations with another. *Id.* at 156. Other researchers are less pessimistic than Cressey. See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 299-300 (describing programs successfully challenging offenders’ neutralization techniques, but acknowledging the effectiveness of these programs “remains an [open] empirical question”).

²⁶⁶ See *Examples of Restorative Justice Practices*, Minnesota Department of Corrections, available at <http://www.doc.state.mn.us/rj/documents/ExamplesofRJPractices.pdf> (detailing nine restorative justice programs and the goals, implementation, and “lessons learned” of each).

²⁶⁷ See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 299 (describing programs that force offenders to understand the causes of their behavior and take responsibility for them).

²⁶⁸ Courts must first understand what neutralizations are and their role in white collar offending. See Part III(B)(2), *infra*, for a discussion of the institutional challenges courts face when engaged in these inquiries and evaluations. And while federal judges may not impose or lengthen a prison term to promote a particular rehabilitation program, they may influence treatment by urging the Bureau of Prisons to place a defendant in a particular program or by recommending where a defendant serves his time. See *Tapia v. United States*, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2385, 2392 (2011). Judges have more leeway in determining conditions of supervised release; ordering offenders to participate in programs aimed at helping them understand the role of neutralizations in their criminal behavior is certainly permissible. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2012) (giving courts broad discretion to impose conditions of supervised release).

great weight in most sentencing decisions.²⁶⁹ And because of steady increases in penalties for economic crimes, white collar defendants, particularly those facing high loss amounts, are being sentenced drastically higher than in the past.²⁷⁰

Judicial inquiry into a defendant's neutralizations may provide the court with a more complete understanding of the defendant's conduct, possibly mitigating his criminal behavior that would have otherwise resulted in a lengthy sentence.

This appears to be precisely what happened in Judge Rakoff's courtroom. He rejected the guidelines' heavy reliance on the monetary gain to Rajaratnum from Gupta's tips because it failed to address what he saw as the heart of Gupta's crime—the abuse of trust.²⁷¹ Judge Rakoff then sought an explanation for that abuse of trust, finding credible Gupta's justifications of his conduct. Gupta's appeal to the higher loyalty, metaphor of the ledger, and claim of entitlement neutralizations became sentencing mitigators under §3553(a), resulting in a downward variance from the applicable guideline range.²⁷²

²⁶⁹ See *Gall*, 552 U.S. at 49 (“the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark” at sentencing).

²⁷⁰ See *White Collar Sentencing Data*, *supra* note [], at 129 (showing steadily increasing average sentence length for white collar offenders since 2005). See also Felman, *supra* note [], at 138; Bowman, *Sentencing High-Loss*, *supra* note [], at 169. Some say, pointedly, that white collar sentencing, even under the advisory guidelines system, is completely “out of whack” and “patently absurd on [its] face.” See Bowman, *Sentencing High-Loss*, *supra* note [], at 172; *United States v. Adelson*, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). As Professor Frank Bowman points out, “Under the current Guidelines, a judge who wanted to impose a 25-year sentence on an Ebbers, Skilling, or a Rigas, thus equating their economic offenses with murder by a five-time felon, would have to depart downward 19 offense levels to do it.” Bowman, *Sentencing High-Loss*, *supra* note [], at 169.

²⁷¹ Sentencing Memorandum, *supra* note [], at 2.

²⁷² It appears that many judges sentencing white collar offenders are finding reasons to impose lower prison terms than suggested by the applicable guidelines range, particularly in high loss cases that go to trial. See *White Collar Sentencing Data*, *supra* note [], at 131 (reporting judges are varying downward in 23.5% of white collar cases that end in a guilty plea and in 43.7% that end in a conviction after trial).

Many, of course, will not agree that the economic crime guidelines are overly harsh. In fact, many argue white collar offenders are finally receiving sentences commensurate with the harms they cause, and therefore, judicial inquiry into offender neutralizations would not be necessary.²⁷³ Moreover, judicial inquiry into the mental processes white collar offenders undergo to neutralize their criminal behavior may create other problems. It is possible that neutralizations could become legally-sanctioned proxies for judges wishing to give lenient sentences to offenders with which they most closely identify. This was one of the concerns expressed at the time of the Sentencing Reform Act's passage and embodied in the original fraud guideline.²⁷⁴ The metaphor of the ledger neutralization, which Judges Rakoff and Swain credited, seems particularly susceptible to becoming a tool for judges seeking to lessen punishment for defendants with similar backgrounds as their own. Of course, Judge Swain and Judge Hittner also rejected many of the neutralizations offered by Madoff and Stanford, so there are no guarantees how judges will view specific offender neutralizations.

All of this highlights the larger concern of increasing sentencing disparity. By nature, the more individualized sentencing becomes, the less uniformity there is. Uniformity in sentencing was one of the primary goals of the Sentencing Reform Act.²⁷⁵ While the *Booker-through-Pepper* line of cases preferences judicial sentencing discretion over mandatory guidelines that guarantee uniformity, a "just

²⁷³ See e.g., Andrew Weissmann & Joshua A. Block, *White-Collar Defendants and White-Collar Crimes*, YALE L.J. POCKET PART, at 286, available at <http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/105.pdf> (disagreeing that white collar defendants are subjected to uniquely harsh penalties under the guidelines).

²⁷⁴ Breyer, *supra* note [], at 20; Bowman, *Pour Encourger*, *supra* note [], at 385.

²⁷⁵ See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, Ch. 1, Pt. A, at p. 3; Hofer, et al., *supra* note [] at 20.

legal system seeks not only to treat different cases differently but also to treat like cases alike.”²⁷⁶ And for white collar sentences, disparity is on the rise. Non-governmental sponsored below guidelines range sentences in fraud cases, which include white collar offenses,²⁷⁷ rose from 6.2 percent prior to *Booker*, to 16.4 percent after *Booker*, and now sits at 22.6 percent.²⁷⁸ The limited data available focusing specifically on white collar offenders indicates that non-government sponsored below range sentences currently top 25 percent.²⁷⁹ This trend appears to be even more pronounced for high loss economic crimes, such as those committed by Gupta, Madoff, and Stanford. Whether these increases in variance rates are warranted or not depends on one’s point of view, but providing judges another tool to vary from the guidelines will likely decrease overall sentencing uniformity.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁶ *Pepper*, 131 S. Ct. at 1252 (Breyer, J., concurring).

²⁷⁷ The Sentencing Commission does not consistently break out statistics for white collar offenses; the fraud offense category includes white collar crimes, as well as other forms of economic crimes sentenced under §2B1.1.

²⁷⁸ See Prepared Testimony of Judge Patti B. Saris Chair, United States Sentencing Commission, before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives at 47 (Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Testimony/20111012_Saris_Testimony.pdf; 2011 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing, United States Sentencing Commission, at 78 (2011). The numbers are even higher when focusing on offenders sentenced under the specific fraud guideline, §2B1.1, which would include the vast majority of white collar offenders. In fiscal year 2011, 23.9 percent of §2B1.1 offenders received a non-government sponsored below range sentence. *Id.* at 79. Non-governmental sponsored below range sentences are the best measure of whether the guidelines are being followed by sentencing courts because they represent “pure” judicial discretion.

²⁷⁹ See *White Collar Sentencing Data*, *supra* note [], at 128.

²⁸⁰ Rising variance rates could be tempered by formalizing neutralization inquiries and making the evaluation of neutralizations part of the guidelines themselves. Neutralizations could be taken into account by amending the text of the fraud guideline or its application notes, or by adding a policy statement addressing neutralizations. Some may argue,

One final consideration related to increased individualized sentencing is whether courts possess the institutional competency to accurately assess offender neutralizations. Most district court judges are not social scientists or criminologists. It could be argued that judges lacking criminological training are ill-equipped to investigate and accurately assess how offenders neutralize their conduct. While there is some intuitive appeal to this argument, sentencing judges routinely make assessments regarding defendants' backgrounds and mental processes, including delving into their motivations and justifications. The nature of some offenses requires it,²⁸¹ and section 3553(a) suggests such an inquiry is mandated in all cases. Not surprisingly, then, many judges see such inquiries as their "prime objective" at sentencing, using their considerable auto-didactical abilities to perform them effectively.²⁸² Even if individual judges do not possess special training in evaluating neutralizations, they are not acting alone during the sentencing process. Each judge is aided by a comprehensive presentence investigation report created by a probation officer who has special expertise in uncovering all relevant information about the offender and the offense.²⁸³ This is not to mention the role of the prosecutor and defense attorney, whose obligation it is to educate the court,

however, that this simply hides sentencing disparity; offenders are still being sentenced in a less uniform manner, but the disparity is now sanctioned by the guidelines.

²⁸¹ See Hessick, *supra* note [], at 96-97.

²⁸² Irving R. Kaufman, *Sentencing: The Judge's Problem*, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1960, at 3, available at

<http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/flashbks/death/kaufman.htm>.

²⁸³ See note [around 21], *supra*.

possibly through expert testimony, as to all sentencing aggravators and mitigators, including offender neutralizations.²⁸⁴

However, a nagging question related to judicial competency in assessing neutralizations remains: are judges able to determine whether a defendant's justifications of his conduct occurred prior to the criminal act, making it a neutralization, or after-the-fact, rendering it an excuse? This question is particularly vexing because many social scientists have raised the same query.²⁸⁵ If the criminologists cannot figure it out, how can judges?

Fortunately, neither must. As explained by criminologists Shadd Maruna and Heith Copes, even if white collar offenders commit criminal acts "in the absence of definitions favorable to them" (*i.e.*, without using verbalizations that minimize moral guilt), those definitions "get applied retroactively to excuse or redefine the initial deviant acts. To the extent that they successfully mitigate others' or self-punishment, they become discriminative for repetition of the deviant acts and, hence, precede the future commission of the acts."²⁸⁶ In other words, neutralizations might start off as after-the-fact rationalizations, but they become the rationale for facilitating future offending.²⁸⁷ Because almost no white collar offenses are truly singular acts, there is little concern that a defendant may be employing an

²⁸⁴ The adversarial process, which is still very active during sentencing, should guard against defendants raising neutralizations as a way to game sentencings to get a lower punishment. The validity of a defendant's claimed pre-act mental process may be tested by the usual evidence—witness testimony, affidavits, etc.

²⁸⁵ See Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 271 (calling this the "lingering 'chicken-or-the-egg' debate").

²⁸⁶ Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 271 (quoting RONALD L. AKERS, *DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH* 60 (3d ed. 1985)).

²⁸⁷ Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 271.

after-the-fact rationalization as an excuse that did not somehow neutralize his course of criminal conduct.

2. *Disrupting the mechanisms that make white collar crime possible*

In addition to increased individualized sentencing, judicial inquiry into offender neutralizations also has the benefit of disrupting the mechanisms that make white collar crime possible. How this may occur, however, is a bit counterintuitive.

In one view, all neutralizations are negative because they are the mechanism by which individuals commit white collar crime. According to Cressey, without neutralizations, there is no white collar crime.²⁸⁸ Therefore, it may seem that regardless of what the law allows, sentencing judges should not be inquiring into or evaluating neutralizations because that would only perpetuate their existence, thereby perpetuating the very offenses judges are punishing.²⁸⁹ Under this view, any consideration by a court of crediting an offender's neutralization as a sentencing mitigator (as occurred in the Gupta and Madoff cases) should be strictly prohibited.

Although this view has the benefit of definiteness, it is myopic.

Neutralizations originate from many different sources, not just the legal system or sentencing hearings. In fact, neutralization theory posits that offenders learn the verbalizations they use to neutralize criminal conduct from a number of sources.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁸ See Cressey, *The Respectable Criminal*, *supra* note [], at 15 ("It follows from my generalization that embezzling can be effectively blocked at the . . . verbalization point.").

²⁸⁹ Indeed, Sykes and Matza believed the legal system itself provided many of the neutralizations offenders used to facilitate their delinquency. See Sykes, et al., *supra* note [], at 666; Matza, *supra* note [], at 61 ("[t]he law contains the seeds of its own neutralization").

²⁹⁰ See Lanier, et al., *supra* note [], at 169-70; Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind*, *supra* note [], at 588.

While these sources may include the legal system generally and judicial sentencing determinations specifically, they also include the corporate and organizational environments in which offenders work and live—a more direct (and likely) source of learned neutralizations.²⁹¹ Therefore, a blanket prohibition on judges inquiring into neutralizations would not eliminate the mechanisms that make white collar crime possible.²⁹²

A better approach allows judges to inquire into defendants' motivations and justifications, confront the neutralization techniques employed, and credit or reject those neutralizations as part of the court's discretionary sentencing process. For one, this approach conforms to what is likely widespread practice among judges. If the Gupta, Madoff, and Stanford cases are any indicator, judges are already engaged in neutralization inquiries. This approach also has the benefit of not sacrificing the positives of increased individualized sentencing, especially considering how little we actually know about neutralizations. If it is true that not all neutralizations are uniformly bad, it may be that the goals of sentencing are best furthered by crediting benign neutralizations even at the risk of marginally enabling some white collar crime. Allowing, and even encouraging, neutralization inquiries lets judges practice

²⁹¹ See Benson, *Denying the Guilty Mind*, *supra* note [], at 588 (explaining how neutralization techniques vary across white collar offense types).

²⁹² It could be argued that judges, as part of their sentencing determinations, should be required to identify white collar neutralizations and then reject them, possibly even treating any raised by a defendant as a sentencing aggravator. The idea being that this practice would lessen the effectiveness of neutralizations because judges would be directly rejecting their validity. The problem with this approach is that it would still not capture neutralizations learned from other sources outside of the legal or sentencing context, and it would likely drive neutralizations underground. No defendant would offer a justification for fear of it being used as an aggravator. Neutralizations would continue to enable white collar crime; they would simply be more difficult to identify.

individualized sentencing, yet still reject “toxic” neutralizations. This balanced approach stays true to the normative underpinnings of *Pepper*, while providing courts with an opportunity to disrupt the mechanisms that make at least some white collar crime possible.

Regardless of where the line is drawn between encouraging some neutralizations (potentially leading to more crime but increasing individualized sentencing) and discouraging others, judicial inquiry into the neutralizations defendants employ must be transparent. Sentencing transparency was one of the twin goals of the Sentencing Reform Act, and it is no less important today.²⁹³ As evidenced by the Gupta, Madoff, and Stanford cases, some courts’ sentencing determinations are being influenced by offender neutralizations. But precisely what inquiries are being made, under what circumstances, and to which defendants is unclear. Nor is it clear how much judges truly understand about the role of neutralizations in the etiology of white collar crime. In order for judges to make effective sentencing inquiries and properly credit or reject defendants’ neutralizations, judges must be better educated as to the cause of white collar crime. At the same time, in order for sentencing policy makers to evaluate the effectiveness of these inquiries and how they affect federal sentencing as a whole, judges must memorialize their sentencing determinations, including their search for the “why” of white collar crime.

²⁹³ See Stith et al., *supra* note [], 38-77; SENTENCING GUIDELINES, *supra* note [], at Ch. 1, Pt. A, at p. 3.

CONCLUSION

“When you ask people why they commit crime, they make sounds. I call them verbalizations. These are data. You study them.”²⁹⁴ This is how Donald Cressey, the pioneering white collar criminologist, described his research into what would become known as offender neutralizations, the psychological justifications white collar defendants employ to free themselves from social norms and engage in criminal behavior. Cressey spent his career searching for the “why” of white collar crime, trying to understand what caused good people to commit terrible breaches of trust.

As the cases of Rajat Gupta, Peter Madoff, and Allen Stanford demonstrate, judges are also engaging in this inquiry, and it is having an impact at sentencing. This article set out to explore this previously unexamined aspect of white collar sentencing, primarily through the criminological theory of neutralizations, which is particularly compelling in describing the etiology of white collar crime. The sentencings of Gupta, Madoff, and Stanford highlight how defendants may justify their conduct through eight different neutralization techniques specific to white collar offenders, and how judges credit some of those neutralizations as sentencing mitigators while rejecting others. Although judicial inquiry into offender neutralizations raises legitimate concerns regarding increased sentencing disparity and institutional competence, on the whole neutralization inquiries are beneficial. When undertaken in a transparent manner by judges educated about the role of

²⁹⁴ Maruna, et al., *supra* note [], at 222 (quoting *Interview with Edwin M. Lemert, in CRIMINOLOGY IN THE MAKING: AN ORAL HISTORY* 139 (John H. Laub, ed. 1983)).

neutralizations in white collar cases, these inquiries can increase individualized sentencing and potentially disrupt the mechanisms that cause some white collar crimes. Because neutralization inquiries are legally and normatively justified, they should become a larger part of the white collar sentencing discussion.